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No exegesis or act of interpretation is presuppositionless. Accordingly, this study 
addresses the question of the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the 
interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. Chapter 1 provides a brief 
introduction to why such analysis is necessary. The chapter explores the neglected issue 
of presuppositions in exegesis and why Exodus is an appropriate platform upon which to 
evaluate them. This introductory chapter also presents the purpose and methodological 
approach of this study, namely, the descriptive analysis of the text. Chapter 2 addresses 
the philosophical issues behind the conception of the God-human relation, namely the 
notion of ontology (God), the notion of epistemology (human), and the notion of history 
(relationship). Chapter 3 identifies these philosophical conceptions in the foundation of 
two interpretative traditions: the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods. 
Chapter 4 traces the influence of these presuppositions within the interpretation of 
Exodus in general, and in the context of the notion of the God-human relation in 
particular. The dissertation concludes by summarizing the findings and conclusions and 

















A STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL  
PRESUPPOSITIONS RELATING TO THE NOTION  
OF THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION UPON  






Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
 
of the Requirements for the Degree  
 
























© Copyright by Tiago Arrais 





A STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL  
PRESUPPOSITIONS RELATING TO THE NOTION  
OF THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION UPON  






presented in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 




















____________________________________           ______________________________ 




















To the God of the Exodus. 
 
To my wife, Paula, and the son of my pain and virtue, Benjamin. 
 
To my parents, Jonas and Raquel. 
 
























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 




    1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
 
Background of the Question ........................................................................ 1 
The Question of Presuppositions ....................................................... 4 
The Question of Exodus ................................................................. 10 
The Question ............................................................................................ 13 
The Purpose.............................................................................................. 14 
The Approach to the Study ........................................................................ 14 
The Approach to the Text ......................................................................... 16 
Identify and Suspend ...................................................................... 19 
Look and See ................................................................................. 21 
Presuppositions and Text ................................................................ 23 
 
    2. THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN PRESUPPOSITIONAL 
        FRAMEWORKS ......................................................................................... 25 
 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 25 
The Principle of Epistemology ................................................................... 26 
Introduction ................................................................................... 26 
Objectivist Epistemology ................................................................ 31 
The Subject in Objectivist Epistemology ............................... 31 
The Object in Objectivist Epistemology ................................ 35 
Subjectivist Epistemology ............................................................... 37 
The Subject in Subjectivist Epistemology .............................. 37 
The Object in Subjectivist Epistemology ............................... 42 
Summary ....................................................................................... 45 
The Principle of Ontology ......................................................................... 45 
Introduction ................................................................................... 45 
The Conception of Being: Timelessness and Temporality in 
Interpretation ................................................................................. 47 
Introduction ........................................................................ 47 
Being as Timeless in Interpretation ....................................... 48 
Being as Temporal in Interpretation ..................................... 56 
Onto-Theology in Interpretation .......................................... 64 
 
v 
God/God-Acts in Interpretation ..................................................... 67 
Introduction ........................................................................ 67 
Summary ....................................................................................... 87 
The Principle of History ............................................................................ 88 
Introduction ................................................................................... 88 
From Text to History ..................................................................... 94 
From History as Geschichte to History as Wissenschaft ....................... 98 
From History as Wissenschaft to History as Historiography .............. 100 
History, Presuppositions, and Biblical Interpretation ...................... 104 
Summary ...................................................................................... 105 
Summary ................................................................................................. 106 
 
    3. THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN INTERPRETATIVE 
        TRADITIONS ............................................................................................ 108 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 108 
The Historical-Grammatical Method ........................................................ 110 
Introduction .................................................................................. 110 
The Principle of History ................................................................ 112 
From History to Text .......................................................... 112 
From Text to History .......................................................... 115 
Historical-Grammatical Structure of Meaning ..................... 119 
Figuration, Typology, and Time ......................................... 126 
Verba, Res, Sensus: The Text and Truth ................................ 129 
Historical Criticism .................................................................................. 134 
Introduction .................................................................................. 134 
Spinoza ......................................................................................... 138 
Introduction ....................................................................... 138 
The Principle of Epistemology and Ontology ...................... 143 
Spinoza’s Structure of Meaning........................................... 147 
Wellhausen ................................................................................... 154 
Introduction ....................................................................... 154 
The Principle of History ...................................................... 156 
Summary ...................................................................................... 159 
 
    4. THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF  
        EXODUS ................................................................................................... 163 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 163 
Review of Literature ................................................................................ 164 
Two-Part Structures....................................................................... 167 
Three-Part Structures ..................................................................... 169 
Four-Part Structures ...................................................................... 169 
Multi-Part Structures ..................................................................... 170 
The Parallel-Panel Structure of Exodus: An Introduction .......................... 174 
The God-Human Relation in Exodus ....................................................... 179 
 
vi 
Section I: A and A’ (Exodus 1:1–2:15a and 14:1–15:21) ................. 180 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 180 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 185 
Section II: B and B’ (Exodus 2:15b-25 and 15:22–18:27) ................. 195 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 195 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 198 
Section III: C and C’ (Exodus 3:11–4:31 and 19–24:11) .................. 206 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 206 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 209 
Section IV: D and D’ (Exodus 5–7:2a and 24:12–32:30) ................. 220 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 220 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 223 
Section V: E and E’ (Exodus 7:2-13 and 24:12–32:31–36:7) ............ 233 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 233 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 236 
Section VI: F and F’ (Exodus 7:14–12:32 and 36:8–40:33) .............. 240 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 240 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 244 
Section VII: G and G’ (Exodus 12:32–13 and 36:8–40:34-38) ......... 249 
Textual Notes ..................................................................... 249 
God-Human Relation Notes ............................................... 250 
Summary ................................................................................................. 253 
 
5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 256 
 
The God-Human Relation as Presuppositions ........................................... 257 
Epistemology ................................................................................ 257 
Ontology ....................................................................................... 258 
History .......................................................................................... 259 
Presuppositions in Interpretative Traditions .............................................. 260 
The Historical-Grammatical Method ............................................. 260 
The Historical-Critical Method ...................................................... 261 
Presuppositions in the Interpretation of Exodus ........................................ 262 
The Relation between Genesis and Exodus .................................... 263 
The Relation between Hebrew Faith and History ........................... 264 
Divine Action: Egypt and Wilderness ............................................ 264 
Israel’s Rebellion: Wilderness ........................................................ 265 
Sinai and Law ............................................................................... 266 
Sinai and Revelation ..................................................................... 266 
Sacred Space ................................................................................. 267 
Divine Presence: God and Moses on the Mountain ........................ 268 
Divine Action: Plagues and Passover ............................................. 268 
Divine Presence: Cloud and Fire.................................................... 269 
Implications for Scholarship and Life ....................................................... 270 
 








LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. Seven sections of Exodus ................................................................................ 176 
2. A and A’ textual notes..................................................................................... 181 
3. B and B’ textual notes ..................................................................................... 196 
4. C and C’ textual notes ..................................................................................... 207 
5. D and D’ textual notes .................................................................................... 220 
6. Translations of 231 .......................................................................................... ׁשכן 
7. E and E’ textual notes ..................................................................................... 234 
8. F and F’ textual notes ...................................................................................... 241 
9. G and G’ textual notes .................................................................................... 249 
10. Effects of extrabiblical assumptions on interpretations of the God-human 












“My charming reader, in this [study] you will find something that you perhaps 
should not know, something else from which you will presumably benefit by coming 
to know it. Read, then, the something in such a way that, having read it, you may be 
as one who has not read it; read the something else in such a way that, having read 
it, you may be as one who has not forgotten what has been read.” 
 
















Background of the Question1 
 
 This study attempts to trace the influence of macro-hermeneutical2 or 
philosophical presuppositions3 relating to the God-human relation4—found within 
                                                 
 
1 This section introduces the reader to the issues that lead up to the research 
question this study will address. It provides a taste of what is to come throughout this 
study. At this stage, the reader is invited to exercise the virtue of patience.  
2 Fernando L. Canale, borrowing the language of Hans Hüng, emphasizes the 
significance and influence of philosophical presuppositions upon biblical 
interpretation and systematic theology in terms of “macro-hermeneutics.” Canale 
writes: “Macro hermeneutics is related to the study and clarification of philosophical 
issues directly or indirectly related to the criticism and formulation of concrete 
heuristic principles of interpretation. Meso hermeneutics deals with the interpretation 
of theological issues and, therefore, belongs properly to the area of systematic 
theology. Micro hermeneutics approaches the interpretation of texts and, 
consequently, proceeds within the realm of biblical exegesis.” In Fernando L. 
Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical Understanding 
of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology,” Journal of the Adventist 
Theological Society 12, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 21. This study is grounded on the macro-
hermeneutical level. It aims to uncover, critique, and clarify the principles that 
function as presuppositions in the macro-hermeneutical framework of biblical 
scholars and theologians. A more familiar way of explaining these terms may be to 
understand macro-hermeneutical questions as philosophical questions, meso-
hermeneutical questions as doctrinal/theological questions, and micro-hermeneutical 
questions as exegetical questions.  
3 Presuppositions in this study is a term that will be used interchangeably with 




the presuppositional frameworks5 of biblical scholars and interpretative methods—
                                                 
 
interpreted notions. As the expression already suggests, presuppositions are “previous 
suppositions.” The term presupposition may include a wide variety of intended (or 
interpreted notions) and unintended (feelings, experiences, memories) elements. 
Even so, the use of the term presupposition in this study will carry the connotation of 
“interpreted” or intended philosophical conceptions that include notions of God, 
humans, history, etc.  
4 The God-human relationship in this study refers to how God relates to 
humanity through presence, revelation, speech, theophany; as for the human aspect, 
the conditions that allow humans to understand and interpret such dynamic in the 
context and flow of history. Thus the macro-hermeneutical (philosophical) notion of 
the God-human relationship carries basic philosophical categories to be interpreted, 
namely ontology (questions of Being, God, and the conditions of God’s actions), 
epistemology (questions of how humans can know and interpret reality), and history 
(questions concerning the locus or context where the interaction between God and 
humans takes place). This study will trace how extrabiblical conceptions of the God-
human relation within the presuppositional frameworks of scholars and methods 
shape the interpretation of the God-human relation the text presents in itself. 
5 By presuppositional framework, I mean the categories in the mind of an 
interpreter that carry intended and unintended conceptions. These categories include 
conceptions of God, humans, the world, history, etc. The reader could think of this 
in the following way: human beings carry, among many other things, “philosophical 
buckets” in their minds. These “buckets” relate to the general way in which 
humanity perceives broad philosophical notions such as the understanding of God 
(as a reality or non-reality), the world, humans, history, etc. These are basic, general 
notions, present within the worldview or philosophical framework of any human 
being. Biblical interpreters normally have an intentional interpretation of these 
categories even before biblical interpretation takes place. So, when interpretation 
begins, the categories or “buckets” of God, humans, the world, and history within 
the human mind are already filled with pre-established notions derived from different 
sources (philosophy, natural philosophy, science, tradition, the Bible, etc.). These 
notions are hypothetical in nature, that is, open to the choice of the individual 
interpreter. Perhaps a better term to describe this presuppositional framework would 
be worldview, or historical point of view of the interpreter. Even so, it is my hope that the 
reader becomes familiar with the expression presuppositional framework. Furthermore, 
the reader must be aware that presuppositional frameworks carry more than 
“interpreted” notions that fill the “philosophical buckets” of the mind. 
Presuppositional frameworks also carry personal experiences, feelings, memories, 
etc.: that is, elements that are beyond the awareness of the interpreter and might still 




upon the interpretation of Exodus. The notion of how God relates to humans may be 
the most basic macro-hermeneutical (philosophical) conception in the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars.6 This study will attempt to show 
how an extrabiblical7 interpretation of God’s relationship to humans can determine 
the parameters of biblical interpretation in general, and the interpretation of Exodus 
in particular.  
 This introductory section raises two preliminary questions to demonstrate the 
value and necessity of this study, as well as the one question it will directly address.8 
First, is an analysis of the presuppositions of biblical scholars and their effects upon 
biblical interpretation necessary? Second, is the book of Exodus the best text to 
                                                 
 
of this study, since the focus will be on the notions that are interpreted before biblical 
interpretation takes place. In sum, any interpreter has a presuppositional framework 
that carries intended and unintended presuppositions. This study will focus on the 
intended interpretation of how God relates to humanity that functions as a 
presupposition in the process of biblical interpretation. 
6 The thesis of this study is that the broadest conceptions and assumptions 
that influence biblical interpretation follow the God-human relationship pattern. 
Certainly there are other assumptions that influence biblical interpretation, but I 
chose the God-human relationship framework because of its scope. Many 
assumptions not listed in this framework can still be traced back to these basic 
categories. 
7 By extrabiblical I mean that the scholarly understanding of the God-human 
relation is not always based on conceptual pointers emerging from the biblical text. 
The first chapter will clarify these issues and how they are generally interpreted 
before the interpretation of the text begins.  
8 Although there are many questions in this introductory section, they may 
not all find proper answers in this study. Sometimes the best answer to a question is a 
better question. To answer is to conclude; to answer with a question is to move 
forward, opening new paths of study. These two preliminary questions prepare the 
reader to understand the research question, in the hope that by the end of this study 
the reader finds not an answer, but an even better question.  
 
4 
engage, compare, and contrast the interpreted notion of how God relates to humans 
within the presuppositional framework of biblical scholars and methods? To the first 
question I now turn. 
 
The Question of Presuppositions 
 
 Biblical exegetes and theologians have long recognized that the clarification 
of presuppositions is not only necessary but imperative.9 Gerhard Maier addresses 
the interpretative imperative of clarifying presuppositions: “It is precisely our 
presuppositions that the Bible wants to place in question, correct, and to some extent 
obliterate.”10 Yet in order for a possible “obliteration” of presuppositions to occur, 
                                                 
 
9 Virtually all contemporary books on hermeneutics deal at least briefly with 
the issue of presuppositions. Even so, a few examples of scholars who observe the 
influence of presuppositions upon biblical interpretation are in order: Rudolf 
Bultmann and Schubert M. Ogden, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic 
Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 145–53; Richard S. Hess and Gordon J. 
Wenham, Make the Old Testament Live: From Curriculum to Classroom (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 72–73; Andrew E. Hill and John H. Walton, A Survey of the 
Old Testament, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 24; Grant R. Osborne, 
The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2006), 407, 516–17; Gerhard Maier, Biblical 
Hermeneutics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), 16; Jeannine K. Brown, Scripture as 
Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2007), 121–24; Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 13–16. 
10 Maier, Biblical Hermeneutics, 25. One of the questions this study raises is: can 
the philosophical perspective of the authors of the biblical text shape in any way the 
philosophical presuppositions of the biblical interpreter? If so, how? It is important 
to, first, assess the assumptions brought into interpretation by biblical interpreters, 
and second, compare and contrast them to the perspective of the biblical authors 
concerning the same assumptions. This study focuses on the first step: assessing the 
philosophical assumptions that shape interpretation. Another example of this 
sensitivity toward the text and need to revise assumptions is found in Alister E. 




the interpreter must have a grasp of which presuppositions influence the 
interpretation of the text.11  
 Scholars who see the need to allow the text to deconstruct the presuppositions 
within their presuppositional framework suggest that a conscious “bracketing out”12 
is necessary. For instance, Grant R. Osborne writes: 
The problem is that our preunderstanding too easily becomes prejudice, a set of a 
prioris that place a grid over Scripture and make it conform to these preconceived 
conceptions. So we need to “bracket” these ideas to a degree and allow the text to 
deepen or at times challenge and even change those already established ideas.13 
                                                 
 
to revise, even to abandon, such prior ideas of God and to refashion them in the light 
of who and what Jesus of Nazareth is recognized to be.” See Alister E. McGrath, 
The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 175.  
11 The need for allowing the text to judge presuppositions has been recognized 
by several scholars. I strongly agree with Thiselton that “texts must translate us 
before we can translate them.” See Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 8. Furthermore, John 
Walton, commenting on the literary structure of Leviticus, writes: “Interpreters have 
found it difficult to identify a cohesive structure to the book. One possible 
explanation may be that we have been deterred by presuppositions.” See John H. 
Walton, “Equilibrium and the Sacred Compass: The Structure of Leviticus,” Bulletin 
for Biblical Research 11, no. 2 (2001): 293. The issue of presuppositions, although 
commonly recognized in biblical interpretation, is commonly set aside due to the 
philosophical nature of the discussion. In the study of Ancient Near Eastern 
(henceforth, ANE) texts, the natural tendency is to focus on the objective meaning of 
the text and its historical context. Yet, as Walton describes above, the issue of 
presuppositions cannot be ignored at the level of biblical interpretation, since they 
inevitably affect the interpretation of the text. 
12 The action of “bracketing out” presuppositions does not imply the 
possibility of arriving at the text with suspended presuppositions or biases, but it does 
imply that one is able to recognize and critique the presuppositions that influence 
one’s own interpretation of the biblical text. The value of such an approach is not in 
the naïve belief that presuppositions can be fully suspended, but in the interpreter’s 
awareness of that which influences his perspective of, and approach to, the biblical 
text. 




Walter Brueggemann also speaks of “bracketing out” as he writes: 
By using the word history I mean simply the concrete interactions among persons, 
communities, and states which partake of hurt and healing. Thus I mean to 
bracket out the issues evoked by modern understandings, e. g., the problematic of 
Geschichte and Historie.14 
 
Yet the way scholars commonly “bracket out” assumptions lacks methodological 
clarity. Why are some assumptions bracketed out and not others? Failure to 
methodologically verify how intentional presuppositions are inserted or bracketed 
out in interpretation may lead to a lack of clarity between what the text says and 
what the presuppositions of the interpreter shape the text to say.15  
 Walter C. Kaiser observes that in the history of Old Testament theology, “the 
imposition of theological conceptuality and even theological categories derived from 
                                                 
 
14 Walter Brueggemann, Hope within History (Atlanta: John Knox, 1987), 2. 
15 Knowing the crucial role played by presuppositions within the interpreter’s 
presuppositional framework, for exegesis to be, to some extent, consistent 
methodologically, it cannot rely only on results. Brevard Childs writes, “Whether or 
not the exegesis is successful cannot be judged on its theory of interpretation, but on 
the actual interpretation itself.” Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, 
Theological Commentary, Old Testament Library (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), 
xiii. The question I would raise in return is: how and through which terms will the 
interpreter know that the “actual interpretation” is close to the meaning of the text? 
It seems to me that distancing methodological concerns from the actual praxis of 
exegesis does not solve the dilemma, but only strengthens it. Kevin J. Vanhoozer is 
right in seeing the interrelation between questions of God, Scripture, and 
hermeneutics in theological thinking and practice, and the need to treat them “as one 
problem.” See Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture, & Hermeneutics 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 9. This study only affirms the concern of 
treating these three questions as one. 
 
7 
systematic or philosophical theology became common.”16 These impositions, though 
sometimes elusive and unnoticed in scholarly writings, have become so common that 
no one is able to know “how or by which process”17 they are implemented, especially 
since they are established a priori.18 
 The postmodern context of biblical interpretation enhances the necessity of 
exposing and justifying the interpreted notions within one’s presuppositional 
framework. Dan R. Stiver writes: “In a time of transition in philosophy and in a time 
of flux in theology, being clear about one’s epistemological commitments and 
presuppositions continues to be desirable.”19   
 The present study is not only a response to this desire, but an expansion of it. 
Awareness of the interpretative biases present in biblical interpretation is important, 
                                                 
 
16 Walter C. Kaiser Jr., Toward an Old Testament Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1978), 6. At least one initial example of this problem in Old Testament 
theology is in order. Samuel Terrien in The Elusive Presence uses anthropological and 
sociological insights to evaluate the biblical text. Inevitably, the outcome of his entire 
biblical theology is conditioned by the set of paradigms he chooses. Remarks such as 
“The theology of presence is the anthropology of communion” and “[The 
resurrection] does not evoke the thought of Jesus redivivus, a mortal brought back for 
a season of mortal existence, but it sings the exaltatio of authentic humanity” prove 
this to be true. See Samuel L. Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical 
Theology, Religious Perspectives 26 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 462. 
17 Kaiser, Old Testament Theology, 6. 
18 A priori means an interpretative commitment established before 
interpretation itself. The challenge of this study is to trace the influence of these basic 
assumptions relating to the notion of the God-human relationship upon biblical 
interpretation. 
19 Dan R. Stiver, “Theological Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 175. 
 
8 
and so is understanding their philosophical roots and their influence upon the 
interpretation of the biblical text. Moshe Greenberg writes: 
A translation of and commentary on a biblical text should bridge the gap that 
separates the present-day reader—with his culture and tradition bound range of 
knowledge, assumptions, and conventions—from the ancient Israelite, who 
encountered the text with different knowledge, assumptions, and conventions 
conditioned by circumstances.20 
 
Concerning the book of Exodus itself, Brevard Childs understands that the “author 
does not share the same hermeneutical position of those who suggest that biblical 
exegesis is an objective, descriptive enterprise, controlled solely by scientific 
criticism.”21 This study is another attempt to help bridge the interpretative gap. And, 
as this study will attest, perhaps one of the most forgotten aspects of the 
interpretative gap is the relation of the philosophical assumptions within the 
presuppositional frameworks of interpreters to the philosophical assumptions of the 
authors and readers of the text themselves expressed in the text. 
 At least one introductory and representative example of how presuppositions 
affect the interpretation of the text can be found in the recent work of John W. 
Walton. Walton begins his treatise on the lost world of Genesis by affirming that his 
interpretation attempts to be “faithful to the context of the original audience and 
author, and one that preserves and enhances the theological vitality of the text.”22 
                                                 
 
20 Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), 18. 
21 Childs, Book of Exodus, xiii. 
22 John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the 
Origins Debate (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 7. 
 
9 
Yet macro-hermeneutical commitments established a priori lead Walton to write, 
later in the same volume, that “what science provides is the best explanation of the 
data at the time,”23 and furthermore, that such a perspective is accepted within 
evangelical circles “by consensus, and often with few detractors.”24 For Walton and 
others, science is the source and key to understanding the reality the biblical text is 
attempting to depict.25 Consequently, the implicit philosophical conceptions of the 
biblical author within the biblical text are divested of their value by scientific 
philosophical presuppositions established a priori. 
 The starting point, then, for a proper interpretative approach that is sensitive 
to the issues above, is to identify the interpreted notions within the presuppositional 
frameworks of biblical interpreters and methods and to trace their influence upon the 
interpretation of the biblical text. 
 One question remains to clarify the background of this study: why choose the 
                                                 
 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid. 
25 At least one simple implication of this position is that supernatural 
revelation, a common feature in the Hebrew Bible, is immediately dismissed by 
scientific methodology. Jack Bonsor writes: “Supernatural revelation is excluded a 
priori from scientific debate. The scientific method excludes revelation as data. This 
exclusion is intrinsic to the scientific method and, thereby, occurs prior to (a priori) 
any particular investigation.” See Jack Arthur Bonsor, Athens and Jerusalem: The Role 
of Philosophy in Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 179. In other words, 
Walton’s reliance on scientific methodology in his depiction of Gen 1 eliminates, a 
priori, a basic feature of biblical theology—the possibility and reality of divine 
revelation. Can the biblical text challenge such an approach along with its 
conclusions? The challenge of this study is to allow the assumptions of the 
author/audience to shape the macro-hermeneutical or philosophical assumptions 




book of Exodus to engage the assumptions within the presuppositional frameworks 
of biblical scholars? To this question I now turn.  
 
The Question of Exodus 
 
 Langdon B. Gilkey understands that the clash between modern assumptions 
and the orthodox nature of the text itself—which includes supernatural activities and 
speeches—demands a threefold reinterpretation of the biblical narratives.26 Gilkey 
describes this reinterpretation in the following way: 
First, the divine activity called the “mighty deeds of God” is now restricted to 
one crucial event, the Exodus-covenant complex of occurrence. Whatever else 
God may not have done, we say, here he really acted in the history of the Hebrew 
people, and so here their faith was born and given its form. Second, the vast 
panoply of wonder and voice events that preceded the Exodus-covenant event, in 
effect the patriarchal narratives, are now taken to be Hebrew interpretations of 
their own historical past based on the faith gained at the Exodus. . . . Third, the 
biblical accounts of the post-Exodus life—for example, the proclamation and 
codification of the law, the conquest, and the prophetic movement—are 
understood as the covenant people’s interpretation through their Exodus faith of 
their continuing life and history.27 
 
 Gilkey presents biblical interpreters with a sober reminder of the inherent 
paradoxes created by the intermix of modern assumptions and the biblical text, with 
the significance of the book of Exodus in the midst of the problem. According to 
Gilkey, the validity and significance of the Hebrew Bible hinge upon the reality 
depicted in the book of Exodus.28 The way in which one understands the God-
                                                 
 
26 Langdon B. Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical 
Language,” Journal of Religion 41, no. 3 (July 1961): 194–205. 
27 Ibid., 197. 
28 Even for Baruch Spinoza, the event at Sinai represents “the only instance of 




human relationship in the book of Exodus, to some extent, determines both the 
nature of the Hebrew Bible and how it should be interpreted. Because of this, Exodus 
seems like an appropriate and natural choice for this study.29 
 Another question that might arise about the use of Exodus in this study 
relates to the possibility that the text lends itself to a possible evaluation of scholarly 
assumptions. In regards to this, some considerations are in order: (1) although the 
text is not explicitly laid out with the intent of providing a scientific or philosophical 
depiction of reality, and (2) reading the book of Exodus with the assumption that it is 
found in its final form,30 the author of the book of Exodus has an implicit outlook on 
how God relates to humans in the context of history throughout the book. This 
philosophical outlook is in the background of the writing.31 
                                                 
 
Theologico-Politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 61. Furthermore, he 
adds: “So it would be more in conformity with Scripture that God did really create a 
voice by which he revealed the Decalogue.” Ibid., 62. 
29 There are other reasons for choosing the book of Exodus to engage the 
assumptions of biblical interpreters; among these is the idea of Exodus as a resource 
for methodological development. Some see that the “book of Exodus has been and 
continues to be a significant resource for the development of biblical methodologies 
in the Modern and Postmodern periods.” See Thomas B. Dozeman, Methods for 
Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2. 
30 The question of authorship and unity will be properly dealt with in the 
subsequent chapters. 
31 Recently, this new field of study—the uncovering of the philosophical 
outlook of the Hebrew Bible—has been developed with fruitful results. A few 
significant works that motivated the formulation of the present study are: Yoram 
Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Jaco Gericke, The Hebrew Bible and Philosophy of Religion (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2012); Dru Johnson, Biblical Knowing: A Scriptural Epistemology of 
Error (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2013). Hazony, for example, also sees the problem of 




In the first chapters of Exodus, this implicit perspective can be noticed in texts 
that express God’s relation to humanity as well as humanity’s ability to interact with 
and know God.32 Texts like Exod 1:21, “Because the midwives feared God, He 
established households for them,”33 or Exod 2:25, “God saw the sons of Israel and 
God took notice of them,” express the divine ability to see and react to human 
suffering within the flow of history. Texts like Exod 3:6, “Moses hid his face, for he 
was afraid to look at God,” attest to the possibility that humanity can hear and 
respond to God’s revelation. In this sense, within the description of the narrative and 
its events, the biblical text gives some indications of how the author and readers at 
the time of its composition understood the dynamic of how God relates to humans. 
 In sum, the need for this study co-appears with: (1) the need for 
presuppositions to be understood and laid out in biblical interpretation; (2) the need 
for the interpretative gap between contemporary interpreter and author/audience to 
be bridged; and (3) the need for the biblical text to validate or critique assumptions 
                                                 
 
why theologians fail to assess this is because of “alien interpretative framework[s] 
that prevents us from seeing much of what is in these texts,” and adds: “the Hebrew 
Scriptures can be read as works of philosophy, with an eye to discovering what they 
have to say as part of the broader discourse concerning the nature of the world and 
the just life of man.” See Hazony, Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 3, 4. The present 
study is aimed at expanding this initiative to take the content of the Hebrew 
Scriptures seriously since its authors also develop in their writings a solid 
philosophical viewpoint, in the case of this study, of the manner in which God 
relates to humanity.  
32 These are introductory examples given without any analysis, as they are, in 
the text. Later in this study I will provide an overview of how the book of Exodus 
expresses the dynamic of the God-human relationship.  
33All Bible quotations are taken from the New American Standard Version 
unless noted.  
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interpreters, including myself, bring into the process of interpretation. If a 
philosophical understanding of the God-human relation is founded on extrabiblical 
sources, this could create a problem in interpretation, especially if the text’s 
conception of the God-human relation differs from the assumptions scholars and 
methods carry by default.  
 This study, then, addresses a problem hidden in one research question, a 





 How do philosophical notions of the God-human relation within the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and interpretative methods 
influence the interpretation of the God-human relation in the book of Exodus?34 
 
 
                                                 
 
34 Note that I will evaluate the assumptions of interpreters based on not the 
assumptions of the author/audience, but the assumptions within the text. This is 
because the only access I have to the author or audience is found in the written 
words of the text. Although archaeology provides many windows into the past, my 
task as a biblical scholar is to find the meaning of the text within the text. I side with 
John Sailhamer in the assumption that through “language, modern readers can 
understand the thoughts of biblical authors who lived thousands of years ago in a 
culture very different from our own” and the “goal is always to understand what the 
author has written.” See John H. Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch: Revelation, 
Composition and Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 68. In regard 
to archaeology, I also side with Sailhamer in his “supplemental” position, 
recognizing that our “knowledge of ancient history supplements what we know of 
the events from the biblical narratives.” Ibid., 101. In this sense, the control of the 






 The present study has a threefold purpose: (1) to clarify presuppositions 
regarding the God-human relation and identify them within the presuppositional 
frameworks of biblical scholars and theologians; (2) to identify the presence of these 
same presuppositions within the most influential approaches to the book of Exodus,35 
that is, the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods; (3) to trace how 
these presuppositions influence the interpretation of the textual depiction of how 
God relates to humanity within the book of Exodus. 
 
The Approach to the Study 
 
 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation, its methodological 
approach is varied. Below is a brief outline of the steps to be taken in order to reach 
the goals of this study. 
                                                 
 
35 Some clarifications are in order concerning the methods to be analyzed. 
The third chapter of this study examines the philosophical underpinnings of the 
historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods. It seems appropriate to focus 
on these two methods, since they are used in the majority of commentaries on the 
book of Exodus. Although a reader-oriented approach is becoming more popular 
today, no major work has been produced using it exclusively. Thus, because the 
study of the book of Exodus so far has been guided by the historical-critical and 
historical-grammatical methods, this study will focus on the philosophical 
presuppositions inherent in them. Secondly, although both of these approaches have 
undergone significant changes over the years (the historical-critical method is no 
longer understood as a single approach, but is split into different critical tasks like 
form criticism, tradition criticism, “new” literary criticism, discourse analysis, etc.), 
the choice of these two approaches remains. The analysis here is not intended to 
deconstruct modern methods that influence the interpretation of Exodus in order to 
present a better interpretation: it is intended to show how interpretative methods are 
not exempt from the influence of philosophical presuppositions. Examining the roots 
of the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods (at the turn of the 
eighteenth century) seems like a fruitful place to start.  
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 The second chapter is aimed at clarifying and identifying the interpreted 
notion of how God relates to humans within the presuppositional frameworks of 
biblical scholars.36 The first task, then, is to focus on the interpreter: that is, on 
humanity’s ability to reason and know in the context of the God-human relation, 
and on the epistemological (how humans arrive at knowledge) context of 
interpretation. The second task is to introduce how scholars understand the notion of 
God in the God-human relation. The assumption of God touches on the issue of 
ontology, of Being, and on the possibility of God acting in the world. The third task 
relates to the locus or context of the relation between God and humanity: that is, the 
notion of history. Thus, the chapter clarifies three basic components of the God-
human relationship within the presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and 
theologians: the notion of human knowledge (epistemology); the notion of God 
(ontology); and the notion of relationship (history). 
 The third chapter is aimed at identifying the presence of philosophical notions 
relating to God (ontology), humanity (epistemology), and relationship (history) 
within two interpretative approaches to the text of Exodus: the historical-
grammatical method and the historical-critical method. Since each interpretative 
tradition inherently carries an interpretation of these categories, this chapter will 
show how each method assumes an interpretation of the God-human relationship. 
                                                 
 
36 For an introductory attempt to evaluate the influence of philosophy upon 
interpretation, see Craig G. Bartholomew, “Uncharted Waters: Philosophy, 
Theology and the Crisis in Biblical Interpretation,” in Renewing Biblical Interpretation, 
ed. Craig G. Bartholomew, Colin Greene, and Karl Möller, Scripture and 
Hermeneutics Series 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 1–39. 
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These two chapters, then, will not deal with the book of Exodus in particular, but 
with the presuppositions that influence both interpreters and interpretive traditions.37  
 The fourth chapter traces the influence of these assumptions on the 
interpretation of the book of Exodus, in the context of how the book itself presents its 
understanding of the God-human relation. The textual approach to the book of 
Exodus in this study is a matter that deserves separate attention, and is covered in the 
section below. 
 
The Approach to the Text 
 
 The fourth chapter of this study takes a phenomenological, or descriptive, 
approach to the text that I will simply call descriptive analysis.38 Even though the 
                                                 
 
37 Paying attention to these presuppositional and philosophical questions 
seems like an appropriate first step before one can provide a common-sense 
evaluation of the text. Ludwig Wittgenstein shares this same vision, since for him a 
“philosopher is a man who has to cure many intellectual diseases in himself before 
he can arrive at the notions of common sense.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and 
Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 44e. In this sense, Chapters 2 and 3 are aimed at 
identifying the disease (which can be considered a first step toward the cure), and 
Chapter 4 attempts to discover if the disease has spread out into the interpretation of 
the text itself.   
38 Phenomenology as a philosophical approach can be traced back to Husserl, 
Kant, and Hegel, yet the approach is not unified, since it is “neither a school nor a 
trend in contemporary philosophy” but “rather a movement whose proponents, for 
various reasons, have propelled it in many distinct directions, with the result that 
today it means different things to different people.” See Joseph J. Kockelmans, 
“Phenomenology,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 664. The perspective of 
phenomenology will be no different in this study. I can think of at least two works 
that use phenomenology as an approach to the text with fruitful results: Fernando L. 
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial 




study focuses on the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the 
interpretation of Exodus, I will still deal indirectly with how the text itself describes 
the God-human dynamic. 
 The descriptive analysis of the text in this study understands the text as a 
phenomenon comprising different constituents: language, meaning, author, context, 
external referentiality, readers, telos, reception and transmission, discourse, etc.39 Yet 
since the object of the descriptive analysis is the authorial understanding of 
philosophical notions that include the God-human relationship depicted in the text,40 
the way in which the descriptive analysis will be used here differs from traditional 
exegetical approaches.41 
                                                 
 
Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of Jeremiah: A Study 
of Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Referential Incoherence 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 57–75. 
39 For a detailed analysis of these constituents see Glanz, Understanding 
Participant-Reference Shifts, 57–75. 
40 The God-human relation structure is also open to criticism and obliteration 
by descriptive analysis. Does the text explain this dynamic in these terms? If not, 
how does it depict the relation between the divine and humans? These questions will 
be addressed in Chapter 4 of this study. 
41 Umberto Cassuto’s Commentary on the Book of Exodus is an example of one 
“descriptive” approach to the text. Cassuto opens his commentary by affirming that 
his commentary is concerned with “the plain meaning of the text.” See Cassuto, 
Commentary on the Book of Exodus (Skokie, IL: Varda, 2005), 2. Even so, because 
Cassuto maintains a “scientific” orientation toward the text, his descriptive approach 
is guided by “all the resources that modern scholarship” sets before him. Ibid., 1. In 
other words, his descriptive analysis is guided by the inherent presuppositions within 
these modern approaches. The difference, then, between the descriptive analysis in 
this study and others is that it begins with an evaluation of the philosophical 
presuppositions that might influence a proper reading of the text. The primary focus 
is on how the reality being depicted in the text is interpreted by the subject even 
before the interpretation of the text itself takes place. 
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 Traditional exegetical approaches involve the actions the interpreter makes to 
interpret the biblical text following a set of principles of interpretation (philosophical 
notions that include conceptions of God, humans, and history) that are normally 
established, as noted earlier, a priori.42 This is the default mode of biblical 
interpretation, and it can be found in most—if not all—exegetical works in Old 
Testament studies.  
 Descriptive analysis of the text, on the other hand, attempts: (1) to identify the 
philosophical notions that might influence one’s understanding of the biblical text;43 
(2) to suspend these philosophical notions in order for them to be validated or 
obliterated by the biblical text itself; and (3) to approach the text in a descriptive 
manner so that the philosophical outlook within the biblical text might be 
understood as it appears to the reader. In these senses, the approach is both 
descriptive and analytical.  
 At this stage, I will expand on each of these three levels to further explain the 
                                                 
 
42 For example, Anthony C. Thiselton comments on Wycliffe’s pre-
understandings of Scripture: “Wycliffe argued that the interpretation of Scripture 
must follow the intention of its Divine author.” See Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 125. The 
common understanding that Scripture has a divine author inherently carries an 
interpretation of Scripture: it assumes that there is a divine author. Thus, the 
presuppositions an interpreter brings into the act of biblical interpretation inevitably 
carry a pre-understanding of the text. Yet this is not to be seen as negative. An 
interpretation that claims to be strictly objective is, to say the least, suspicious. The 
task at hand, as outlined previously, is to allow the biblical text itself to determine or 
judge which of these pre-understandings are in harmony with the text and which are 
not, especially the broad pre-understandings that interpret macro-hermeneutical 
notions such as the God-human relationship. This movement is an attempt to allow 
the biblical text to be the arbiter of that which interpreters bring into interpretation.   
43 In this sense the approach moves beyond the descriptive to the analytical.  
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textual approach this study proposes. 
 
Identify and Suspend 
 
 In relation to the identification of interpreted philosophical notions and their 
suspension: how can one identify that which influences an interpreter in 
interpretation and suspend it? Here one finds oneself beyond conventional methods, 
because, as mentioned earlier, the presuppositional framework of a particular 
interpreter includes not only chosen philosophical concepts, but experiences and 
emotions that are as influential as they are unnoticed. Because of this, the interpreter 
must exercise self-criticism before biblical criticism, identifying presuppositions that 
might shape the application and results of interpretation, with the intent to align 
these assumptions with that which the text might be presenting regarding the content 
of the same presuppositions.44 In other words, descriptive analysis of the text begins 
with descriptive analysis of the self.  
 Yet how are the interpreted philosophical notions the interpreter is aware of 
in his/her own presuppositional framework to be suspended? In order for this to take 
                                                 
 
44 Although it seems impossible for all interpreters to be aware of all 
philosophical elements that might influence interpretation, here the biblical text 
might be of help. When reading a particular text, along with the common exegetical 
questions, one must ask questions about reality. To which reality is this text 
pointing? The reality of God, of man, of world, etc.? Once the implicit textual reality 
is identified, interpreters should ask what in their presuppositional framework might 
impede a proper understanding of how the text portrays that particular reality. In this 
sense, the descriptive analysis begins as a posture before the text, an interpretative 
awareness, rather than a method proper.  
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place, this study will apply epoché,45 or what I will call in this study suspension. On the 
concept of suspension or epoché, Canale writes that there is a “need to place all 
previous scientific interpretations of the God principle under Husserlian epoché, that 
is, in methodological brackets.”46 Fundamentally, the concept of suspension removes 
the usage of the scientific or philosophical principle of doubt from the control of the 
subject (interpreter),47 and instead, places it under the control of the object (biblical 
text), which now investigates the validity of the philosophical assumptions of the 
interpreter. Canale adds, “The phenomenological approach aims to grasp what is 
                                                 
 
45 On the concept of phenomenological epoché, Søren Overgaard writes that 
the “problem for Husserl is how to ensure that no natural knowledge, whether 
scientific, common sense, or otherwise, enters into our constitutive 
phenomenological investigation . . . the general name that Husserl gives this 
procedure of ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung) is epoché (Greek: restraint, holding back; 
Zurückhaltung).” See Søren Overgaard, Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World 
(Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 42. If the reader is tempted to see such a 
category being applied to biblical interpretation as another modernistic attempt to 
approach the text, I invite the reader to think again. Phenomenological epoché in this 
study is applied as a remedy against critical, scientific, and philosophical 
preconceived notions that interpreters have inherited from the rise of modernity 
onward. One must suspend that which is understood as “common sense” in order to 
see what the text presents as “common sense.” 
46 Fernando L. Canale, “Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical 
Sanctuary,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 36 (1998): 185. For further insight 
into the origins and first usages of epoché, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Muirhead Library of Philosophy (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1969). 
47 The principle of doubt is commonly attributed to Descartes, since he “had 
declared that universal doubt should purge his mind of all opinions held merely on 
trust and open it to knowledge firmly grounded in reason.” See Michael Polanyi, 
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), 283. 
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being thought in the text.”48  
 This, to me, is as close as one can arrive to articulating a biblical approach to 
dealing with subjective elements that might impede a balance between the 
assumptions of the interpreter and the assumptions of the biblical text. The first two 
steps of the descriptive approach to the text are, then, (1) identifying philosophical 
assumptions that might influence interpretation and (2) suspending them through 
phenomenological epoché.  
 
Look and See 
 
 Much can be said about the need to approach the text in a common-sense or 
descriptive manner. On this last and important point in the descriptive analysis of the 
text, I begin with what could be conceived as Calvin’s original intention for biblical 
interpretation. Gilkey writes:  
If we had asked an orthodox theologian like Calvin this confessional and 
systematic question: “What do you believe God did at the Exodus?” he would 
have given us a clear answer. “Look at the book of Exodus,” he would have 
answered, “and see what it says God did.”49  
 
Although Gilkey’s portrayal of Calvin’s answer is speculative, it leads interpreter and 
interpretation on a fruitful path—one of looking at the text and seeing what it says 
about the actions of God. This same idea is found in the philosophical work of 
                                                 
 
48 Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason, 321. 
49 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 198. 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language: “Look at it! That’s how it is!”50  
 While biblical interpretation is grounded on the action of looking and seeing, 
it often looks at and sees what interpreters project into the text via philosophical 
presuppositions. Even Calvin was not able to free himself from the temptation of 
seeing in the text what his implicit philosophical presuppositions conditioned him to 
see. The descriptive analysis applied in this study, then, will follow the action of 
looking and seeing the notion of how God relates to humanity in text and interpreter. 
The descriptive analysis proposes not the construction of a new model of how God 
relates to humans,51 but a description of how God relates to humans according to the 
biblical text of Exodus, beginning with how this dynamic is interpreted a priori. This 
description will provide the ground for an analysis of the same interpreted 
philosophical notion of the God-human relation within the presuppositional 
frameworks of biblical scholars. 
 Descriptive analysis of the text differs from traditional approaches to biblical 
interpretation not as an alternative proper, but as a starting point. Traditional 
approaches to the biblical text operate with an inherent conception of the God-
human relationship that may or may not have the Bible as a source of its formation. 
Thus, a traditional approach to the text at this philosophical level could lead to some 
                                                 
 
50 Tim Labron, Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View (New York: Continuum, 
2006), 51. 
51 Labron's depiction of Wittgenstein’s rejection of constructing new models 
to understand concepts serves as an appropriate basis for what I am attempting to do 
here: “Someone who is not familiar with the landscape is not helped by constructing 
theories, but by becoming familiar with their concrete surroundings.” Ibid., 36.  
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confusion. To look and see the God-human relation in the text with an approach that 
already assumes a God-human relation leads to looking and seeing what one projects 
into the text. Starting with descriptive analysis does not eliminate this confusion, but 
it does reduce it. The approach accomplishes this by identifying philosophical 
notions, suspending these philosophical notions, and providing a textual description 
that either critiques or validates these philosophical notions.  
 
Presuppositions and Text 
 
 In Chapter 4, the philosophical presuppositions within the interpretative 
frameworks of biblical scholars will be evaluated in a unique way. In order to trace 
the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon the interpretation of Exodus, I 
will need two platforms: first, a textual basis that points to possibilities regarding how 
the text understands the God-human relation; and second, a interpretative basis that 
points to how scholars interpret issues relating to the God-human relation. I will 
attempt to accomplish this via the literary structure of Exodus. From the literary 
structure of Exodus, the reader can derive an idea of how the author/redactor of the 
book articulated—or not—the notion of the God-human relation. From these textual 
pointers, I will move into how biblical interpreters understood and interpreted these 
same texts under extrabiblical philosophical categories. In this way, the issues 
concerning the God-human relation are not dictated beforehand; rather, they emerge 
from the text. Once these issues are identified in the text via the literary structure of 
the book, I will move into how scholars interpret them as I attempt to trace the 
philosophical presuppositions at work in such interpretation.  
 In short, this study’s descriptive approach to the text does not imply a method 
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proper,52 nor does it lead to a presuppositionless hermeneutic; rather, it must be seen 
as an interpretative awareness, a posture before the text.53 The phenomenological 
approach allows interpreters to ascertain the philosophical conceptions they bring 
into interpretation via their own assumptions and interpretative methods, and 
harmonize them with what the biblical text implicitly depicts regarding the same 
issues. The approach begins with a description of the self, before describing the text 
and its interpretation. 
 I hope that this introduction has sufficiently explained the question this study 
addresses and the approach it will take to arrive at either answers or better questions.  
                                                 
 
52 I am not implying here that these steps are not methodological; I am only 
assuming their limitation. Terence J. Keegan is correct in observing that “scholars 
fail to recognize the limitations of their methodologies. There are some who proceed 
almost as if one given method could solve everything. What is really dangerous 
about this approach is not so much that the method will fail but that the scholars 
using the method will be satisfied with inadequate results.” See Terence J. Keegan, 
Interpreting the Bible: A Popular Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1985), 7. 
53 This interpretative awareness also implies the critical nature of this study. It 
is a study on the necessary contexts the interpreter of any text must consider. While 
general criticism is aimed at the biblical text, this attempts to bring the text to a 

















 This section begins the process of evaluating the presence, influence, and 
roots of the philosophical notion of how God relates to humans in the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical interpreters.54 I will begin by addressing the 
principle of epistemology:55 that is, humanity’s ability to know and reason,56 and the 
                                                 
 
54 This chapter does not intend to provide a chronological analysis of the 
philosophical influences that shape biblical interpretation, nor will it attempt to place 
them in theological (liberal, conservative, progressive) or religious (Christian, Jewish, 
etc.) categories. Rather, it attempts to present presuppositions relating to 
epistemology, ontology, and history as they emerge in their particular historical 
contexts. Among the many chronological treatments of Old Testament 
interpretation, see Magne Saebø, ed., Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its 
Interpretation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008); Mark S. Gignilliat, A 
Brief History of Old Testament Criticism: From Benedict Spinoza to Brevard Childs (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2012); and the four-volume series by Henning Graf 
Reventlow, History of Biblical Interpretation (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2010).  
55 In this study I will follow the basic definition of epistemology given by Paul 
K. Moser, that is, epistemology as the explanation of knowledge or the study of the 
nature of knowledge, “from Greek episteme, ‘knowledge,’ and logos, ‘explanation.’” 
See Paul K. Moser, “Epistemology,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. 
Robert Audi, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273. 
56 Several theories of how the mind functions in the process of knowledge 




notion of “human” in the God-human relation structure. Second, I will address the 
principle of ontology: that is, conceptions of Being and the divine ability to 
communicate or act within history, and the notion of “God” in the God-human 
relation structure. Third, I will address the principle of history: that is, the locus 
where the dynamic between God and humans takes place, and the notion of 
“relation” in the God-human relation structure.  
 




 This section will begin by highlighting the relation between subject and 
object,57 the epistemological component, in theological reasoning. This analysis will 
                                                 
 
typically thought to be derived from at least one of two paths, we can gain 
knowledge through our innate ideas or we can gain knowledge through our senses. 
The former is rationalism and the latter empiricism.” See Tim Labron, Wittgenstein 
and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 25. 
57 It is important to note that I am not endorsing a distinction between 
subjects and objects (also known as the “Cartesian theater”), an idea that can be 
traced back to the philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650), the father of modern 
foundationalist epistemology. See Nancey Murphy and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Anglo-
American Postmodernity: A Theology of Communal Practice,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 27. Wittgenstein was also critical of the Cartesian theater, 
since for him the idea of “thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed 
space, makes thinking something occult.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), section 64. Although the subject-object distinction is questioned by 
some scholars due to its limitation in embracing the complexity of human cognition, 
I will maintain the inevitable relation between subject and object, that is, in “order to 
create meaning, Reason needs a subject and an object.” See Oliver Glanz, 
“Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical Theological Methodology, Part 




provide a basis to evaluate the context in which biblical interpretation takes place.  
 To generate meaning, reason requires three main philosophical 
presuppositions: the ontological (the concept of reality), the epistemological (the 
concept of knowing), and the theological framework (the particular system that 
provides unity and guarantees coherence).58 The epistemological framework—that 
assumes to some extent a subject and an object—is present in any scientific or 
theological quest for knowledge and meaning. The necessity of a subject and an 
object provides the context in which reason occurs and defines the conditions for 
interpretation to take place. Oliver Glanz writes: 
In any philosophical endeavor, the interpreted subject-object relation is a 
necessary fundamental of a detailed construction of a philosophical system. Thus 
the basic framework of Reason is the subject-object relationship, and it is this 
relationship that is the center of meaning.59 
 
Concerning the subject-object relationship, Fernando L. Canale writes, “All 
cognitive activities spring from the subject-object relationship which functions as the 
                                                 
 
question is how this relation takes place. The subject-object distinction as a way of 
conceptualizing human knowledge must also be critiqued by the parameters set forth 
by the text, that is, through the possibility that human cognition is not isolated from 
life. A similar articulation of this idea is found in the work of Wittgenstein, who 
understood that “clarity begins with an acknowledgement of the irreducibly social 
character of human experience and the intrinsic relation of human experience to the 
real world.” See Murphy and Kallenberg, “Anglo-American Postmodernity,” 35. Or, 
in Wittgenstein’s own words: “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could 
say—forms of life.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), 226e. 




foundational cognitive unit.”60  
 Throughout time, philosophers and theologians have argued over how the 
subject-object relation functions in Reason and in the search for meaning.61 As 
philosophy developed, the emphasis in epistemology shifted from object to subject. 
This historical development was also related to general understanding of the concept 
of Being.62  
 Any understanding of the subject-object relationship contains a 
conceptualization of Being. At this stage, it is imperative to understand that thinkers 
throughout history understood this essential concept as it relates to epistemology as a 
hermeneutical choice. On this, Glanz writes: 
                                                 
 
60 Fernando L. Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role of Method in 
Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: LithoTech, 2005), 17. 
61 When I write of Reason, I mean the framework through which one arrives 
at meaning, as mentioned earlier: the ontological, epistemological, and theological 
frameworks.  
62 I do not imply Being as a broad conceptualization of the localization within 
which reality takes place; rather, I side with Fernando Canale in understanding 
Being as an overall quality shared by everything real. Also, Being in this study will be 
conceived as a reality in human minds, while the concept of “being” will be 
conceived as entities outside the human mind. Furthermore, Being is that which “co-
appears with all things as a basic characteristic of their being.” See Fernando L. 
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien 
Springs, MI: LithoTech, 2005), 38. According to Canale, an evaluation of how Being 
is interpreted in history reveals two possible interpretations of Being: 
temporal/historical Being and timeless Being. The concept of temporality and 
timelessness will be recurrent in this study, since it is a philosophical principle that 
influences all other frameworks that constitute Reason and consequently 
interpretation. For a historical analysis of how Being is interpreted, see Canale, 
Criticism of Theological Reason. For more details on Being, how it is interpreted, and its 




Because the concept of Being functions as the first and all-embracing concept by 
which everything else is conditioned, it reveals the primordial, unconditional, or 
hypothetical character of Reason. The concept of Being, functioning as Logos, is 
not conditioned by any logic, since it is the ground for logic itself, but by choice 
of the subject.63 
 
The conceptualization of Being is a hermeneutical choice interpreters make due to 
the hypothetical character of Reason, and this choice influences not only the 
epistemological standpoint from which interpretation takes place, but the 
interpretation of the God-human relation itself. 
 The interpretation of Being will be evaluated in the following section dealing 
with the principle of ontology, but at this stage, some introductory notes must be 
given to the reader. In the history of thought, Being, as noted earlier, has been 
interpreted in two ways: temporal/historical and timeless. The subjective choice 
between the two directly affects what the human subject perceives in its relationship 
to a particular object. Because of this, attention will be paid to how the subject and 
the object are understood from both the objectivist and subjectivist epistemological 
standpoints.  
 The following evaluation of the epistemological principle, then, is double-
pronged. It attempts to understand not only how significant philosophical shifts in 
history grasped the relation between subject and object, but also how they chose the 
concept of Being,64 the ground upon which Reason and interpretation take place.  
                                                 
 
63 Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 229. 
64 Glanz understands that the conceptualization of Being in Reason is that 
which “the subject brings to the subject-object relationship and that predominantly 




 The two major philosophical shifts in the interpretation of the subject-object 
relation, along with its inevitable choice of the understanding of Being, will be 
classified in this study as objectivist epistemology (encompassing the classical and 
modern periods) and subjectivist epistemology (encompassing the modern and 
postmodern periods).65 At the end of this analysis, I will draw out the possibility of a 
hermeneutical epistemology as another shift in the understanding of epistemology.  
 
                                                 
 
Ibid. In other words, the subjective understanding and choice of Being is inevitably 
carried into the interpretation of the dynamic between subject and object. Again, the 
issue of Being will only be evaluated in this section as it relates to the principle of 
epistemology. For a proper evaluation of the concept of Being and how it is 
interpreted in history, see the next section on the principle of ontology.  
65 This study will not follow the classical Hegelian structure of historical 
developments. On the Hegelian arrangement of the history of thought, John 
Goldingay writes: “G. W. F. Hegel suggested a three-stage model for understanding 
the history of thought. . . . Current conventional wisdom implies a Hegelian 
understanding of biblical interpretation. In the first millennium there was premodern 
interpretation, the second millennium saw the development of modern 
interpretation, and in the third there is postmodern interpretation.” See John A. 
Goldingay, “Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern in Old Testament Study,” in 
Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible, ed. James D. G. Dunn and J. W. Rogerson (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 13. For the objectives of this study, the Hegelian 
classification, though present in biblical interpretation today, represents a 
modernistic outlook on history that fails to embrace the complexity and continuation 
of systems of thought throughout the historical periods. Although it may help in 
identifying the macro-hermeneutical patterns present in the different periods, I will 
resort to objectivist and subjectivist epistemology as the pattern through which to 
understand the complexity of epistemological developments throughout history. This 
is not an attempt to exhaust the epistemological issues within the different periods, 
but allows for the continuation of perspectives without resorting to clear breaks in 





The Subject in Objectivist Epistemology 
 
 The objectivist understanding of the subject-object relation has ancient 
historical roots. From the birth of philosophy through the time of the classical 
thinkers until the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the emphasis in the subject-
object relation was on the object. An evaluation of the interpretation of the subject-
object relation from its earliest to its later stages falls outside the scope of this study; I 
will begin this assessment with the transition between classical and modern thinking, 
since it best applies to the influential period where biblical interpretation took the 
form it carries today. Also, some key features of the objectivist interpretation of the 
subject-object relation emerged during this transition. 
 Heavily influenced by the Renaissance, the Enlightenment,66 and the initial 
effects of rationalism, eighteenth-century thinkers left behind the pre-critical phase of 
biblical interpretation to embrace a more critical approach to reality and 
consequently to biblical interpretation. The epistemological significance of this 
emphasis on human reason and rationality is that it presented a particular 
understanding of the human mind that uncovers how the subject-object relation was 
understood.  
                                                 
 
66 Gerhard F. Hasel observes that “the Enlightenment was characterized by a 
new philosophical norm—rationalism. This meant that human reason was set up as 
the final criterion and chief source and arbiter of what is to be accepted as true and 
factual.” See Gerhard F. Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today: An Analysis of Modern 
Methods of Biblical Interpretation and Proposals for the Interpretation of the Bible as the Word 
of God, Biblical Research Institute (Lincoln, NE: College View Printers, 1985), 9.  
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 The assumption in the seventeenth century was that “the subject passively 
receives input from its objects,”67 and the mind of the subject was depicted, via the 
work of John Locke,68 as a tabula rasa,69 that is, empty and awaiting the influence of 
the object to reach a possible immaculate subjective reception of its communicated 
content. In this epistemological conception, besides the clear distinction between 
subject and object,70 the lines of intelligibility71 communicated by the object are 
immersed into the mind of a passive subject. The epistemological movement that 
characterizes this period interprets the subject-object relation in its distinction as the 
content is communicated from the object to the subject. This basic premise led to the 
                                                 
 
67 Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 19. 
68 See R. S. Woolhouse, “Tabula Rasa,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. 
Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, Blackwell Companions to 
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 763. 
69 Tabula rasa is “the theory that the mind at birth is a tabula rasa (blank 
writing tablet) awaiting ideas from experience.” Ibid., 763. 
 70 As in the beginning of this section, the distinction of subject from object 
and its effects in modernity can be traced to Descartes, who understood that “the 
body is always a hindrance to the mind in its thinking.” J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, 
and D. Murdoch, trans., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3:336. This anthropological perspective leads 
some to see that the “core Judaeo-Christian view of the soul is quite at odds with the 
views of Plato and Descartes.” See Rebecca D. Pentz, “Veatch and Brain Death: A 
Plea for the Soul,” Journal of Clinical Ethics 5, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 132. In other 
words, the distinction of subject from object is marked by a Platonic understanding 
of the body-soul distinction.  
71 The role of the object does not bypass the communication of intelligible 
content to the subject, something that can also be called transobjectivity. On this 
Glanz writes, “Transobjectivity means two things: on the one hand, that the object 
exists in ontic independence from the subject, and, on the other hand, that the object 
is open in the sense that it does not hide, but communicates its properties within the 
structure of Reason.” See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 221. 
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birth of the “notion of scientific objectivity as excluding all contributions from the 
cognitive subject.”72 
 Theologians in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century reflected 
the epistemological paradigm outlined above in their hermeneutic. Gerhard Maier 
puts together the general mindset of the time in the following manner: “F. C. Baur 
wanted to ‘apprehend’ the state of affairs given to us in the Bible in its ‘pure 
objectiveness.’ Similarly W. Wrede wished to work ‘as objectively… as possible.’”73 
This mindset, again, follows the tenets set forth by Descartes’ philosophical reflection 
on the “lone individual as ‘thinking subject,’ abstracted from the world.”74 
 The idea of an abstracted thinking subject created several problems for 
interpretation that will be seen in subsequent sections of this study. Among these 
problems is a limited perspective of the self in interpretation, since “the classical 
mind was paramountly concerned with the interpretation of reality and not with the 
patterns of its own functioning.”75 Objectivist epistemology, then, was shaped by an 
                                                 
 
72 Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 19. Also, as a foretaste of the 
influence of such principles upon biblical interpretation, a theme that will be 
developed in the next chapter, the passive role of the subject seen in classical and 
modern interpretations of the subject-object relation has “never been entirely 
overcome among practitioners of historical-critical methods.” See Ben F. Meyer, 
“The Challenges of Text and Reader to the Historical-Critical Method,” in The Bible 
and Its Readers, ed. Wim Beuken, Sean Freyne, and Anton Weiler (London: SCM, 
1991), 4. 
73 Gerhard Maier, Biblical Hermeneutics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), 334. 
74 Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 17. 
75 Fernando L. Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive 
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 2001), 17. 
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overemphasis on the active object in the formation of Reason and consequently in 
interpretation. This resulted in the heightening of the mental capacities of the 
individual in interpretation and a mindset that asserted that any interpretative 
activity must be accomplished through pure objectivity. This distancing of the 
individual from the object in interpretation, prevalent throughout modernity, is 
perhaps one of the most destructive epistemological features when applied to biblical 
interpretation—due not only to its Platonic dependence, but more importantly, to its 
incoherence with the apparent biblical movement of proximity to the word for 
understanding to take place rather than distancing.  
 In the mid- to late eighteenth century, the epistemological mindset began to 
show signs of a transition from empiricism to idealism, from object to subject. This 
conception can be seen to some extent in the work of Immanuel Kant.76 Ronald H. 
Nash summarizes Kant’s contribution to epistemology in the following way: 
Philosophers prior to Kant (or so Kant claimed) had assumed that human 
knowledge is possible only as the mind is adapted to the world. Kant reversed 
this order. Instead of the mind adapting to the supposed objects of its knowledge, 
all objects are instead adapted to the knowing mind.77 
 
Glanz adds: “The Cartesian paradigm and the influence of Kant changed the 
direction of the flow of meaning by grounding the interpretation of the 
                                                 
 
76 For more on Kant’s contribution to epistemology see Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990); 
Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); Julián Marias, History of Philosophy (New York: Dover, 
1967), 189–223. 
77 Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 1992), 26. 
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dimensionality of Reason in the epistemological framework.”78 In late modernity, 
then, more attention was given to the subject in interpretation. This emphasis 
provided the context for the appearance of the next epistemological emphasis in 
history: subjectivist epistemology. 
 Yet, before turning to this second stage in the historical development of 
epistemology, it is important to turn to how the object, or conception of Being, was 
interpreted during the objectivist period.  
 
The Object in Objectivist Epistemology 
 
 So far, the role of the subject in the objectivist understanding of the subject-
object relationship has been uncovered. Now I turn to how thinkers in the objectivist 
period interpreted the function of the object in the subject-object relationship: that is, 
how thinkers chose to interpret Being. 
 From classical times through the Enlightenment, the overall interpretation of 
Being was through a timeless conception. The definition of this timeless conception 
and its implications for biblical interpretation will be fully given in the next section, 
so for now I introduce this concept only tentatively. It suffices to point out that the 
“impetus for defining eternity as timelessness is not found in any dynamic of 
scripture’s logic,”79 but, rather, seems to have “been stirred by a concern to articulate 
                                                 
 
78 See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 231. 
79 Richard C. Prust, Wholeness: The Character Logic of Christian Belief 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 89. 
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in terms classically schooled converts would find congenial.”80 In sum, “Christianity 
took root in an intellectual world in which Plato’s belief in the unchangeable nature 
of truth and Aristotle’s in an unmovable mover provided the terms of systematic 
understanding.”81  
 Although, as seen above, the conception of Being as timeless is criticized by 
contemporary thinkers, it prevailed during the classical and modern periods alike, 
demonstrating how scholarly thought was heavily dependent on a Platonic 
understanding of reality.82 This macro-hermeneutical or philosophical choice of 
Being as timeless affected the epistemological structure of the objectivist perspective, 
since the “absolute truth” that the rational subject arrives at in interpretation “stands 
on the belief that our knowledge springs from timeless, changeless realities.”83 Even 
though the late modern period brought about the beginning of a change in the 
approach to knowledge, the timeless understanding of Being, or of the object in the 




82 Stanley J. Grenz writes on the development of Greek thinking during the 
Renaissance: “Renaissance thinkers were humanists in that they adhered to the 
human values presented in the classical writings. In addition, the return to the 
classics included a rejection of the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages in favor of 
Platonism and even mysticism.” In Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 58.  
83 Fernando L. Canale, “Absolute Truth in Postmodern Times,” Andrews 
University Seminary Studies 45, no. 1 (2007): 92. Such a dependence on Platonic 
conceptions of Being, as mentioned earlier, is also seen in the work of Descartes. 
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subject-object relationship, was still shaped by Platonic conceptions.84 
 Glanz correctly points out that even though much changed in the transition 
between pre-modern times and modernity, “Being was still interpreted as timeless.”85 
Such a conception did not allow modernistic thinkers to depart from a 
foundationalist perspective of knowledge; truth was still determined by verifiable 
universal propositions, while Being was still interpreted as a timeless reality.  
 Both classical and modern perspectives of epistemology, or objectivist 
epistemology, assumed “the existence of an ‘absolute universal truth’ independent 
from the subject’s contribution.”86 This conception, at the ontological level, would 




The Subject in Subjectivist Epistemology 
 
 A major shift in the historical development of the interpretation of the subject-
object dynamic came in late modernity, or what other scholars prefer to call 
postmodernity.87 Knowing that a “precise understanding of postmodernity is 
                                                 
 
84 Canale writes: “Plato devised the timeless ontology on which absolute truth 
of classical and modern times was constructed.” Ibid. Although a proper analysis of 
timeless Being will be given in the next section, one can already notice the influential 
character of such a conception upon the foundation of knowledge. In both classical 
and modern times, Being was interpreted through such a timeless conception. 
85 See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 232. 
86 Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 10. 
87 For more on the influence of postmodernity in interpretation and theology, 




notoriously difficult to pin down”88 and “those who attempt to define or analyze the 
concept of postmodernity do so at their own peril,”89 at this stage, and for the 
purposes of this study, I will focus on how contemporary thinkers in this postmodern 
condition understand the role of the subject and object in the subject-object 
relationship.90 
 The historical and philosophical understanding of the subject-object 
relationship in the subjectivist period is marked by an attempt to overcome the 
classical-modern objectivist framework. Although it is difficult to draw out every 
                                                 
 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jean-François Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984); Terrence W. Tilley, Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Religious 
Diversity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995); Lawrence Cahoone, ed., From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Roman T. Ciapalo, ed., 
Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997); Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: 
Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2001); Michael W. Nicholson, A Theological Analysis and Critique of the 
Postmodern Debate: Mapping the Labyrinth (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1997); Hugo 
Anthony Meynell, Postmodernism and the New Enlightenment (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1999); David Harvey, The Condition of 
Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, The 
Postmodern Turn (New York: Guilford, 1997).  
88 Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, 18. 
89 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity: A 
Report on Knowledge (of God),” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4. 
90 I will not present an exhaustive account of the historical and philosophical 
developments that led to what is today termed postmodernity. Even so, I do not see 
postmodernity as a rupture from modernity, but as the natural result of the modern 
project: in other words, it is impossible to see postmodernity divorced from 
modernity, especially since it still carries the term modern.  
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single element that led up to this subjectivist mindset, it is imperative to focus yet 
again on the late modern period. Here I briefly turn to the influence of German 
Idealism on the epistemological developments that led to the subjectivist turn.91 
 The nineteenth century “marked one of the richest and most exciting 
explosions of philosophical energy and talent, perhaps even comparable to the 
generation that gave birth to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.”92 Whereas classical 
epistemology in the pre-modern and modern periods emphasized the active object, 
German Idealism emphasized the influence of the active subject, who “in turn is 
supposed to create its own object of thought.”93 The objectivism present in classical 
thinking began to be overcome by the subjective emphasis in the epistemological 
developments in German Idealism. The mind of the subject was no longer passive in 
                                                 
 
91 For more on what is known as the “classical period” of philosophical 
thought in Germany, see Karl Ameriks, ed., The Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Frederick C. Beiser, 
German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781–1801 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); Nektarios G. Limnatis, German Idealism and the 
Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (Dordrecht, Germany: 
Springer, 2008); Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and 
Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). The “ideal” in German 
Idealism, of course, carries a positive and a negative intention in its application, and 
its implications are well articulated by Karl Ameriks, who writes: “The negative 
meaning of ‘idealism’ implies that most things that are commonly taken to be real 
are not so in fact . . . . The positive interpretation of ‘idealism,’ in contrast, involves 
seeing the term as adding rather than subtracting significance.” See Ameriks, 
Companion to German Idealism, 8. The negative and positive sides of the “ideal” in 
German Idealism mark the active influence of the subject in interpretation. 
92 Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds., The Age of German 
Idealism (London: Routledge, 2003), 1. 
93 Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 19. 
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interpretation, but was understood to create the necessary conditions for meaning to 
take place: a notion that can be traced to where this study left off in the previous 
section—Immanuel Kant.  
 This emphasis on the subject is one of the significant characteristics that mark 
the shift from the objectivist to the subjectivist interpretation of the subject-object 
relation. Naturally, this conception brought about an array of issues that had been 
overlooked by its predecessors. 
 As seen above, the roots for a paradigmatic shift in the interpretation of 
Reason formed in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century. The twentieth 
century saw significant criticism of the idealistic emphasis on the subject in 
interpretation, as well as the classical emphasis on the object. Stanley Grenz focuses 
on the active participation of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger in this 
period, affirming that it was Heidegger who argued that “Descartes and Kant 
directed all modern philosophy down an illegitimate and destructive path.”94  
 This destructive path was characterized by a misconception in regard to the 
active subject in interpretation, since, for Heidegger, “the human being is not 
primarily a thinking self, a subject that engages in cognitive acts; rather, we are above 
all else beings-in-the-world, enmeshed in social networks.”95  
 Some of the epistemological implications of understanding the subject not as 
“thinking self” but as “being-in-the-world” are outlined by Canale as he writes that 
                                                 
 




in “postmodern times, knowledge and truth have become relative to the historical 
and cultural conditions of the cognitive subject,”96 replacing the “‘epistemological 
foundationalism’ of classical and modern times”97 with the relativeness of truth in 
“historically and culturally conditioned lives.”98  
 While the Enlightenment project and the work of Kant attempted to bring the 
absoluteness of truth to the epistemological dimension of the thinking subject while 
maintaining a timeless conception of Being, postmodern thinkers understood that 
this project was bound for failure, since a thinking subject is part of an interpretative 
community that is conditioned by history, time, and language. At the same time, the 
idea that the active subject in his/her historically, culturally conditioned life 
determines the content of reason lays the groundwork for the possibility of cognitive 
relativism. The epistemological shift from object to subject, in postmodern times, 
allows for meaning to be communicated from subject (within a historical and cultural 
context) to object.  
 As mentioned in passing before, another level that marks this shift is a 
sensitive attention to language. Vanhoozer not only sees this linguistic turn as one of 
the most important shifts from modernity to postmodernity, but affirms that the 
postmodern mind understands that “not only do we have a nonlinguistic access to 
the way things are, but the way we speak and think is conditioned by the particular 
                                                 
 





language in which we dwell.”99 Thus the conception of the active subject in 
interpretation undergoes a major shift within the postmodern condition: modern 
objectivity is not only overcome, but replaced by an emphasis on the subject’s 
historical, temporal, and linguistic context.  
 Finally, by “the end of the twentieth century, philosophy finally came to 
realize the failure of the Kantian transcendentalism and scientific methodology as 
sources of absolute truth.”100 Yet the postmodern understanding of the thinking 
subject in the subject-object relationship as part of a hermeneutical, historical, 
linguistic, and changing context also stems from a foundational change in the 
philosophical understanding of the object, or Being. To this issue I now turn. 
 
The Object in Subjectivist Epistemology 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the epistemological conception of the dynamic between 
subject and object carries an a priori choice of how Being is interpreted. Such a 
hermeneutical choice directly affects not only one’s elaboration of the functionality 
of the subject-object relationship, but more importantly, how a particular person can 
arrive at knowledge and meaning. The question to be answered at this stage is, how 
does the subjectivist period that encompasses the postmodern condition or turn 
interpret Being? As pointed out earlier, the interpretation of Being as timeless during 
the objectivist period was left unchanged.  
                                                 
 
99 Vanhoozer, “Theology and the Condition,” 12.  
100 Canale, “Absolute Truth in Postmodern Times,” 91. 
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 It is at this ontological level that the postmodern condition creates the 
possibility of a different epistemological direction, though it is still not fully arrived 
at. The postmodern turn, or modernity reaching its full consequences, marks the 
possibility of a reinterpretation of Being from a timeless and changeless 
understanding to a historical and temporal one. The realization that the subject was 
now conceived as a historical or social individual in history opened the path for the 
same conclusion to be reached at the level of Being. Canale writes: 
Postmodernity replaced absolute reason with historical hermeneutical reason in 
epistemology; and timeless, changeless reality with temporal, changing reality in 
ontology. . . . The epistemological postmodern shift from classical absolute 
reason to hermeneutical reason springs from the ontological shift from a timeless 
to a temporal ontology.101 
 
Although a change to temporal ontology took place at the level of the historical 
subject, the same change on the level of the object, or Being, has not yet been arrived 
at. Even so, this change does create the possibility that the subject is no longer able to 
apprehend timeless truths, only historical truths situated in time. 
 This initial paradigm shift—from the object to the hermeneutical/historical 
subject—created the necessary conditions for some theologians to depart from the 
modern project in essential elements that relate to theology and consequently to 
interpretation. Vanhoozer outlines three of the main postulates in modernity that 
were rejected in the transition to late modernity or postmodernity: “(1) that reason is 
absolute and universal (2) that individuals are autonomous, able to transcend their 
place in history, class, and culture (3) that universal principles and procedures are 





objective whereas preferences are subjective.”102  
 The last point is significant to the concerns of this section, since it shows what 
remains to be overcome: the idea that there is still some timeless objective truth to be 
arrived at subjectively apart from “preferences.” So, while the postmodern turn 
brought a temporal ontological change to the level of the subject, it has not made the 
same conclusion reach the level of Being.  
 It is here that Canale anticipates the possibility of the full conclusion of the 
modern project or the postmodern turn: 
When the subject-object relationship is understood as working in the temporal 
dimensionality of knowledge, the interpretation of what essence and objectivity 
mean in themselves is bound to differ from the classical timeless interpretation of 
them.103 
 
While the postmodern turn made significant changes in the realm of the thinking 
subject, the full implications of these changes are yet to be implemented in the 
sciences and theology.104 Postmodernity opened the possibility that both subject and 
object could be seen on the same ontological platform, that is, historical or temporal 
Being. While objectivist epistemology created a clear break between subject and object 
through a timeless conception of Being, postmodernity opens the way to 
understanding subject and object in relation to each other, interacting in the same 
                                                 
 
102 Vanhoozer, “Theology and the Condition,” 8. 
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 This section outlined the context in which interpretation takes place: namely, 
the question of how humanity arrives at knowledge, meaning, and that which is real. 
In focus was the epistemological dynamic of the subject-object relationship as a way 
to see the historical developments in answer to this question. 
 The first period addressed was objectivist epistemology and its emphasis on 
the role of the object in interpretation as the subject took on a passive role. During this 
period, Being was interpreted as timeless and dependent upon a Platonic ontology.  
 The second period addressed was subjectivist epistemology, characterized by 
a change of emphasis from the object to the subject. While the subject was active in 
interpretation, this change brought a significant passivity to the object. By 
understanding the subject differently and breaking from the timeless categories that 
reigned throughout history, postmodernity introduced the temporal and historical 
dimension of reality to the level of the subject. However, postmodernity has not as 
yet integrated this discovery into the understanding of Being.  
 Now that the notion of “human” in the God-human relationship has been 
examined via epistemology, I turn to the second part of that relationship: the notion 
of “God.”  
 




 This section will assess the second component in the God-human relationship 
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structure, namely, the principle of ontology.105 First, I will introduce how the 
ontological principle, operating in the presuppositional frameworks of biblical 
scholars and theologians as a presupposition, influences the general flow of biblical 
interpretation along with its results. Second, I will move into the issue of how these 
assumptions shape the scholarly understanding of God and how God acts in the 
biblical text in particular,106 since this issue is aligned with the interests of this study: 
the actions of God in relation to humanity, and humanity’s ability to know and grasp 
revelation in the context of history. Throughout this analysis, I will also provide 
preliminary examples that reflect the influence of the principle of ontology at the 
level of scholarly assumptions and their effect on biblical interpretation.  
 
                                                 
 
105 The question of Being is at the foundation of theological thinking. Apart 
from Canale’s foundational Criticism of Theological Reason, already cited in this study, 
the following works can also attest to this point: Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God 
and the Question of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-Ontology (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 2005), 4–5; George Pattison, God and Being: An Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 103–48. Even in Old Testament studies and biblical 
interpretation, the relation between Being and theology has not been ignored; see, for 
instance, Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theology of 
the Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006); Francesca 
Aran Murphy, God Is Not a Story: Realism Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
106 In referring to assumptions about God and how God acts, I do not imply 
that which God does through the biblical text in relation to the reader, but rather the 
textual descriptions of who God is and what he does in the context of the biblical 






The Conception of Being: Timelessness and  




 In the analysis of the principle of epistemology, I pointed out that Being was 
interpreted as timeless in philosophical and theological thought even during the 
development from classical to late modern or postmodern thinking. Because the 
concept of Being as timeless is foundational for the development of theological 
thinking in general and biblical interpretation in particular, it is necessary to dedicate 
space to address it properly. 
 The notion of Being as timeless was first articulated in philosophical circles,107 
yet “this view has affected theology throughout history and is still pervasive 
today.”108 Although Christian tradition maintains a timeless view of God, several 
thinkers have seen the problematic effect of this view on biblical interpretation. 
Among them is Oscar Culmann, who writes: 
How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and how little Biblical 
Christianity, becomes clear to us when we confirm the fact that far and wide the 
Christian Church and Christian theology distinguish time and eternity in the 
Platonic-Greek manner.109 
                                                 
 
107 Norman Gulley correctly points out that “the view that God is timeless 
does not come from Scripture, but from philosophy.” In Norman R. Gulley, 
Systematic Theology: Prolegomena, Vol. 1 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University 
Press, 2003), 4. 
108 Ibid., 1. 
109 Oscar Culmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time 




Culmann not only recognizes the Greek origin of the timeless conception of Being, 
but also the mixture of Greek and biblical ideas within Christian tradition and 
theology. Culmann adds that “to primitive Christianity, as to Judaism, the Greek 
manner of distinguishing between time and eternity is quite foreign.”110 Grenz111 also 
reacts to the proximity between theology and philosophy as he writes that “the 
wedding of philosophy and theology in what has become the traditional and 
accepted manner is no longer possible (if it ever was).”112 He calls for “the demise of 
onto-theology.”113  
 At this stage, I will focus on the question of Being itself in order for the reader 
to understand “what it is” before I can explore the question of “what it does.” After 
this clarification, I will continue to trace the issue of the relation between theology 
and philosophy, especially as it relates to biblical interpretation, and the issue of 
onto-theology itself. To the issue of Being I now turn. 
 
Being as Timeless in Interpretation 
 
 Scholars acknowledge Parmenides (540–470 BC) as the “first philosopher to 
                                                 
 
110 Ibid., 62. 
111 Even though I cite Grenz here, in his own work, Grenz attempts to resolve 
the problem of the proximity between philosophy and theology without breaking 
from the classical ontological structures. I cite him here as a representative scholar 
who sees the problem, but not as one who attempts to break from the classical 
ontological grounds that assume timeless Being.  
112 Grenz, Named God, 6. In short, onto-theology implies the preeminence and 




view all reality under the common aspect of Being.”114 In Plato’s evaluation of 
Parmenides,115 beyond the understanding that Being is immutable, there are two 
basic characteristics of Being that shape its conception and that remain a significant 
part of philosophical and theological discussions throughout the centuries. First, in 
accordance with other philosophers of the pre-Socratic era, he drew a clear 
distinction between the appearance of things and the reality of things. That is, what 
is “perceived by the senses is not actually the case.”116 Secondly, Being had no birth 
or beginning, it has no end, and it is not subject to change.117  
                                                 
 
114 Ibid., 20. By Being I mean the element that “co-appears with all things as a 
basic characteristic of their Being.” See Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 
228. See also Canale, Basic Elements, 67–68. In other words, Being is that element of 
reality that co-appears with everything real, that is, “beings.” Hence the distinction 
between Being and beings. Parmenides, then, was the first to consider the question of 
Being, an idea that would be discussed for centuries of philosophical thinking. For 
more on Parmenides, see Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato and Parmenides: 
Parmenides’ Way of Truth and Plato’s Parmenides Translated with an Introduction and a 
Running Commentary (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); Marias, History of 
Philosophy, 19–25; Richard G. Geldard, Parmenides and the Way of Truth (Rhinebeck, 
NY: Monkfish, 2007); David Sedley, “Parmenides and Melissus,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 113–33. 
115 What remains of the writings of Parmenides are about one hundred and 
fifty lines of “didactic poem.” See Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, “Parmenides,” in 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 646. 
116 Grenz, Named God, 20. Plato sets forth this Parmenidean notion with a 
distinction between forms and things: “Forms are what they are of themselves and in 
relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they 
are in relation to themselves. . . . So none of the forms is known by us, because we 
don’t partake of knowledge itself.” In Plato, Parmenides, trans. Mary Louise Gill and 
Paul Ryan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 136–37. 
117 Grenz, Named God, 22. In the philosopher’s words: “changeless within the 




 Parmenides arrived at this second characteristic of Being in his logical 
conclusion regarding the concept of time. Grenz, for instance, understands that the 
logic in the argument of Parmenides led him to reject “any temporal or spatial 
distinction in ‘what is,’ and consequently, replaced the concept of time with the 
‘eternal now.’”118 By stating that Being (the concept of what “is”) is changeless, 
Parmenides discarded any temporal elements to its interpretation. That is, anything 
that represented sequence, time, etc., was incompatible with changeless Being.  
 Since that time, different philosophers have advanced the discussion of Being 
as timeless through history. Among these was Plato (427–347 BC),119 one of the 
foundational proponents of timeless Being in philosophical history. As seen 
previously, Plato developed the two basic characteristics of how Being is understood 
timelessly. On the first characteristic, the distinction between what is and what 
appears, Plato wrote that “the world as perceived by the senses is changing 
                                                 
 
Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection 
of Texts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 251. 
118 Grenz, Named God, 22. Such conception is developed throughout 
Parmenidean philosophy, especially in such conclusions: “‘But the one had nothing 
with such affections.’ ‘No, it had not.’ ‘It has nothing to do with time, and does not 
exist in time.’ ‘No, that is the result of the argument.’ . . . ‘Then if the one has no 
participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor is it becoming nor is it in 
the present, and it will never become nor be made to become nor will it be in the 
future?’ ‘Very true.’” In Plato, Parmenides, 249–51.  
119 For more on the philosophy of Plato, see Marías, History of Philosophy, 42–
58; Richard Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 




constantly.”120 The appearance of things to the senses is inherently tied to change, 
and thus must be distinguished from the changeless nature of Being. This idea leads 
to the second characteristic: the timeless character of Being. In short, “Plato ascribed 
logical priority to the forms and elevated the realm of being above the world of 
becoming.”121 What results is the theological idea that “God is eternal and His 
creation is temporal.”122  
 Even though these Greek philosophical accounts of Being were greatly 
influential in the development of philosophical thinking, it was the Christian church 
that inherited and expanded their insights. Grenz writes that “insofar as Christian 
theologians carried forward the trajectory of ontological reflection bequeathed to 
them by their Greek philosophical forebears, the fortunes of Being came to be tied to 
their speculations.”123 It is because of this fusion of Greek thinking with Christian 
theology in its earliest stages that the issue becomes relevant to biblical 
interpretation. 
 Yet what is the influence of a timeless conception of Being upon one’s 
outlook on reality, and consequently, upon biblical interpretation? To address this 
                                                 
 
120 Grenz, Named God, 25. 
121 Ibid., 26. 
122 Gulley, Systematic Theology: Prolegomena, 6. Gulley goes on to add Plato’s 
own words on the difference between divine eternity and human time: for Plato, the 
world is the divine initiative to make a “moveable image of Eternity.” See Plato, 
Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 75–77. 
123 Grenz, Named God, 34. 
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question, one must keep in mind the two main characteristics of a timeless 
conception of Being: the issue of appearance versus reality and the elevation of Being 
to a timeless realm above a world marked by change.  
 Much can be said about the impact of the issue of appearance versus reality, 
seen in the Platonic developments of Being, in hermeneutics. Bridging the Platonic 
understanding of Being to hermeneutics, Manfred Oeming understands that “in 
accordance with the Platonic teaching that things are something other than what 
they appear to be, the undignified actions of the god as well as contradictions within 
the text are re-interpreted as ethical truths and natural laws.”124 In other words, what 
Oeming attempts to convey here is an idea that flows from this Platonic 
interpretation of Being and directly affects biblical interpretation—that a timeless 
understanding of Being allows the interpreter to bypass the literal meaning of the 
historical biblical text. The idea that the appearance of things is to be distinguished 
from the reality of things effectively lays the foundation for the following attitude: 
“Good exegetes must never limit themselves to the vague and superficial literal 
meaning of the text; the exegete must free herself from such lowly errors and ascend 
to the true spiritual meaning of the work.”125 
 This conception provided the context for the appearance and lifespan of 
allegorical interpretations of Scripture, and consequently, to the modern disregard 
for, or suspicion of, a literal reading of the biblical text. These characteristics 
                                                 
 
124 Manfred Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006), 10. 
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commonly seen even in contemporary hermeneutics, then, have roots in a Platonic 
conception of Being that creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality.126 The 
Platonic timeless interpretation of Being leads to this hermeneutical principle: things 
as they appear in history are not things as they are.  
 This principle—that things as they appear in history are not things as they 
are—has appeared in many forms throughout the history of philosophy and 
theology. As noted earlier, even though the location of truth and knowledge shifted 
from the object in objectivist epistemology to the subject in subjectivist epistemology, 
the timeless conception of Being as a macro-hermeneutical presupposition remained 
intact.  
 The assumption of Being as timeless at the level of ontology naturally 
influenced the level of epistemology, of humanity being able to grasp reality 
altogether. David Hume (1711–1776), for instance, understood that interpreters 
“cannot have knowledge about the transcendent.”127 Ronald H. Nash traces the 
influence of a timeless conception of Being upon biblical interpretation. Nash 
correctly observes that while Hume had an epistemological gap preventing human 
subjects from knowing transcendent, timeless things, Kant had his own epistemic 
barrier to reality: “Kant’s system had the effect of erecting a wall between the world 
                                                 
 
125 Ibid., 9. 
126 Reality here implies that which is: in other words, one’s interpretation of 
Being. In this sense, the senses cannot grasp reality as it is, only as it appears. 
127 Nash, Word of God, 20. 
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as it appears to us and the world as it really is.”128 
 Every philosophical and theological system has attempted to come to terms 
with the problem of appearance and reality, or what Kant called the phenomenal 
world (that which “appears”) and the noumenal world (that which “is”).129 This 
problem affects not only the readers of the biblical text (as to what they can 
comprehend about the divine through the text), but also the parameters of what is 
real or possible in the depictions of the biblical text (how the biblical characters 
comprehended the divine). Because of the ontological assumption of a timeless 
Being, the resolution to this problem became increasingly complex.130 
 Now I turn to the second Parmenidean-Platonic characteristic of timeless 
                                                 
 
128 Ibid., 27. 
129 Ibid. In the words of Kant: “We ordinarily distinguish quite well between 
that which is essentially attached to the intuition of appearances, and is valid for 
every human in general, and that which pertains to them only contingently because it 
is not valid for the relation to sensibility in general but only for a particular situation 
or organization of this or that sense. And thus one calls the first cognition one that 
represents the object in itself, but the second one only its appearance.” In Immanuel 
Kant, Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood, Critique of Pure Reason, The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 169. 
130 Such conceptions of appearance and reality directly influence the objectives 
of this study, namely, the God-human relationship. Scholars debate the implications 
of Kant’s division of phenomenal and noumenal realities. For some, Kant “posited 
the knowledge of God and eternal life for the sake of morality, denying the 
possibility of any sensual experience of God’s presence.” See Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, “The Postmodern as Premodern: The Theology of D. Stephen Long,” in 
Interpreting the Postmodern: Responses to Radical Orthodoxy, ed. Rosemary Radford 
Ruether and Marion Grau (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 78. Naturally, the 
complexity of the problem is not confined to philosophical and theological circles, 




Being: the elevation of what is real above the temporal world marked by change. 
Oliver Glanz writes on its implications in the realm of epistemology:  
When Being is defined as timeless, the ontological framework consequently 
conceives ultimate reality as timeless. Timelessness further implies that Being 
exists independently from the cognitive subject. This means that the 
interpretation of Being as timeless automatically creates a gap between being and 
Being, as they do not share the same time frame. This gap, albeit in different 
ways, exists both in the Platonic and Kantian line of thinking.131 
 
In order for the reader to have a better grasp of what is presented here, I will review 
the basic understanding of Being.  
 The concept of Being is the broadest concept or idea that human minds can 
reach.132 Being is the broadest conception of what is real. The ontology of something 
is, in short, the description of how that something “is” or “exists.” This difference 
between Being (as the broadest conception of reality human minds can fathom) and 
all things real (beings) is crucial for the subsequent analysis of how theologians and 
exegetes approach the text.  
 From the time of Plato through the time of Hume and Kant, the same 
conception of Being as timeless remains. Following the insight of Glanz, what 
happens when Being is interpreted as timeless is a break between that which is, or 
reality (Being), and the entities immersed in it (beings). The first consequence of 
                                                 
 
Religious Truth and Religious Diversity, American University Studies Series VII, 288 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 22–38. 
131 Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional,” 232. 
132 On the relation of Being to thinking, Canale understands that “the 
ontological framework stands on the fact that ‘thinking’ and ‘Being’ belong 
together.” Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason, 35. 
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upholding a timeless view of Being in interpretation is, therefore, that everything in 
the physical world of change and time will naturally be understood as an analogy to 
a timeless reality determined a priori. It is this break between the subject and the object 
in the structure of reason, maintained in the work of both Plato and Kant by a 
timeless interpretation of Being, that leads some biblical interpreters knowingly or 
unknowingly to see the objective realities of the biblical text as analogies of that 
which is ultimately real in a timeless sense.  
 In sum, as it pertains to biblical interpretation, the choice of a timeless 
conception of Being implies that what is depicted in the text is analogical speech in 
time about a timeless reality beyond time, history, or the world. I will revisit this 
crucial issue below when I address how a timeless conception of Being influences the 
understanding of God and God-acts in the interpretation of the text. However, before 
I continue to examine the implications of a timeless conception of Being upon 
biblical interpretation, I will briefly turn to an alternative conception of Being: 
namely, Being as a temporal reality. 
 
Being as Temporal in Interpretation 
 
 So far, I have attempted to outline the scope and influence of the conception 
of Being as timeless throughout the history of philosophy and theology. As I turn to 
the alternate interpretation of Being as temporal,133 I will focus on two main 
                                                 
 
133 Richard Rice, when speaking of the traditional, classical view of God, 
writes, “For most of Christian history, one idea of God and his relation to the world 
has dominated the church’s perspective, among thinkers and general believers alike, 




representatives of this position: first, the proponents of what is known as open 
theism, or the open view of God,134 and second, Fernando Canale.  
 In the words of Richard Rice, the open view of God is a “striking 
alternative”135 to the traditional, classical, timeless view of God. Breaking the 
Platonic conception of a dualistic world split into a sphere of God/ideas and a 
sphere of space and time, the open view of God claims that “God interacts with His 
creatures”136 in history—that is, in the changeable historical flow of events, and not 
                                                 
 
Support for a New Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the 
Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark Pinnock et al. (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1994), 11. This is how Rice introduces his alternate conception of Being 
and consequently his position on God and how God relates to the world and 
humanity. He concludes by saying that the traditional view of God leads his 
relationship to the world to be characterized as “one of mastery and control.” Ibid.   
134 For an introduction to the open view of God, see Clark H. Pinnock, Most 
Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2001); Clark H. 
Pinnock, ed., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding 
of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994); John E. Sanders, The God Who Risks: 
A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998); Gregory A. Boyd, 
God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 2000); William Hasker, Thomas Jay Oord, and Dean W. Zimmerman, God in 
an Open Universe: Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011). 
Since traditional evangelical theology is grounded in classical theism, that is, in 
classical timeless ontology, it is only natural to observe several evangelical thinkers 
writing in opposition to the open theistic conception: Bruce A. Ware, Their God Is 
Too Small: Open Theism and the Undermining of Confidence in God (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2003); John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth, Beyond the 
Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2003); John M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2001). This controversy indicates that the new perspective of 
God is a formal alternative to classical ontology, although only developed 
theologically, and not so much philosophically. 
135 Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” 15. 
136 Ibid., 15. 
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from beyond the world. In classical and modern times, God, ideas, and truth were 
considered inaccessible to humanity. Open theists break from their predecessors at an 
ontological level as they deal with the doctrine of God, but not as they deal with the 
conception of Being itself. 
 William Hasker, outlining the philosophical and theological foundations of 
the open view, understands that “the doctrine of divine timelessness is not taught in 
the Bible and does not reflect the way biblical writers understood God.”137 In 
addition, Hasker writes that “there is simply no trace in Scripture of the elaborate 
metaphysical and conceptual apparatus that is required to make sense of divine 
timelessness.”138 In this sense, proponents of the open view depart from the 
conception of Being as timeless theologically as they attempt to ground its alternative 
within the lines of Scripture.  
 At the outset, then, the open view of God questions the central tenets of the 
traditional, classical view of God. Its proponents ask the logical questions any 
thinker would ask in attempting to merge a classical timeless ontology with the 
biblical text. For instance, “If God is truly timeless, so that temporal determinations 
of ‘before’ and ‘after’ do not apply to him, then how can God act in time, as the 
Scriptures say that he does?”139 In other words, the proponents of the open view of 
                                                 
 
137 William Hasker, “A Philosophical Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A 
Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark Pinnock et al. 





God ask proper questions as they attempt to relate the biblical material to the 
ontological assumptions with which it was interpreted for over two millennia.  
 Yet the critique given by the open view project does not relate to the macro-
hermeneutical principle of ontology they seem to overcome via the meso-
hermeneutical level of doctrine (from God as timeless to God as temporal). In 
reality, the criticism is toward the doctrinal implications of such macro-
hermeneutical changes, especially as they relate to the doctrine of God’s 
foreknowledge, providence, and human freedom.140 
 God’s knowledge is a crucial doctrinal issue for open-view thinkers. Clark 
Pinnock, for instance, believes that the rejection of Being as timeless implies that 
“God’s close engagement with time implies that God does not yet know all that will 
eventually happen,”141 and “if the future does not yet exist, God may not yet know 
all of it.”142 The conception of a God who does not know the future is an example of 
a doctrinal position presented by open-view theologians as part of the temporal view 
of God. In this sense, God’s time is univocal to human time: that is, God experiences 
the sequence and limitations of time just as humanity does. Both God and humanity 
                                                 
 
140 Because this study focuses on the macro-hermeneutical or philosophical 
issues that influence interpretation, doctrinal issues are out of its scope. But, since 
there is an overlap between how such macro-hermeneutical conceptions affect 
biblical interpretation and these doctrinal standpoints, I will provide a preliminary 
evaluation of the issue.  
141 Clark H. Pinnock, “Reconstructing Evangelical Theology: Is The Open 
View of God a Good Idea?,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 41, no. 2 (2003): 
218–19. 
142 Ibid., 219. 
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stand equally in the flow of time and history, and because the future is not an object 
to be known (since it does not exist yet), neither God nor humans can foresee it.  
 Among the critics of open theism is Fernando Canale, who questions open 
theists’ understanding of what they are discovering through biblical analysis of God’s 
time while sustaining the conception of Being as temporal.143 Canale writes: 
On the surface the controversy that the open view of God has generated revolves 
around a small issue within the doctrine of divine providence. Yet, at the deeper 
hermeneutical level, most open-view theologians have not yet perceived their 
horizon shift from classical philosophical timelessness to biblical temporality.144 
 
In short, Canale assesses that the work of open-view theologians revolves around 
what they believe to be the doctrinal implications of the temporality of God, and not 
around the importance of uncovering the full potential and philosophical 
implications of the ontological shift from Being as timeless to Being as temporal.  
 At this stage, I will review some key characteristics of the open view as an 
alternate ontological standpoint to the interpretation of Being. First, open-view 
thinkers believe that a timeless ontology is incompatible with the biblical text, since 
the Bible itself proposes a temporal conception of God. Second, open-view thinkers 
draw the implications of this macro-hermeneutical shift at the level of doctrine, with 
attention to the doctrine of God (foreknowledge, providence, etc.). And finally, 
open-view thinkers interpret divine time univocally as it relates to human time: that 
                                                 
 
143 Canale attempts to overcome the traditional timeless ontology present in 
Christian theology through a temporal view of God and reality without resorting to 
the open view of God. For more on his work as it relates to open theism, see Canale, 
“Evangelical Theology and Open Theism,” 16–34.  
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is, they see divine and human time as one and the same. The point here is that 
although open-view thinkers focus on the doctrinal outcome of a possible change at 
the macro-hermeneutical level of the interpretation of Being, they make no attempt 
to develop the philosophical underpinnings of such an outcome.  
 A second alternate position that embraces the possibility of divine temporality 
grounded on a conception of Being as temporal is found in the work of Fernando 
Canale. Canale agrees with open-view thinkers that “the timeless horizon has it 
origin in philosophical speculation and the temporal-historical horizon has its origin 
in biblical revelation.”145 Yet, for Canale, the biblical portrayal of Being as temporal 
should lead evangelical theology deeper than the doctrinal stances present in open-
view theology related to the doctrine of God and human freedom. Canale 
understands that a change at the macro-hermeneutical level of the interpretation of 
Being should affect “the entire range of Christian theology.”146 
 This assertion implies that Canale assesses the problem of timeless Being and 
God’s time from a different angle than do open-view theologians. For Canale, the 
uncovering of Being as temporal stems from a macro-hermeneutical (philosophical) 
level rather than a meso-hermeneutical (theological/doctrinal) or micro-
                                                 
 
144 Fernando L. Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?,” Andrews 
University Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 121. 
145 Ibid. Even though classical theists, open theists, and Fernando Canale all 
appeal to Scripture to justify their approaches to the question of Being, they all seem 
aware that “it is not difficult to surround an idea with biblical quotations.” See Rice, 
“Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” 15. 
146 Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?,” 122. 
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hermeneutical (exegetical) one. His focus is on the philosophical macro-
hermeneutical structure that inherently influences doctrinal and textual issues. In 
fact, according to Canale, it is the focus on meso- and micro-hermeneutical issues 
that brings inevitable disagreements between classical theists and open theists. For 
Canale, “the micro and meso hermeneutical level where the controversy between 
classical and open theism takes place is conditioned by the deeper and foundational 
macro-hermeneutical level.”147 
 So far, one could say that Canale agrees with open-view thinkers that the 
Bible does not endorse a timeless conception of God. Yet, in regard to the 
philosophical background of this doctrinal standpoint, Canale breaks with them and 
asserts that the development of such a shift should begin at the macro-hermeneutical 
level, and only then influence meso- and micro-hermeneutical issues. But how does 
Canale sustain a temporal conception of Being while avoiding the meso-
hermeneutical commitments of open theism that are widely criticized—namely, 
issues concerning the limitation of God’s knowledge, power, and human freedom?  
 Canale’s assessment of the biblical text on the question of divine time takes on 
a broader scope. Canale writes, “We should exercise care not to conceive that God is 
limited by time as his creatures are. . . . God’s time is not to be conceived as being 
identical to created time (univocal), or as totally different from it (equivocal), but as 
analogical to our time.”148 According to Canale, Scripture does not view God as 
                                                 
 
147 Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism,” 24. 
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experiencing timelessness: rather, it presents a God who “experiences the fullness of 
time, while we experience it only partially.”149 In other words, God is not bound to a 
timeless reality, but “can experience the temporal succession of future-present-past 
both in the deepness of his divinity and at the limited level of his creation.”150 
 In sum, both open-view theologians and Fernando Canale provide an 
alternate interpretation of Being. While open-view thinkers do not focus on the 
philosophical underpinnings of their doctrinal position, especially as it relates to the 
significance of Being as temporal, Canale’s A Criticism of Theological Reason provides 
the philosophical basis for his doctrinal positions. The difference between these 
approaches, apart from attention to the philosophical interpretation of Being as a 
basis for doctrinal construction, is the understanding of divine time. While open-view 
thinkers understand divine time as univocal to human time, Canale views divine 
time as analogical to human time while carrying univocal and equivocal 
components.151 
 These perspectives directly affect thinkers’ approach to the biblical text as well 
as their interpretations of the dynamic between God and humanity. The edifice of 
Christian theology has been built on the concept of a timeless God separate from the 
created world. At the same time, scholars from different backgrounds observe that 




151 Univocal in the sense that both God and man experience past, present, and 
future, and equivocal in the sense that God experiences the fullness of time while 
humans experience it partially, or conditionally, due to sin and mortality. 
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this perspective is incompatible with biblical depictions of God’s relationship to 
humanity.  
 This brief diversion from analysis of the influence of Being as timeless upon 
interpretation brings the analysis back to where it left off—the relationship of 
philosophy and theology and its implications for biblical interpretation.  
 
Onto-Theology in Interpretation 
 
 Now that some preliminary implications of how timeless and temporal 
conceptions of Being influence interpretation have been laid out, I will turn briefly to 
the concept of onto-theology and how some scholars, because of the issues raised 
above, attempt to depart from the proximity between classical philosophy and 
Christian theology.152   
 On the origin and implications of onto-theology for the theological method, 
Canale writes:  
Dependence on Greek ontology brought about two paradigmatic changes at the 
macro-hermeneutical level. The conviction that neo-Platonism properly described 
the nature of reality led Christian theologians to adopt its views on God’s being 
and human nature for theological use. Thus the “onto-theo-logical” movement as 
the basis of the constitution of Christian tradition began. The notions that God’s 
being and the human soul are not temporal but timeless realities became 
hermeneutical guides in the construction of Christian theology. They played a 
decisive macro-hermeneutical role in the interpretation of Scripture (micro 
hermeneutics) and the construction of Christian doctrines ([meso] hermeneutics). 
                                                 
 
152 For more on onto-theology and its implications for philosophy and 
theology, see Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern 
Christian Faith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001); Jeffrey W. Robbins, 
Between Faith and Thought: An Essay on the Ontotheological Condition (Charlottesville, 




They also led in the interpretation, formulation, and application of the 
theological method.153 
 
In short, reliance upon an a priori conception of timeless Being leads to an “onto-
logical” or even “onto-theo-logical” development in interpretation, where the 
“theological” element is interpreted by the “ontological” conceptions that precede it. 
That is, the biblical portrayal of God and His acts, the “theological component,” is 
interpreted and understood in light of a timeless conception of Being, the 
“ontological component.”  
 A few biblical scholars have noticed these problems and added insight to the 
discussion from a biblical point of view. Among them is Jacques B. Doukhan. 
Doukhan asserts that for the Hebrew mindset, Western conditions of thought are not 
primary, and it is the theological component, the knowledge of God and His acts, 
that precedes the ontological component. Doukhan writes: “Hebrew thought does 
not construct the truth as a philosophical system; rather it is essentially the response 
to an event. The fact that the Hebrew Bible starts with the event of Creation points to 
that movement.”154 
 For Doukhan and others,155 then, biblical interpretation should be founded on 
                                                 
 
153 Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?,” 109. 
154 Jacques B. Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians: A Textbook for the Study of 
Biblical Hebrew in Relation to Hebrew Thinking (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1993), 192–93. 
155 Apart from the examples already given in the introduction to this study is 
G. Ernest Wright, who observes the effects of the systematic control of propositional 




the parameters set forth by the text. It is not onto-logical or even onto-theo-logical, 
since for both of those approaches the conception of timeless Being is established 
prior to the interpretation of God and His acts in the biblical text. If the 
manifestation of God through His acts as recorded in Scripture is primary in the 
structure of reason, then what is implied in the structure of reason is a possible theo-
onto-logical orientation.157 In other words, theo-ontology implies the precedence and 
ground of everything in the revelation of God within Scripture. Divine revelation in 
Scripture provides the foundation and the content to interpret Being, influencing the 
framework of reason. 
 Thus far, the evaluation of ontology in biblical interpretation has pointed out 
the influential character of a timeless conception of Being. Being as timeless creates a 
dichotomy between Being or things as they are (essence/reality) and beings or things 
as they appear (matter/appearance), a conception that for some is incompatible with 
the depictions of God and His acts in the biblical text.  
 Now, I turn to the problem of how a timeless conception of Being can directly 
affect the conception of God and God’s actions as recorded in the biblical text.  
                                                 
 
Hebraic.” See G. Ernest Wright, God Who Acts, Studies in Biblical Theology 8 
(London: SCM, 1964), 11.  
157 Yet even the theo-onto-logical designation can carry unverified 
assumptions that have the potential to be irreconcilable to the biblical text. Again, 
this is the complexity of the task at hand. Perhaps new terminology must be 
developed in order to express the biblical correspondent to these designations. Even 
so, the movement from onto-theology to theo-ontology was heralded by Fernando 
Canale years ago. See, for instance, Canale, Critique of Theological Reason, 388–409. 
Others such as Stanley Grenz have also used the term “theo-ontology,” but used 








 So far, I have outlined the influence of timeless and temporal conceptions of 
Being upon interpretation at the level of assumptions. This section will concentrate 
on the influence of the timeless conception of Being upon the interpretation of the 
biblical text, with a special focus on God and God’s actions as depicted by the 
biblical text.158 At this stage, I will address only the timeless conception of Being, 
since it is the one that permeates the majority of contemporary theological and 
exegetical interpretation. 
 At the outset, it is important to review the characteristics of a timeless 
conception of Being delineated previously. First, a timeless conception of Being 
creates a dichotomy between “beings,” that is, things as they appear (phenomenal 
world), and Being, that is, things as they are (noumenal world). Second, and 
consequently, a timeless conception of Being raises ultimate reality above the 
phenomenal world marked by change and time. 
 The dichotomy of appearance versus reality is made visible in interpretation 
through an approach to the text that assumes a break between “being” including 
                                                 
 
158The idea of a God who acts is not limited to the Hebrew Bible. James A. 
Wiseman correctly observes that “in all of the major theistic traditions, God is firmly 
believed to be a God who acts.” In James A. Wiseman, Theology and Modern Science: 
Quest for Coherence (New York: Continuum, 2002), 113. Further study would be 
necessary to outline possible parallels between how God acts in each religious 
community or theistic tradition and how the biblical text presents the dynamic; such 
analysis is out of the scope of this study. 
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texts and “Being” implying reality. In other words, the philosophical dichotomy 
between being and Being is appropriated in interpretation by an analogical approach. 
While reality is timeless, the text is temporal. When timeless reality becomes one 
side of the analogy, the relation between the subject in the world and the object as 
timeless inevitably renders the analogy unintelligible, since subject and object are not 
on the same platform of intelligibility. The attempt of those who sustain Being as 
timeless is to interpret things in the world and in texts (beings) through ultimate, 
timeless reality (Being).  
 For example, the text of Exod 3 presents God speaking from a burning bush. 
While the majority of scholars would not contest that this is what the text says, their 
ontological macro-hermeneutical assumptions prevent them from concluding that the 
reality depicted in the text occurred as it is narrated within the flow of historical 
reality. Once the conception of Being is interpreted as timeless, all entities in the 
world (things as they appear) will be understood analogically in relation to reality 
(things as they are). And when one assumes a timeless conception of Being, things as 
they are in the world are not as they are in reality.  
 This analogical relation between a temporal being (subject) and timeless Being 
(object) I will call in this study unintelligible analogy. Unintelligible analogy implies (1) 
that the broadest conception of reality in human minds, Being, determines the flow 
of interpretation by describing what is real, and (2) that ultimately, with a timeless 
interpretation of Being, one cannot know “what is” in the text through the text 
alone, but must resort to external ontological inferences. Thus, a timeless 
interpretation of Being can distort what the text attempts to say in regard to the God-
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human relation, especially if the macro-hermeneutical standpoint of the biblical 
author is incompatible with an interpretation of Being as timeless. Within the text, 
Being as timeless creates a possible unintelligible analogy between things as they are 
and things as they appear, since the text is written within the flow of time and 
history. 
 At this stage, it is necessary to further articulate the analogical relation 
between text (being) and reality (Being), and the possibility that an unintelligible 
analogy may influence interpretation through a timeless conception of Being.  
 
Langdon Gilkey and the travail of Biblical interpretation 
 
 In order to uncover the overall significance of a timeless understanding of 
Being as it applies to the text through the interpretation of God and God’s acts as 
recorded in the biblical text, I will revisit a criticism of the state of biblical theology 
heretofore mentioned in passing: Langdon B. Gilkey’s renowned article 
“Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language.”159 
 Gilkey begins his essay by positing what he believes to be not only the 
                                                 
 
159 Much of this section will be devoted to Gilkey’s evaluation of biblical 
theology. I give his analysis a central role in this section, in this chapter, and behind 
the rhetoric of this study as a whole, since, in my understanding, biblical scholars 
have not overcome the problem Gilkey outlines in this essay. Dan O. Via is at least 
one other scholar who sees Gilkey’s problem as unanswered: “If the act of God is a 
theological interpretation of history . . . Where does revelation occur? Langdon 
Gilkey raised this issue in 1961, and we are still dealing with it.” In Dan O. Via, The 
Revelation of God and/as Human Reception: In the New Testament (Harrisburg, PA: 
Trinity Press International, 1997), 28. For more on the effects of Gilkey’s criticism in 
Old Testament theology, see Kaiser, Old Testament Theology, 1–4. This study builds 
upon Gilkey’s criticism in attempting to harmonize text and assumptions, since it is 
at their intersection that the interpretation of the biblical text is greatly affected. 
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problem, but also “the source of the difficulties and ambiguities which exist in 
current biblical theology.”160 As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the 
problem Gilkey notices in contemporary theology is that it “is half liberal and 
modern, on the one hand, and half biblical and orthodox, on the other, i.e., its 
worldview or cosmology is modern, while its theological language is biblical and 
orthodox.”161 According to Gilkey, what triggers this dichotomy is what he calls the 
“scientific interpretation of observable events,”162 an outlook that leads to the notion 
of a “causal continuum of space-time experience”163 that inherently negates the 
possibility of supernatural events (like those depicted in the biblical text). 
 The criticism that Gilkey sets forth here is directly tied to the issue at hand—
the influence of the principle of ontology upon interpretation. One way of looking at 
his criticism of the bipolar approach to the text—liberal/modern in cosmology, and 
biblical/orthodox in language—can be based on the dichotomy between phenomenal 
and noumenal, between things as they appear and things as they are. The scientific-
modernistic mindset that inevitably operates within a timeless interpretation of Being 
cannot endorse supernatural elements in the world, or, consequently, in the biblical 
text. 
 Gilkey correctly outlines the results of holding to such assumptions in 
                                                 
 
160 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 194. 
161 Ibid. 




interpretation and to the “validity one assigns to biblical narratives and so to the way 
one understands their meaning”164 as he writes: 
Suddenly a vast panoply of divine deeds and events recorded in Scripture are no 
longer regarded as having actually happened. Not only, for example, do the six 
days of creation, the historical fall in Eden, and the flood seem to us historically 
untrue, but even more the majority of divine deeds in the biblical history of the 
Hebrew people become what we choose to call symbols rather than plain old 
historical facts. To mention only a few: Abraham’s unexpected child; the many 
divine visitations; the words and directions to the patriarchs; the plagues visited 
on the Egyptians; the pillar of fire; the parting of the seas; the verbal deliverance 
of covenantal law on Sinai; the strategic and logistic help in the conquest; the 
audible voice heard by the prophets; and so on—all these “acts” vanish from the 
plane of historical reality and enter the neverland of “religious interpretation” by 
the Hebrew people.165 
 
According to Gilkey, this denial of the factual historicity of the divine acts recorded 
in the biblical text shifted the theological language from univocal (literal) to 
analogical (proportional meaning).166 The choice of approaching the text with a 
scientific mindset implicitly carries the interpretation of Being as timeless, and in this 
way, the analogical meaning in theological language was established upon the 
ontological break between subject and object. In other words, assuming a timeless 
conception of Being and a dichotomy between beings and Being results in 
unintelligible analogy.167  
                                                 
 
164 Ibid., 195. 
165 Ibid., 195–96. 
166 Ibid., 196.  
167 Such a conclusion is also seen in more scientific approaches to biblical 
interpretation, such as the views of scientist-theologian Arthur Peacocke. He writes: 
“God’s own Being is distinct from anything we can possibly know in the world, then 
God’s nature is ineffable and will always be inaccessible to us, so that we have only 




 A. Berkeley Mickelsen correctly assesses the implications of an unintelligible 
analogical approach to the biblical text when he comments on Gilkey’s conclusions: 
Those who use biblical language analogically rather than univocally are often not 
very clear about what they are doing. If they do not know what one term of the 
analogy means, what God really did or say, then the analogy is unintelligible. It 
is not analogical language but rather equivocal language (different unrelated 
meanings)!168 
 
A timeless conception of Being leads into a dichotomy in one’s outlook on reality, 
between things as they appear and things as they are, and this presupposition leads 
interpreters of Scripture to understand the text in analogy to an ultimate timeless 
reality that by definition they cannot know. Mickelsen correctly points out that such 
an approach runs the risk of being not only unclear, but unintelligible when one does 
not grasp at least one side of the analogy.169 
                                                 
 
Peacocke, “The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with 
Humanity?” in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. 
Robert John Russel (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1999), 
235. The inconsistency in logic here is seen in Peacocke’s move from correctly 
describing the unknowable nature of God to applying the principles mentioned 
above to God’s influence upon events. He equates nature (timeless) with the issue of 
divine action in the world. 
168 A. Berkeley Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1963), 60. 
169 Alan J. Torrance summarizes the theological situation of the past and 
present as he writes: “Theology has traditionally rejected univocal predication 
(which leads to anthropomorphism) and equivocal predication (which implies 
agnosticism) in favor of analogy as a means of referring to God.” See Alan J. 
Torrance, “Analogy,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer et al. (London: SPCK, 2005), 39. So, the risk here seems to be a failed 
analogical understanding of the text that leads to an equivocal approach to its 
content and anthropomorphism. Torrance adds: “If we assume that the word ‘love’ 
is used univocally of humans and also God, we seem to risk the charge of 




 What results, then, from a timeless conception of Being is actually an 
equivocal understanding of the text: one in which timeless content or truth that 
cannot be understood due to its timeless nature is deposited within the historical 
wrapping of the text. In other words, holding to a timeless conception of Being leads 
to an analogical approach to the text that renders the reality of the text, with its 
supernatural events and divine speeches, unintelligible. In the end, what remains is 
an equivocal reading of the text as it pertains to supernatural events and anything 
that contradicts timeless ontology or scientific reasoning.  
 I agree with Mickelsen’s assessment that what Gilkey does in his article is put 
                                                 
 
creature.” Ibid., 39. The analogical understanding espoused by Torrance and the 
minds behind the theological interpretation of Scripture has its roots in the thinking 
of Thomas Aquinas. Torrance himself traces the analogical approach to Scripture to 
him: “In Western thought, this theory has been associated primarily with the thought 
of Thomas Aquinas as interpreted by Cardinal Cajetan.” Ibid. This, of course, 
supports the understanding that the analogical approach to Scripture is grounded on 
classical ontology, and consequently, on a timeless conception of Being. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to point out that neither Aquinas nor Augustine “knew 
Hebrew.” See John C. Collins, The God of Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God’s 
Action in the World (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000), 65. Thus far the term analogy has 
been treated in two different spheres: the first ontological, in Canale’s assessment of 
divine temporality, and the second epistemological, in relation to the influence of 
timeless Being upon the formation and interpretation of the text. These are not to be 
merged together. Canale does not hold a timeless view of Being, so he understands 
that the “text itself” can provide a window into reality, since it is not in distinction to 
the historical dimension of the subject. In this manner, he sees that when one 
interprets Being as historical, the natural analogical relationship between God, 
world, and man can be understood by uncovering the point of view of the biblical 
author concerning what God has revealed (this would be an “intelligible” analogy, 
contrasting with the “unintelligible” analogy of modernity and postmodernity). Even 
so, one of the problems in reaching a clear biblical understanding of Being is 
developing terminology that encompasses the biblical reality without the 
preconceptions that the common philosophical terms carry. 
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“forth a fervent plea for clear thinking,”170 since ambiguity in theological language 
“is a credit to no one.”171 Yet there is a deeper conclusion in Gilkey’s essay still to be 
addressed. Gilkey ends his article by stating that “biblical theology must take 
cosmology and ontology more seriously,”172 and adds: “A contemporary 
understanding of ancient Scriptures depends as much on a careful analysis of our 
present presuppositions as it does on being learned in the religion and faith of the 
past.”173  
 These points summarize the intention of this study to focus on both the 
ontological assumptions within the presuppositional framework of interpreters and 
the necessity to expose those assumptions as they relate to the biblical text. Yet the 
question at this stage is, how do interpreters deal with such ontological standpoints 
in biblical interpretation? How do they harmonize timeless Being with the dichotomy 
of things as they appear and things as they are?  
 To address these questions, I will analyze the work of two representative 
scholars from different time periods who attempted to bridge the gap between 
appearance and reality. 
 
Demythologizing, remythologizing, and God-acts 
 
 Throughout history, biblical interpretation has been directly affected by a 
                                                 
 
170 Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 60. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 203. 
173 Ibid., 205. 
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timeless conception of Being that leads to the possibility of unintelligible analogy. 
Among the thinkers who have attempted to bring intelligibility between things as 
they are and things as they appear in the biblical text is Rudolf Bultmann (1884–
1976).174  
 Bultmann correctly pointed out that “no exegesis is without 
presuppositions,”175 yet he was not known for harmonizing the biblical portrayal of 
reality with the assumptions of the interpreter. Bultmann’s late work operated from 
an existentialist perspective because “from this perspective he sees what is relevant to 
the needs of modern man.”176 This reliance upon existential philosophy led 
Bultmann to the project for which he became primarily known—the 
demythologizing of Scripture.  
 For Bultmann, mythology in its broadest sense was “anything in the Bible 
which is contradictory to a modern scientific world-view.”177 This perspective led 
                                                 
 
174 For more on Rudolf Bultmann’s work, see Bultmann and Ogden, New 
Testament and Mythology; Roger Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing: Philosophy 
and Historiography in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Leiden: Brill, 1974); Paul 
Ricoeur, “Preface to Bultmann,” in Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays 
in Hermeneutics (London: Continuum, 2004), 377–96; Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 166–
84. 
175 Bultmann and Ogden, New Testament and Mythology, 145. 
176 Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 66. 
177 Ibid., 68. This premise is still prevalent today within biblical interpretation. 
Some see Ernst Troeltsch as one of the key players in this regard, since Troeltsch 
“proposed three principles, and these became axiomatic in the New Quest. First, he 
insisted on the principle of doubt—that is, that all statements of an historical nature 
are open to doubt and require corroborative evidence if they are to be accepted. The 
second was the principle of analogy—that courses of events in the ancient world 




Bultmann to conclude that “the world-picture of the New Testament is a mythical 
world picture.”178 Operating from a dichotomized view of appearance and reality—a 
perspective resulting from a timeless conception of Being—Bultmann considered the 
things of this world (appearances) to be appropriately interpreted by the scientific 
method. For Bultmann, the scientific method was how one arrived at some 
intelligibility within the unintelligible analogy between an interpreter in the flow of 
history and time and an object that is conceived as timeless. In other words, 
Bultmann assumed the Platonic cosmological dichotomy, and dealt with its paradox 
by resorting to science and existentialism179 in order to arrive at the meaning of the 
biblical text. 
 In his project of demythologizing Scripture, Bultmann was faced with the 
question of whether “the New Testament proclamation has truth that is independent 
                                                 
 
(following the physical laws devised by Isaac Newton) posited the principle of 
correlation, by which he understood that every event in the natural world is the result 
of a natural cause.” In Paul J. Achtemeier, Joel B. Green, and Marianne Meye 
Thompson, Introducing the New Testament: Its Literature and Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 59. 
178 Bultmann and Ogden, New Testament and Mythology, 1. 
179 Along with scientific methodology, as mentioned previously, Bultmann 
was influenced by existential philosophy. Notice how Mickelsen comments on the 
presuppositions that Bultmann brought to his demythologizing project: “Bultmann 
saw clearly that the interpreter must surrender any pretense of neutrality and come to 
the text fully recognizing his own attitude and the framework of thought in which he 
operates. The earlier Bultmann had as his own framework the tradition of the 
Church and the Church’s faith. But the Bultmann of twenty-five or thirty years later 
talks about ‘pre-understanding.’ The current framework for his ‘pre-understanding’ is 
existentialist philosophy. . . . Because he thinks that from this perspective he sees 
what is relevant to the needs of modern man.” Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 66. 
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of the mythical world picture.”180 If the biblical text had truth beyond the historical-
mythical “wrapping,” the task of theology would be to “demythologize the Christian 
proclamation.”181 Denying the reality of the mythical world-picture of the New 
Testament (and the Old Testament), including heaven, hell, angels, and divine 
speech and acts, was the object of this demythologizing effort. For Bultmann, if the 
world-picture of the Bible was maintained, this would lead to the sacrifice of one’s 
own intellect.182 In Bultmann’s words: 
Any satisfaction of the demand [of maintaining the biblical world picture without 
criticism] would be a forced sacrificium intellectus, and any of us who would make 
it would be peculiarly split and untruthful. For we would affirm for our faith or 
religion a world picture that our life otherwise denied. Criticism of the New 
Testament is simply a given with modern thinking as it has come to us through 
our history.183 
                                                 
 
180 Ibid., 3. 
181 Ibid. 
182 The tendency within biblical scholarship was to assume a scientific 
perspective that, following Troetsch’s influence, understood the world in causal 
terms. Concerning this presupposition, Mickelsen writes that such “assumption is 
only a presupposition that [the interpreter’s] experience is the only possible 
experience and represents the only experience of any other person or groups of 
persons who lived on this planet. The scholar who assumes this has made his 
empirical experience and that of his contemporaries the sole criterion of what is 
possible.” In Mickelsen, Interpreting the Bible, 67. Gilkey understands that this 
tendency is still prevalent; he writes that the “causal nexus in space and time which 
Enlightenment science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind . . . is also 
assumed by modern theologians and scholars; since they participate in the modern 
world of science both intellectually and existentially, they can scarcely do anything 
else.” In Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 195. 
183 Ibid., 3–4. This suspicion toward the depictions of the biblical text, also 
known as methodological doubt, is another indication of a reliance on scientific 
methodology to determine the epistemological and ontological framework of 
Reason. While the scholar who does not submit to it sacrifices his intellect, the 
implementation of the principle in biblical interpretation causes another death—the 





Here one is confronted with the same problem that Gilkey encountered in his 
evaluation of the “travail” in biblical theology.  
 In the background of Bultmann’s project is the dichotomy between things as 
they appear and things as they are. Bultmann’s interest is arriving at the truthful 
aspects of the Gospel proclamation, and it is science and existential philosophy that 
sift truth from myth in the biblical text, bringing the demythologizing project to its 
full completion—a biblical text and faith devoid of divine actions or speeches.184 The 
                                                 
 
edge of modern critical thinking The hermeneuts of suspicion, in short, accuse 
religious people of having a false consciousness, of projecting their own quite 
mundane self-interests onto God and heaven, where they do not belong. This critical 
consciousness accounts for the so-called death of God.” Ted Peters, God—The 
World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2000), 14. This Cartesian principle is still quite influential in biblical interpretation 
today. Along with a conception of timeless Being that leads to unintelligibility in 
interpretation, some observe that the implementation of the principle of doubt in 
biblical interpretation leads to “a mind emptied of rationality and order.” Leon O. 
Hyson, Through Faith to Understanding: Wesleyan Essays on Vital Christianity 
(Lexington, KY: Emeth, 2005), 32. Apart from the scientific use of the principle of 
doubt that leads to suspicion toward the text, I cannot ignore that “Husserl’s call to 
return ‘to the things themselves’ amounts to a bracketing of the real, to a return to 
the things as they appear to consciousness, the things as phenomena, as they are 
perceived by consciousness” and that “such a view is bound up with a principle of 
doubt towards the reality of things.” See Carole Bourne-Taylor and Ariene 
Mildenberg, eds., Phenomenology, Modernism, and Beyond (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), 
25. In this sense, apart from its scientific implementation in interpretation, the 
principle of doubt might still be useful when applied to the human subject, as this 
study proposes. 
184 The influence of science upon the interpretation of Scripture is not first 
observed in the works of Bultmann, of course. Mark. C. Gignilliat correctly notes 
that the work of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) is where this assumption was first 
openly implemented. Spinoza assumed that “the Bible is a product of human history 




possibility of the biblical text itself presenting the content in which to interpret Being 
on a historical-temporal basis in order to render the analogy intelligible is 
inconceivable to Bultmann.  
 A second scholar who has attempted to deal with the gap between things as 
they are and appear, sustained by a timeless conception of Being, is Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer’s Remythologizing Theology185 can be seen as a contemporary 
attempt to overcome Bultmann’s project; it deals with the same ontological and 
interpretative issues.186 
 Vanhoozer begins his book by introducing the text of 2 Pet 1:16 to establish a 
clear distinction between the gospel and myth.187 Vanhoozer departs from the notion 
of the gospel as “myth” (seen in the work of Bultmann) and tries to rescue the idea 
that the biblical content is “mythos,” via Paul Ricoeur’s work.188 For Vanhoozer, 
                                                 
 
185 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and 
Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
186 In the beginning of his book, Vanhoozer wrestles with the implications of a 
timeless ontology and its effect upon biblical interpretation as he writes that from 
“the standpoint of remythologizing theology, the danger in affirming God’s 
timelessness is that it tends to dedramatize or demythosize the biblical accounts of 
God’s dialogical action.” Thus, Vanhoozer attempts to “suggest a possible way 
forward through the conceptual thickets pertaining to the acts of the eternal God in 
human time.” Ibid., 75. This is exactly the issue at hand: how to bring intelligibility 
into unintelligible analogy? How does an interpreter in the flow of history and time 
grasp the “eternal truth” within a text that is also conditioned by history and time—
not to mention the textual depictions of how God acts and speaks themselves?  
187 Ibid., 1.  
188 Vanhoozer writes: “The present work develops Ricoeur’s suggestion in a 
communicative direction: the mythos of Jesus Christ renders intelligible the field of 
triune communicative praxis.” Ibid., 5. 
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“Mythos is Aristotle’s term for dramatic plot: a unified course of action that includes 
a beginning, middle, and end.”189 Vanhoozer appropriates Aristotle’s term mythos to 
refer to the intelligible dramatic framework of the gospel (and God’s actions through 
Jesus), in place of Bultmann’s notion of myth. 
 Vanhoozer addresses similar issues to Bultmann, relating to two distinct 
points that readers by now will recognize. First, he understands that in a post-
Kantian philosophical environment, it is natural for Bultmann to understand that 
“God is neither an object that can be known nor a being that can be experienced in 
space-time.”190 Second, Vanhoozer understands that the project of demythologizing 
“is best viewed as a strategy for translating biblical statements about God into 
existential statements about human beings.”191  
 In this, Vanhoozer has identified some of the ontological elements presented 
thus far: the influence of a timeless interpretation of Being upon epistemology, what 
is knowable about God, and its inevitable effect upon the biblical text and 
interpretation. Yet what is the solution to the problem, according to Vanhoozer? 
How can one understand biblical language that includes supernatural divine acts and 
speeches while assuming the contemporary scientific mindset? Here, Vanhoozer 
departs from Bultmann’s project and proposes his “remythologizing” project. 
 Vanhoozer writes: 
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Remythologizing conceives the God-world relation in primarily communicative 
rather than causal terms. Better: it scrutinizes language about causality in order to 
bring out a communicative sense to which the church has not sufficiently 
attended. The category of communication applies analogically to God’s relation 
to the natural world but comes into its own in God’s relation to humanity whose 
paradigm is the God-man, Jesus Christ.192 
 
Here, for the first time, Vanhoozer outlines his understanding of the framework 
within which God relates to the world and consequently to humanity. According to 
Vanhoozer, this framework is conceived not in causal terms, but in communicative 
terms. So, even though Vanhoozer attempts to bring intelligibility into the analogical 
conception of reality through the exchange of myth for mythos, he is still tied to its 
ontological roots. To determine a priori that the text places any causal activity in 
secondary terms as he emphasizes the communicative activity implies that Being is 
interpreted as timeless, and that the realities of the text cannot be grasped as they 
read—with divine action in the world. In other words, Vanhoozer attempts to bring 
intelligibility to an unintelligible analogical framework sustained by a timeless 
ontology via divine communication.  
 Following the work of William Alston,193 Vanhoozer advocates the idea that 
“we may ascribe action to God in a literal or partial univocal manner, for there is a 
                                                 
 
192 For a full perspective of Vanhoozer’s demythologizing project, see 
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 26–30. For the purposes of this study, I will 
highlight only the points that deal with the topic of the God-human relation.  
193 William Alston, “Divine and Human Action,” in Divine & Human Action: 
Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas Morris (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1988). 
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common core to the concepts of human and divine agency.”194 If God acts in only a 
partial univocal manner, this relation cannot accurately be termed “partially 
univocal,” but analogical. In this, Vanhoozer is correct, since God does not act only 
univocally to humanity (as seen in the discussion of divine time). The question is 
whether the analogy he proposes will be sustained by a timeless ontology (without 
divine action as depicted by the text), thus becoming unintelligible analogy, or by a 
temporal ontology (with the possibility of divine action as depicted by the text), 
where it is possible to make sense of the analogy, since subject and object relate within 
the same ontological framework.  
 Vanhoozer answers the question while articulating his understanding of 
divine speech in Scripture. First he resorts to arguments that will make an 
unintelligible analogical reading of Scripture logical and intelligible. He understands 
that in trying to make sense of audible divine speech in the text, there is “no need to 
consider the movement of vocal chords a necessary component of speech,”195 since 
God “does not have vocal chords.”196 Vanhoozer then arrives at his conclusion:  
God may be able to bring about sound, or communicative action, through other, 
                                                 
 
194 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 58. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. Vanhoozer goes on to add: “So the way in which God speaks will not 
be exactly parallel to human speaking. . . . It is therefore legitimate to say ‘God 
(literally) speaks (because he performs communicative acts via words, which is what 
‘speaking’ ordinarily means) even though ‘speaks’ is not being used univocally with 
regard to God and human beings (because the mode of God’s speaking may be 
extraordinary). The creator-creature distinction serves as a standing reminder not to 
apply terms univocally to God, but it presents no obstacle to affirming that God 
acts.” Ibid., 210–11. 
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secondary means. Perhaps it would be preferable, then, to predicate “being an 
agent” and “being a speaker” of God analogically. There is a true but only 
partial, appropriate but only approximate correspondence between divine and 
human speaking.197 
 
While it is important to sustain the distinction between Creator and creature, one 
cannot negate the textual depiction of what took place. In denying the univocal 
import of divine and human speech, Vanhoozer dismisses what the text is saying in 
regards to Divine speech. Thus, Vanhoozer nuances the idea of Divine speech in 
terms of other means of communication, since it is not possible to affirm that a 
sound was heard when God spoke.198  
 For Vanhoozer, then, what is literal in the text is the idea that God does act or 
speak. Here Vanhoozer keeps that which is in his reach (meaning what is allowed by 
a timeless presupposition of Being) to maintain the biblical language and depiction of 
what is taking place, yet still nuancing its meaning for the sake of relevance to the 
modern mindset.199 He attempts to maintain the idea that God did speak, while 
articulating a modern understanding of its possibility in the background of a timeless 
                                                 
 
197 Ibid., 58. 
198 This leads Vanhoozer to conclude: "we could say that God communicated by 
causing the disciples to hear words inside their heads." Vanhoozer, "Theological 
Commentary and 'The Voice from Heaven': Exegesis, Ontology, and the Travail of 
Biblical Interpretation," in Stanley E. Porter, and Eckhard J. Schnabel, eds., On the 
Writings of the New Testament Commentaries: Festschrift for Grant R. Osborne on the 
Occasion of his 70th Birthday (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 289. 
199 What I mean here is Gilkey’s criticism: half orthodox and half modern. In 
conservative evangelicalism, Vanhoozer is the one who comes closest to a solution to 
the paradox, yet he still operates under a timeless conception of Being via tradition 
that forces him to address these issues in analogical terms, bypassing the depictions 
in the text itself. 
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ontology: God spoke, but not in an audible manner. The dichotomy between 
appearance and reality in Vanhoozer’s remythologizing project is left unchallenged 
on macro-hermeneutical grounds. 
 Vanhoozer accommodates his understanding of divine acts and speeches in 
the interpretation of the biblical text through a method that is now receiving close 
attention in biblical studies—speech-act theory.200 While Bultmann resorted to 
science and existential philosophy to sift through the appearance and the reality 
depicted in the biblical text, Vanhoozer resorts to modern linguistics, i.e., speech-act 
theory.201 It is important to note that I side with Vanhoozer on his basic premise that 
the “fundamental issue in the doctrine of Scripture concerns the manner of God’s 
                                                 
 
200 Vanhoozer addresses speech-act theory in more detail in his book First 
Theology. For more on the birth and development of the method, see Richard S. 
Briggs, “Speech-Act Theory,” in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al. (London: SPCK, 2005), 763–66; John Searle, Speech Acts: 
An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969); and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim 
that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
201 Bultmann’s guiding principle is grounded in a macro-hermeneutical 
framework, that is, in a scientific worldview. For Vanhoozer and other theologians, 
the guiding principle is found in a micro-hermeneutical framework that applies to 
exegetical work. The problem with the latter is that it is inevitably subjective. The 
manner in which one uses speech-act theory determines the outcome of the analysis. 
Speech-act theory is not exempt from macro-hermeneutical principles acting as 
presuppositions, and used in the wrong manner, it can be a new way of working 
under the rule of JEDP (source criticism) and other critical approaches to the text. 
For Vanhoozer, speech-act theory is equated to the manner in which God is present 
in the world. He writes, “The principal mode in which God is ‘with’ his people is 
through speech-acts.” See Vanhoozer, First Theology, 149. Vanhoozer’s thesis of 
divine speech acts would also work better under a different ontology. To speak of a 
God who interacts with humanity through speech-acts while holding to a timeless 
conception of God and reality is, to say the least, counterproductive. 
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involvement in the words of Scripture and thus the manner of God’s activity in the 
world.”202 So, to clarify how Vanhoozer moves his understanding of God’s relation 
to the world and humanity into the interpretation of Scripture, it is important to 
demonstrate how that takes place in speech-act theory.  
 In short, speech-act theory attempts to make a distinction between that which 
is said (locutionary act) and the significance/meaning of the saying (illocutionary 
act). Jeannine K. Brown writes, “Speech-act theory distinguishes a saying (locution) 
from the force of that saying or what it does (illocution) and the response of a hearer 
(perlocution) to the locution and its illocution.”203 Even so, speech-act theory runs 
the risk of not solving the dilemma of the intelligibility of the textual analogy 
between things as they appear in the text and the reality behind the appearance. This 
is because the interpretation of the “meaning” of a divine saying, or “illocution,” will 
always be, to a great extent, under the control of the interpreter. It is up to the 
interpreter to decide, under the influence of macro-hermeneutical assumptions 
established a priori, what the univocal saying of Scripture means (locution) and 
accomplishes (illocution); the guiding pre-understanding that stems from a timeless 
ontology is that it cannot mean what it says.204 
                                                 
 
202 Ibid., 129. 
203 Brown, Scripture as Communication, 111. 
204 Here I arrive again at the original philosophical problem of the appearance 
against the reality. The dichotomy created through a timeless conception of Being 
that leads the interpreter to understand the text through unintelligible analogy is 
appropriated by speech-act theory through locutions, illocutions, etc. As mentioned 
earlier, this method is free of macro-hermeneutical verifications, and in turn, can 




 Vanhoozer is the one who comes closest to the possibility that the biblical 
accounts concerning God’s actions, including but not limited to speech-acts, are not 
timeless. This is evident when he writes that “God’s eternity is the form of his own 
life and hence the medium of his own being in communicative act” and “as such it is 
not timeless.”205 Yet Vanhoozer, like the open-view thinkers (but in a different 
manner), does not apply this discovery to the level of Being itself. By sustaining a 
timeless ontology, he cannot escape unintelligible analogy. For Vanhoozer, in the 
end, “time is not the contradiction but as it were the finite analogy of eternity.”206 
Consequently, because we can only know one side of the analogy, God’s actions 
become inevitably unintelligible. In the end, Vanhoozer recognizes that “Langdon 
Gilkey criticized the biblical theology movement for being only half orthodox and 
half modern. . . . I have precisely the same problem.”207 
 Both Bultmann and Vanhoozer attempt to maintain the language of the text, 
but struggle to express the reality of which the text speaks. For Bultmann, it is 
science and existential philosophy that sift through what is relevant and truthful in 
the text, but for Vanhoozer it is the idea of God as a communicative agent in the 
                                                 
 
even communicative criticism). In speech-act theory, speech-acts are partly univocal, 
in that all speech-acts have locution/illocution/perlocution. Yet the issue here is not 
whether speech-act theory takes into account univocal elements in the text, but 
whether the bridge between the locution and illocution is equipped to unpack the 
reality expressed in the text itself. 
205 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 254. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 150. 
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context of speech-act theory. While Bultmann denies the univocal depiction of the 
reality implied in the text, Vanhoozer attempts to clarify what it means or 
accomplishes. Even so, for both, the ontological foundations that shape their 
approach to the text assume a timeless conception of Being creating a dichotomy 
between appearance (text) and reality (the reality the text points to).  
 From these representative examples, one can perceive that both liberal and 
conservative scholars who assume a timeless ontology are caught in the same 
paradox—the paradox of dealing with unintelligible analogy. At the same time, the 
assumptions that shape their approach to the text are left unchallenged on their 





 This section outlined how ontological premises influence the interpretation 
not only of the text, but also of the interpretation of God and God-acts. Again, these 
conceptions uncover the macro-hermeneutical principles at work within the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars and theologians as they touch on 
the notion of how God relates to humanity. First, I provided an introduction to the 
concept of timelessness and how it carries two basic assumptions that influence 
interpretation: the dichotomy between things as they appear and things as they are, 
and the understanding of Being as timeless. I also briefly outlined the two main 
alternatives to a timeless conception of Being, namely the open view and the work of 
Fernando Canale, along with their similarities and differences.   
 Second, I attempted to demonstrate how these basic ontological assumptions 
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are incorporated and addressed in biblical interpretation. Knowing that a timeless 
ontology creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality, both liberal and 
conservative scholars who assume such an ontology face the difficulty of attempting 
to grasp an unintelligible analogy. I used the examples of Bultmann and Vanhoozer 
to sketch in broad strokes how scholars wrestle with this dichotomy in interpretation. 
For Bultmann, the divine acts as they appear in the text are dismissed through a 
scientific and existential approach, while for Vanhoozer, the divine acts and speeches 
are explained within the parameters of speech-act theory.  
 The assumption of timeless Being, then, directly affects not only 
interpretation, but how scholars perceive the meaning of a text that points to how 
God relates to humanity through both act and speech.208  
 




 So far, this study has focused on the first two components of the macro-
hermeneutical notion of how God relates to humanity: the principle of epistemology 
(humanity’s ability to know) and the principle of ontology (God and God-acts). This 
section will examine the third and final component in the God-human relationship 
structure: the principle of the nature of history. This principle, present in the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical interpreters, relates to the locus or context in 
                                                 
 
208 Nicholas T. Saunders is right in affirming that “of all the challenges science 




which God relates to humanity, according to the biblical text. Whether scholars 
validate or deny such a possibility, they do so under a particular conception of the 
nature of history established a priori. To this principle I now turn.209 
 The nature of history has been the object of struggle and debate in Old 
Testament interpretation and theology since its inception,210 and remains “the key 
defining feature of modern-era readings of biblical and other texts.”211 Because the 
term history will be frequently used throughout this study, some definitions are in 
order.212 The term history will be understood in this study following the general 
                                                 
 
question the doctrine of divine action.” See Nicholas T. Saunders, “Does God Cheat 
at Dice? Divine Action and Quantum Possibilities,” Zygon 35 (2000): 518. 
209 Because the nature of history is central to the evaluation of the historical-
critical and grammatical methods in the next chapter, this section will provide only 
an introduction to the issues so that they might be fully explored then.  
210 For the history and development of Old Testament theology, see Paul R. 
House, Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 11–53; 
Gerhard F. Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), Ben C. Ollenburger, “From Timeless Ideas to the 
Essence of Religion: Method in Old Testament Theology Before 1939,” in The 
Flowering of Old Testament Theology: A Reader in Twentieth-Century Old Testament 
Theology, 1930–1990, ed. Ben C. Ollenburger, Elmer A. Martens, and Gerhard F. 
Hasel (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 3–19. On the interpretative 
development of the Pentateuch in particular, see Joseph Blenkinsopp, “The 
Pentateuch,” in The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. John Barton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 181–97; R. Norman Whybray, 
Introduction to the Pentateuch (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 12–28; Sailhamer, 
Meaning of the Pentateuch, 11–28. 
211 Richard S. Briggs and Joel N. Lohr, A Theological Introduction to the 
Pentateuch: Interpreting the Torah as Christian Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2012), 9. 
212 The challenge here is to deal with the reality that although the term is 
commonly used, “it is not easily defined.” See J. Maxwell Miller, “Reading the Bible 




definition given by the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, due to its scope. Huizinga’s 
definition encompasses both the contemplative and literal forms history can take. He 
writes: “History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to 
itself of the past.”213 
 With this definition of history in mind, it is imperative to nuance at least two 
basic ways in which the term is used. The first, history as historiography, relates to 
the written record of the past; the second, history as historical process, relates to 
what actually happened to people, their actions and suffering.214 While 
historiography is the product of reflection upon a historical process that has passed, 
the historical process itself is beyond the grasp of any historian. This reality 
inevitably allows historiography to be influenced, to some extent, by the perspectives 
and biases of historians.  
 The original division between historical-critical approaches to the text and the 
biblical theology movement, as two disciplines, revolved around the limits of what 
                                                 
 
to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application, ed. Stephen R. Haynes and Steven L. 
McKenzie (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 11. This reality is also 
expressed by Craig Bartholomew as he writes that “history has been, and continues 
to be, a hotly contested area in biblical studies, and theologians and biblical scholars 
express a diversity of views on these issues.” See Craig G. Bartholomew et al., eds., 
“Behind” the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2003), 2. 
213 Johan Huizinga, “A Definition of the Concept of History,” in Philosophy 
and History: Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. R. Klibansky and H. Paton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1936), 9, quoted in J. J. Finkelstein, “Mesopotamian 
Historiography,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no. 6, 
Cuneiform Studies and the History of Civilization (December 20, 1963): 462.  
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historians were able to do. Notice how Ben C. Ollenburger addresses the issue as he 
writes on the debates between Walter Eichrodt and Otto Eissfeldt concerning the 
division between historical and theological approaches to the text. Ollenburger 
asserts that Eissfeldt was in favor of a distinction between the disciplines, since for 
him Old Testament theology could not be a historical inquiry “because it is 
concerned with what is timelessly or abidingly true.”215 
 As for Eichrodt’s response, he understood that “historical investigation can 
get to the essence of Old Testament religion.”216 But in order for the historian to 
reach this goal, Eichrodt had to change the understanding of “essence” from 
“timeless truth” to “the deepest meaning of its religious thought world that historical 
investigation can recover.”217  
 As outlined previously, the understanding that the biblical text as a historical 
document is only a wrapping218 for the essence or truth results from a timeless 
conception of reality. This reality formed the background of the original debates and 
discussions concerning the roles of historical and theological approaches to the 
biblical text. Regardless of the views of Eissfeldt or Eichrodt, the roles of historical 
                                                 
 
214 For more, see David Bebbington, Patterns in History: A Christian Perspective of 
Historical Thought (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000), 1. 
215 Ollenburger, “From Timeless Ideas,” 18. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 
218 For more on the idea of text as wrapping or “husk,” see Peter J. Leithart, 




analysis and theology were already established on a timeless ontological platform. 
 Apart from the influence of the ontological principle upon the task of the 
historian in biblical interpretation, the historian was also conditioned by scientific 
principles, as briefly mentioned thus far. Cristoph O. Schroeder observes that “the 
historical method analyzes historical texts and traditions according to the principles 
of critique, analogy, and correlation.”219 
 Van Austin Harvey traces the threefold framework that conditions the work 
of the historian back to Ernst Troeltsch.220 Concerning the meaning and implications 
of these principles, Harvey writes: 
[Troeltsch] argued that critical historical inquiry rests on three interrelated 
principles: (1) the principle of criticism, by which he meant that our judgments 
about the past cannot simply be classified as true or false but must be seen as 
claiming only a greater or lesser degree of probability and as always open to 
revision; (2) the principle of analogy, by which he meant that we are able to make 
judgments of probability only if we presuppose that our own present experience is 
not radically dissimilar to the experience of past persons; and (3) the principle of 
correlation, by which he meant that the phenomena of man’s historical change 
can take place at any one point in the historical nexus without effecting a change 
in all that immediately surrounds it. Historical explanation, therefore, necessarily 
takes the form of understanding an event in terms of its antecedents and 
consequences, and no event can be isolated from its historically conditioned time 
and space.221 
 
Harvey also adds that Troeltsch himself “understood that the principles outlined 
                                                 
 
219 Christoph O. Schroeder, History, Justice, and the Agency of God: A 
Hermeneutical and Exegetical Investigation on Isaiah and Psalms (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 19. 
By “critique” Schroeder implies what I have called “doubt” previously in this study: 
that is, the interpretative prerogative to evaluate truth from error on the basis of 
scientific reason. 
220 Van Austin Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical 
Knowledge and Christian Belief (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 15.  
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above were “incompatible with traditional Christian belief and, therefore, that 
anyone who based his historical inquiries upon them should necessarily arrive at 
results which an orthodox Christian would consider negative and skeptical.”222 
 As far as these conceptions—the notion of timeless truth and historical text, 
along with the scientific principles that condition the work of the historian—relate to 
the God-human relation, the “biblical notion of divine agency cannot be part of a 
critical conception of history.”223 So, when dealing with these questions, the 
possibility of harmonizing the assumptions of the biblical interpreter with those of 
the text might, to some extent, render useless the common critical and even 
theological approaches to the text. This possibility arises from the fact that both 
theological and critical approaches are established upon philosophical conceptions 
that could be contrary to the textual portrayal of God’s relation to humans in the 
context of history. And it is this possibility that calls for a re-evaluation of the nature 
and function of the discipline of biblical theology altogether, especially as it relates to 
exegesis.  
 So far, I have attempted to outline in broad strokes how the principle of the 
nature of history is not exempt from macro-hermeneutical commitments. J. Maxwell 
Miller is correct in pointing out that the “historian’s own presuppositions, ideology, 
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223 Schroeder, History, Justice, 19. For more on the impact of the scientific 
approach to theology, see Langdon B. Gilkey, Religion and the Scientific Future: 
Reflections on Myth, Science, and Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
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and attitudes inevitably influence his or her research and reporting,”224 and that “it is 
not an overstatement to say that any book reveals as much about its author as it does 
about the period of time treated.”225  
 Knowing that assumptions about the nature of history influence the 
historian’s evaluation of a particular portion of history, and consequently the biblical 
text itself, it is in the interests of this study to further assess these assumptions and 
evaluate their impact on biblical interpretation. 
 This section, then, will be divided into two main parts. The first will provide a 
brief overview of how the nature of history has been understood by scholars from the 
eighteenth century to contemporary times. The second will provide a few examples 
of how presuppositions regarding the nature of history appear in biblical 
interpretation. 
 
From Text to History 
 
 The roots of scholarly interest in the historical background of the biblical text 
in the context of the interpretation of Scripture—an interest that still influences 
interpretation today226—can be traced to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Findings in the field of archaeology, along with the effects of rationalism and the 
Enlightenment project, led biblical interpretation in the late seventeenth century to be 
                                                 
 
224 Miller, “Reading the Bible Historically,” 12. 
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226 See Richard E. Burnett, “Historical Criticism,” in Dictionary for Theological 
Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2005), 290. 
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heavily influenced by modern historical approaches to the point that “revelation 
became for many a predicate to history.”227 
 This fissure in the pre-critical approach to Scripture led the world depicted in 
the Bible “to look increasingly less like the world one actually sees in the Bible and 
increasingly more like the world of the modern historian.”228 By the eighteenth 
century, the “question of the use of history for religion was still one of the most 
pressing problems.”229 
                                                 
 
227 Ibid., 291. For more on the background of historical primacy over the text, 
see Peter Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977); R. K. Harrison et al., Biblical Criticism: Historical, 
Literary, and Textual (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1978); and more importantly 
Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974). 
228 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 93. Although the change in mindset 
attempted to arrive at a modern sense of what really happened in history, that is, the 
historical facts behind the formation of the biblical text, it led in the opposite 
direction. In applying a modern framework to the historical processes, many earlier 
understandings of the same historical processes were left behind. Even apart from 
biblical hermeneutics, neglect of the inherent understanding of history in biblical or 
Ancient Near Eastern thought proved to be problematic in other areas. Ephraim A. 
Speiser writes that a failure “to incorporate the up-to-date findings on the Near East 
has thrown out of balance the existing philosophies of history and invalidated some 
of their principal results.” In Ephraim A. Speiser, “The Ancient Near East and 
Modern Philosophies of History,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 95, 
no. 6 (December 21, 1951): 584. This only testifies to the importance of being critical 
about the critical approach to the biblical text and its implicit understanding of the 
concept of history itself. J. J. Finkelstein is correct in warning the interpreter that in 
“our approach towards any aspect of non Western civilization we commonly expose 
ourselves to the hazard of applying Western categories to phenomena completely 
alien to us.” See J. J. Finkelstein, “Mesopotamian Historiography,” 461. 
229 Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historical 
Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 43. While many today 
believe that the historical approach to the text was almost an organized attack on 




 Yet the modernistic historical approach to the text introduced in this period 
implied more than only attention to the relation of text and modern history, with its 
consequent effects upon biblical interpretation.230 At the foundation of the 
modernistic historical approach to the text was a monumental change in the 
perception of reality, truth, and consequently the meaning of the biblical text.231 Was 
                                                 
 
approach attempted to defend or at least reinterpret religious worship “in the light of 
a revised religious consciousness.” Ibid. 
230 It is important to keep in mind that these transitions in hermeneutical 
thinking were not exempt from radical changes at a theological and philosophical 
level. In fact, these radical changes facilitated a change in hermeneutics. Timothy J. 
Furry writes that “philosophical and theological issues matter in the writing of 
history, since they are part of its inevitable representational structure.” See Timothy 
J. Furry, Allegorizing History: The Venerable Bede, Figural Exegesis, and Historical Theory 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013), 2. 
231 By meaning here, I imply the sense intended by the author as 
communicated through the text. For those who favor a noncritical approach, the 
sense of the text begins with a serious consideration of the text itself along with its 
historical presentation. For those who favor a more critical approach, the sense of the 
text is largely influenced by extrabiblical material, since the biblical material is 
considered an unreliable source for historical accuracy. In other words, for the 
critical mindset, the words and literary devices do not carry a full perspective of the 
sense of the text: it is only through historical reconstructions of the background of the 
text/author that the meaning, or sense, can be clearly seen. On the relation of truth 
and meaning, it is important to note that this period was marked by an outburst of 
possibilities. The question that must be answered at the outset is: are truth and 
meaning identical in Scripture? Through the work of Spinoza and others, the gap 
between these notions was created and increasingly widened. While the meaning of 
the text included a moral/ethical dimension, for Spinoza, that did not mean it should 
be considered truth (since only philosophy and reason were able to discuss matters of 
truth). He felt that the text was as important as this ethical sense, and could be 
discarded once the sense was discovered. This distinction in the work of Spinoza can 
be easily seen as he writes that “the sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and 
wisdom; the sphere of theology is piety and obedience.” Benedict Spinoza, A 
Theological-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: 




the meaning of a biblical text to be found by a critical or a non-critical assessment of 
the text and the history it portrayed? 
 Once the modernistic, historical-critical approach became synonymous with 
biblical interpretation during this period, the meaning of the words of Scripture 
began to be “understood in terms of the world of external events”232 and not the other 
way around. The reality Scripture described (with supernatural events and actions) 
was tied to the reality which modern history approved of (with no supernatural 
events and actions), and consequently, the key to uncover the true meaning and 
significance of the text could only be found through historical criticism. With the 
assumption that only modern historical reconstructions provided a window into 
reality,233 the verification of truth in the biblical text came not from a serious 
consideration of the historical point of view of the text, as in pre-critical times, but 
from the critical reconstructions of the modern historian.  
 Probing this departure from pre-critical to critical interpretation and its 
foundational changes to hermeneutics, Hans W. Frei observes that although the 
                                                 
 
distinction between form and content, things as they are and things as they appear—
a notion addressed previously in the section dealing with ontology. 
232 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 93. 
233 Augustine’s distinction between “words” (verba) and “things” (res) informs 
much of the hermeneutical discussion around the biblical text. For him, the words 
(verba) of the biblical text “are the means by which one enters into the spiritual 
realities of the world of things (res).” Ibid., 76. Although this distinction between 
text/words and reality/things is still foundational for historical approaches to 
Scripture, Sailhamer understands that “Augustine’s view, to be sure, is not that of the 




biblical narratives were written as realistic stories, “the meaning of the stories was 
finally something different from the stories or depictions themselves.”234 The 
departure from this pre-critical stage where “history demonstrated the veracity of the 
Christian message”235 to a modernistic approach where the veracity of the Christian 
message was attested with the aid of historical analysis can be seen as a “definite 
change”236 by 1760.237 
 
From History as Geschichte to History as Wissenschaft 
 
 While the influence of these principles expanded throughout the eighteenth 
century, at the turn of the twentieth century, modern historical reconstructions 
resulting from scientific presuppositions became the main source of the discovery of 
what was conceived as truth. Iain W. Provan writes that by “the end of the 1880s, 
this history-as-science had replaced philosophy as the discipline to which many 
educated people in Europe and elsewhere in the Western world turned as the key 
that would unlock the mysteries of human life.”238  
                                                 
 
biblical authors.” Ibid., 77. I will revisit this distinction in the next chapter when 
dealing with how interpretative traditions arrive at the meaning of a biblical text. 
234 Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 11. 
235 Reill, German Enlightenment, 43. 
236 Ibid. 
237 It is in this context that the historical-critical and grammatical approaches 
appear as formal methods in biblical interpretation. 
238 Iain W. Provan, V. Phillips Long, and Tremper Longman III, A Biblical 
History of Israel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 21. 
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 Until then, though, following scientific principles, the historical approach had 
not received scientific attention and to some extent was considered merely another 
form of art. Before the nineteenth century, the purpose of history was “to delight the 
reader and to teach morals through examples.”239 In other words, before the 
nineteenth century, the process of history writing “was not taken seriously by the 
hard sciences.”240  
 During this period, two ways of approaching history emerged: the already old 
idea of history as Geschichte, carrying a sense of storytelling, a subjective report; and a 
new idea of history as Historie, carrying the scientific spirit of the possibility of the 
historian arriving at truth through the rigorous application of the scientific method. 
 After the nineteenth century, the historical approach became the means to 
arrive at truth (including historical truth or Historie), as a science. Raúl Kerbs 
explores this transition from history to history as science: 
In the times of modernity there was no other model of objectivity distinct from 
that of the natural sciences and more adequate to history. But history knew that, 
in order to be science, it should fulfill the requisites of objectivity. This way had 
to adopt the idea of objectivity of the natural sciences together with the timeless 
interpretation of reality and reason that came with it. Therefore, the timeless 
categories of reason (foundationally the cause and effect relation applied to space 
and time, that is, to nature) provided the mark to determine what is real and what 
is not real in history. That is why miracles and all other supernatural causalities 
were discarded by historical methodology.241 
 
                                                 
 
239 Ibid., 20. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Raúl Kerbs, “El Método Histórico-Crítico en Teología: En Busca de su 
Estructura Básica y de las Interpretaciones Filosóficas Subyacentes,” DavarLogos 1, 
no. 2 (2002): 120.  
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The new connotation of history as science, or history as Wissenschaft, incorporated 
within historical research several philosophical commitments that inevitably 
influenced not only the function of historical approaches to the biblical text, but also 
their results. 
 While the first half of the twentieth century enjoyed the possibility that 
history-as-science could provide a window into past truth (the historical processes 
themselves), the second half was marked by a “decrease in enthusiasm for the 
distinction between Historie and Geschichte among theologians and biblical 
scholars.”242 In that period, “greater interest was shown to historiography,”243 that is, 
to the “way perception of facts are shaped by prior judgments.”244 
 
From History as Wissenschaft to History as Historiography 
 
 As mentioned previously, the concept of the nature of history underwent 
significant changes along with the capability and limitations of the historian. The 
twentieth century left behind the notion or possibility of history as Wissenschaft and 
became sensitive to the biases of the historian in the process of historical 
                                                 
 
242 Richard N. Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism, 
3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 80. 
243 For more on the origins and crisis of historiography, see John C. Collins, 
The Bible After Babel: Historical Criticism in a Postmodern Age (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 27–51. 




 Dan O. Via, using the work of Hayden White, writes on the three categories 
that were attached to the concept of “the historical” before this transition. Via writes: 
“Historical theory [had] conventionally distinguished (1) past reality; (2) 
historiography, the historian’s written discourse about his past object; and (3) 
philosophy of history, the study of possible relations between the object and the 
discourse.”246 To speak of history, then, implied addressing three distinct categories 
that can be summarized under the terms event (what actually happened), narration 
(the historian’s historiographical report of the event), and truth (the correspondence 
between event and narration). According to Via, traditional historiography 
understands that historical truth is found in this last category, in the “correspondence 
between the lived story and the told story.”247 
 At least two problems can be identified in the idea that historical truth is 
found in the correspondence between event (what actually happened) and narration 
(the historiographical report). The first deals with the fact that the historian has no 
access to the event. History is written, “not found.”248 So, no correspondence 
between event and narration can be established, since the historian only has access to 
                                                 
 
245 These changes at the level of history followed the changes in the 
philosophical perspective of epistemology, that is, in this period more attention was 
given to the subject in the formation of knowledge.  
246 Via, Revelation of God, 29. 




historical documents (which are not exempt from bias), not events. A second 
problem relates to the role of the historian. Because the historian has no access to the 
events, the truthfulness and effectiveness of historiography relies on the historian’s 
ability to handle evidence in a “judicious way.”249 In other words, access to events 
resides in the ability of the historian to be, to some extent, unbiased, yet history itself 
proves this to be an impossibility. 
 These problems led biblical interpreters to uncover historical events via one of 
three hermeneutical approaches. The first, reconstructionism, upholds the premise 
that “the more carefully we write history, the closer we will get to what actually 
happened.”250 The second, constructionism, “refers to the approaches to history that 
invoke general laws.”251 The third, deconstructionism, is seen in postmodern 
approaches, which “stress the fact that history writing is always an example of 
literary production, with all the attendant complexities that brings.”252 That is, 
history writing carries an agenda, resulting in an “ideologically compromised”253 
historiography.  
 As the last point indicates, the focus on the subject has brought to light 
significant issues that stem from the epistemological turn to the subject addressed 
                                                 
 
249 Ibid. 
250 Bartholomew, “Behind” the Text, 9.  
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., 5. 
 
103 
previously in this study. The trend in present historiographical assessments is that 
historians bring into historiography a wide range of presuppositions that influence 
their historical reconstructions. But because the postmodern approach is not in itself 
a break from modernity, Provan indicates that the modernistic mindset is still active: 
History is still widely perceived, in spite of the postmodern turn and the 
convictions of many historians themselves, as comprising ‘facts’—facts that can 
be scientifically established and woven together to produce ‘the past’, which can 
then be used as a canonical rule against which to measure particular stories about 
the past and to pronounce them uncertain or false.254 
 
 In sum, in the contemporary setting of the understanding of history, two 
competing models remain. The first maintains the old Enlightenment goal of 
objectivity and seeks to reconstruct the past by scientifically discovering facts and 
distinguishing them from fables. The second follows the postmodern turn and 
understands history as written by individuals who have a hermeneutical background 
and framework that influences their writing. Since historical events are not an object 
to be attained, historical reconstructions in the latter view are focused on the 
uncovering of the hermeneutical background of the historian. 
 In each model, the subject, or historian, in charge of historical reconstructions 
evaluates texts, documents, and artifacts on the basis of a macro-hermeneutical 
structure that establishes conceptions of God, humans, and history a priori. Each 
position mentioned above is not only influenced by such conceptions, but becomes 
the repository of the principles that create the framework for historical 
                                                 
 
254 Iain W. Provan, “Knowing and Believing: Faith in the Past,” in “Behind” 
the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation, ed. Craig G. Bartholomew et al. (Grand 




 I now turn to two remaining questions. How do these conceptions concerning 
the nature of history affect biblical interpretation? How do theologians appropriate 
these assumptions into their work?  
 
History, Presuppositions, and Biblical Interpretation 
 
 Presuppositions concerning the nature of history had a greater influence upon 
biblical interpretation at the turn of the eighteenth century. Again, this was a period 
when the pre-critical “face value” reading of the text to understand history was 
abandoned for a more rational approach to history based on scientific principles. Von 
Rad correctly assesses the situation of the concept of history in this period: 
These two pictures of Israel’s history lie before us—that of modern critical 
scholarship and that which the faith of Israel constructed—and for the present, 
we must reconcile ourselves to both of them . . . The one is rational and 
‘objective’ . . . The other . . . is confessional . . . The fact that these two views of 
Israel’s history are so divergent is one of the most serious burdens imposed upon 
Biblical scholarship.255   
 
The problem Von Rad identifies here requires some explanation. 
 Biblical interpretation, in the transition from pre-critical to critical times, was 
confronted with two alternatives: first, the possibility that the biblical depiction of the 
life and story of its characters, that is, biblical historiography, was accurate and true 
as it related to the historical process of its characters; second, the possibility that 
modernistic historiography, which critically evaluated the biblical text (along with its 
                                                 
 
255 G. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I (Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1973), quoted in “Behind” the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation, ed. Craig 
G. Bartholomew et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003), 5. 
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depictions of the historical process of the biblical characters), was the only rational 
approach to interpretation and the true sense of the biblical text.256  
 The hermeneutical pendulum tended to swing toward the latter side: the 
modernistic historiographical conceptions of the events. This led Gilkey to correctly 
summarize the situation in theological circles as follows: “The Bible is a book of the 
acts Hebrews believed God might have done and the words he might have said had 
he done them and said them—but of course we recognize he did not.”257 
 In order for biblical interpretation to remain a scientific discipline, the 
distinction between history as Historie (modernistic reconstructions) and history as 
Geschichte (how the biblical writers retold history or Hebrew faith) has to be 





 This section attempted to trace the origins of the macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions relating to the principle of the nature of history, along with their 
influence upon biblical interpretation and the book of Exodus.  
                                                 
 
256 The second point, seen in the historical-critical approach to the text, 
introduced the idea of “retrojection” into interpretation, that is, “anachronistically 
attributing present ideas, attitudes, or practices to earlier times,” making the biblical 
text along with its history a vessel in which to carry an earlier message. See Millar 
Burrows, “Ancient Israel,” in The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East, ed. Robert C. 
Dentan and Roland H. Bainton (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955), 107. 
The way these principles affected the development of the historical-critical and 
grammatical interpretative methods will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
257 Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology,” 197. 
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 I began by tracing how historians approached history at the turn of the 
eighteenth century by leaving behind the pre-critical approach to the text and 
embracing a scientific approach along with its macro-hermeneutical commitments. 
This made it possible for history to be seen as Wissenschaft. Yet in the twentieth 
century these conceptions were left behind, to some extent, due to the turn to the 
subject, to the way in which the historian was not exempt from biases and 
assumptions. This period brought forth the approach known as historiography, an 
approach not exempt from macro-hermeneutical influences.  
 Second, I attempted to trace the implications of scientific presuppositions 
concerning the nature of history for biblical interpretation in general and the book of 
Exodus in particular. From this analysis, I was able to outline how the distinction 
between fact and faith is still prevalent in the interpretation of Exodus: the macro-
hermeneutical influences of the scientific approach to the text are still prevalent. This 
reality widens the gap between the assumptions of the interpreter and those of the 




 This chapter attempted to identify the macro-hermeneutical principles that act 
as presuppositional frameworks for biblical scholars as they relate to the notion of the 
God-human relationship. 
 The first section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of epistemology, 
that is, the notion of “human” in the God-human relationship structure. I attempted 
to demonstrate how the understanding of the human ability to know developed over 
the centuries, how such conceptions affect how the biblical text is perceived by the 
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interpreter who reads the text for knowledge, and how that mirrors the 
understanding of how biblical characters could arrive at knowledge.  
 The second section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of ontology, 
that is, the notion of “God” in the God-human relationship structure. In this 
evaluation, I attempted to show how the interpretation of Being affects how 
interpreters perceive God and his actions in the text. I also used the work of 
Bultmann and Vanhoozer to show how biblical scholars deal with the dilemma of 
unintelligible analogy, created by a timeless understanding of Being, between things 
as they are and things as they appear.  
 The third section outlined the macro-hermeneutical principle of the nature of 
history, that is, the notion of “relationship” in the God-human relationship structure. 
Since God’s interaction with humanity takes place in Scripture within the flow of 
history, this section examined how historians have approached the biblical text in 
search of history and truth. The analysis showed that the presuppositions established 
by modernity and science have dominated the practice of biblical interpretation, 
leading the historiography of the text to be perceived as accounts of faith. 
 In the next chapter, I will evaluate how the macro-hermeneutical or 
philosophical presuppositions above are present within two main interpretative 
















 This chapter will attempt to identify the presence, influence, and roots of the 
philosophical notion of how God relates to humans in two of the most influential 
interpretative traditions in the study of the book of Exodus: the historical-
grammatical and historical-critical methods.258 
 I will begin by evaluating the historical-grammatical method with a focus on 
how the method interprets the God-human relation, that is, how it carries within its 
                                                 
 
258 This study will not evaluate these approaches to the text as they stand and 
function today; it is focused on the philosophical presuppositions in these traditions. 
In order to assess the presence and influence of these presuppositions, this study will 
evaluate only the period when both approaches formally appeared—at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. The formative period of these interpretative approaches provides 
an appropriate context to identify the presuppositions that influence their use and 
application. These two interpretative traditions are chosen as representative 
examples of the influence of presuppositions in methodology. This evaluation calls 
for more in-depth analysis of other methodological approaches to the text that will 
not be addressed here, including the more idealistic approaches such as reader-
oriented criticism, etc. For more on contemporary approaches to the book of 
Exodus, see Dozeman, Methods for Exodus; Scott M. Langston, Exodus through the 
Centuries (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); Tremper Longman, How to Read Exodus 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009). 
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framework conceptions of ontology, epistemology,259 and history. Then, I will 
evaluate the historical-critical method with a focus on the same philosophical 
presuppositions. 
 The idea here is that, regardless of the subjective awareness of presuppositions 
regarding the God-human relation in shaping the approach and outcome of one’s 
interpretation, the choice of a particular interpretative method carries within itself, by 
default, an interpretation of the God-human relation.260 With this general idea in 
                                                 
 
259 Since both the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods at the 
turn of the eighteenth century operated under the direct influence of the 
epistemological ideas of Descartes, a separate analysis of the epistemological 
component in both approaches is unnecessary. Even so, a brief review of Cartesian 
epistemology is in order so the reader will not have to go back to the previous 
chapter for answers. Descartes is referred to as the father of modern philosophy, 
since his method consisted of introducing the principle of doubt into all activities of 
the mind or thinking, creating a gap between the interpreter and the external world. 
Rejecting the reliability of the senses, Descartes “whittled his way down to the 
mind,” the one thing that could secure a reliable foundation for rationality. See 
Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, 25. This led him to the expression he is known for: 
“I think, therefore I am,” or cogito ergo sum, that is, the reliability and precedence of 
rationality over existence. These ideas are key to what this study calls “objectivist 
epistemology,” where the human mind (as a tabula rasa) is able to grasp reality as a 
whole through reason, without resorting to the “questionable” influence of the 
senses. These ideas at the epistemological level would lead theologians and exegetes 
to evaluate text and reality under this rational outlook. One of the first implications 
of such an outlook for biblical interpretation (apart from the abused principle of 
doubt) is rejection of the supernatural elements in the biblical text, along with the 
idea that authority resides in the mental capabilities of the interpreter and not in any 
inherited tradition or text. At the same time, these epistemological concepts are 
inherently tied to ontological commitments. Descartes rejects the reliability of the 
senses of the body because they are inherently part of the material world. So, to 
assume such an epistemological standpoint, to some extent, is already to sustain the 
cosmological/anthropological dichotomy tied to a timeless ontology.  
260 Oeming writes that “each method of biblical interpretation is necessarily 
dependent on specific philosophical predilections.” This chapter attempts to assess 
these predilections. See Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics, 2–3.  
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mind, I turn to the evaluation of the historical-grammatical method. 
 




 To pinpoint the precise origin of the historical-grammatical method is a 
complex task.261 However, the influences that led to the formation of the grammatical 
approach to the biblical text can be traced as far as the school of Antioch,262 as well 
as to rabbinic interpretation.263 Even so, John H. Sailhamer264 points to Johann 
                                                 
 
261 Scholars like Richard M. Davidson see the origins of the method during 
the time of the Reformation in the sixteenth century; he writes that the “biblical 
principles of interpretation recovered by the Reformers, coupled with the advances in 
textual and historical-grammatical analysis of the Renaissance (Erasmus and others), 
led to a robust Protestant hermeneutic that has carried until now and has become 
known as the historical-grammatical-literary-theological approach or (for short) the 
grammatico-historical method or historical-biblical method.” See Richard M. 
Davidson, “Biblical Interpretation,” in Handbook of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology, 
Commentary Series 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 90. Hans W. 
Frei also sees the emphasis on grammar and the literal historicity of the text as 
beginning around the same time frame. He writes about Luther’s rejection of the 
multiplex approach to the text set forth by his predecessors: “Luther’s simplification 
meant drastic relief, affirming as it did that the literal or, as he preferred to call it, the 
grammatical or historical sense is the truest sense.” See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical 
Narrative, 19; cf. Martin Luther, “Auf das überchristlich, übergeistlich ind 
überkünstlich Buch Bock Emsers zu Leipzig Antwort,” Werke, 650–52. Another 
example would be Louis Berkkhof, Principles of Biblical Interpretation: Sacred 
Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1950), 27. 
262 For more see Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 109–14; D. S. Wallace-Hadrill, 
Christian Antioch: A Study of Early Christian Thought in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); Vahan S. Hovhanessian, ed., Exegesis and Hermeneutics in the 
Churches of the East: Select Papers from the SBL Meeting in San Diego, 2007 (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2009). 
 
263 Especially Karaite interpretation in medieval times. See Meira Polliack, 




August Ernesti as the one who best articulated what is today known as the historical-
grammatical method.265 For Sailhamer, “Ernesti’s view remains the definitive 
statement of the grammatical-historical approach.”266 Yet, surprisingly, the manner 
in which the historical-grammatical approach was understood and applied by biblical 
interpreters changed with time, looking less and less like that which Ernesti 
envisioned.267 Before I address these changes, it is necessary to focus on Ernesti’s 
vision for, and articulation of, the historical-grammatical method. This evaluation of 
                                                 
 
Jeremy Cohan, and David Sorkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 305–
12. Polliack affirms that the only precursor to the grammatical or linguistic-
contextual approach of Karaite hermeneutics is found in the “vaguely attested” 
rabbinic interpretative orientation known as peshat. Ibid., 306. 
264 I am greatly indebted to the work of John H. Sailhamer in this section. His 
thorough analysis of the work of Johann August Ernesti and its historical 
developments is of utmost importance to biblical interpretation. I summarize some of 
his findings here and outline some implications within the lines of what this chapter 
proposes to accomplish. Since Ernesti wrote in Latin, I rely on Sailhamer’s 
evaluation of Ernesti’s material and on my own readings of Moses Stuart’s 
translation of Ernesti’s work: J. A. Ernesti and Moses Stuart, Elementary Principles of 
Interpretation, 4th ed. (New York: Dayton & Saxton, 1842). From my own reading of 
Ernesti’s work, I believe Sailhamer has done a magnificent job in articulating 
Ernesti’s main ideas and the issues that have risen because of mistranslations of his 
work from the original Latin.  
265 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 105. Other scholars also see Ernesti as 
the one who established the hermeneutical parameters for what is currently known as 
the historical-grammatical method. Robert Jumonville also understands that Ernesti 
is “regarded as founder of the grammatical-historical school of hermeneutics.” See 
Robert Moore-Jumonville, Hermeneutics of Historical Distance: Mapping the Terrain of 
American Biblical Criticism, 1880–1914 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
2002), 104.  
266 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 105. 
267 Among these changes is the development of Ernesti’s approach to the 




Ernesti will inevitably address the notion of history, a conception that is central to 
the formative periods of the method. 
 
The Principle of History 
 
From History to Text 
 
 Johann Ernesti (1707–1781), “one of the dominating figures of his time,”268 
studied at Wittenberg and Leipzig and began teaching theology in Leipzig in 1759. 
Sailhamer and others see Ernesti as the father of a conservative and even evangelical 
approach to the text, yet along with Johann Salomo Semler,269 Ernesti is considered 
one of the founders of the historical-critical method, due to two main premises in his 
work on biblical hermeneutics: 
Firstly, Ernesti made clear the necessity of studying the Old and New Testaments 
not as a homogeneous whole but as distinct bodies of literature. Secondly, he 
applied to the New Testament the philological-historical method that had been 
developed in the interpretation of classical texts.270 
 
                                                 
 
History in Biblical Interpretation,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44, no. 
2 (June 2011): 194. 
268 M. A. Knoll, “Ernesti, Johann August,” in Historical Handbook of Major 
Biblical Interpreters, ed. Donald K. Mckim (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 
316. 
269 Both Semler and Ernesti are also listed as the influences behind the 
thinking of Johann Philipp Gabler. See Magne Sæbø, On the Way to the Canon: 
Creative Tradition History in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1998), 311–12. 
270 David R. Law, The Historical-Critical Method: A Guide for the Perplexed (New 
York: Continuum, 2012), 42. In Ernesti’s words, “the Scriptures are to be 




 The difficulty some scholars have in pinpointing the actual role and thinking 
of Ernesti is due to the fact that although Ernesti held to some of the rising historical-
critical premises of his time,271 he failed “to follow these insights to their logical 
conclusion and, affirming the doctrine of inerrancy continued to hold a conservative 
view of Scripture.”272 Thus Ernesti is influential in a paradoxical way. On the one 
hand, he popularized the historical-critical mindset of his time in his grammatical 
approach to the text,273 but on the other hand, he upheld a conservative posture of 
inerrancy.  
 Even so, because Ernesti is considered the main articulator of what is today 
known as the historical-grammatical method, it is important to briefly highlight some 
important aspects of his approach and trace some of the roots of his ideas.274 The 
                                                 
 
271 The roots of his premises are also numerous, yet some recognize that the 
philosophy of Christian Wolff played a significant role in his moderate rationalistic 
approach to the text. Knoll writes that Ernesti inherited “from Wolff a rational view 
of the universe in which revelation as a distinct source of knowledge apart from 
reason had a well-defined place.” See Knoll, “Ernesti, Johann August,” 316. Others 
see the influence of Schleiermacher in Ernesti’s thinking; see Cornelia Richter, 
“Friedrich Schleiermacher: Symbol Theory, Hermeneutics, and Forms of Religious 
Communication,” in Schleiermacher, the Study of Religion, and the Future of Theology: A 
Transatlantic Dialogue, ed. Brent W. Sockness and Wilhelm Gräb (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2010), 384. Moses Stuart sees the heavy influence of Samuel F. N. Morus’s 
Hermeneutica in the work of Ernesti; on this, see the preface written by Stuart in 
Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, iii-iv. 
272 Law, Historical-Critical Method, 42. 
273 Ernesti’s rationalistic approach to interpretation can be seen when he 
discusses the need for methodological steps in interpretation so that interpreters 
might not “be left to depend on chance rather than reason.” See Ernesti, Elementary 
Principles of Interpretation, 16. 
274 This study does not provide an exhaustive account of the development of 




question here is: how did Ernesti understand and articulate the historical-
grammatical approach?  
 In Ernesti’s writings, the meaning of the historical and the grammatical in his 
method was tied to the parameters set forth by the text: that is, the grammatical and 
the historical were not two different steps in interpretation, but one and the same.275 
This he termed the “usus loquendi.”276 In regard to the “historical” element in the 
“grammatical historical” approach, Ernesti “meant simply the ‘grammatical’ 
meaning of the words of Scripture,” that is, that to understand the meaning of 
history “meant ‘reading’ the historical narratives.”277 
 Historical implied that the narratives found in the biblical text were 
trustworthy depictions of real historical events, and to have access to those events 
one must read what is in the text. As for grammatical, it simply implied careful 
attention to the grammatical, syntactical, and literary components of the Hebrew, 
Greek, and Aramaic texts of the Bible. To understand history, one needs to 
understand grammar. 
                                                 
 
centuries as a window on the method in order to raise questions, concerns, and 
possible problems for further reflection.  
275 For Ernesti, “the act of interpretation implies two things; viz., (1) A right 
perception of the meaning of the words. (2) A proper explanation of that meaning.” 
See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 14. 
276 Daniel O’Leary, “Environmentalism, Hermeneutics, and Canadian 
Imperialism in Agnes Deans Cameron’s The New North,” in The Elusive Land: Women 
and the Canadian Environment, ed. Melody Hessing, Rebecca Raglon, and Catriona 
Mortimer-Sandilands (Vancouver: UBC, 2005), 19. 




From Text to History 
 
 It did not take long before scholars misunderstood Ernesti’s articulation of 
these concepts; “the phrase ‘grammatical-historical method’ went from being a 
description of the primarily textual procedure of studying written narratives to an 
almost exclusive search for the meaning of the historical events (realia) lying behind 
those narratives.”278 This shift indicates the essential difference between Ernesti’s 
vision of the historical-grammatical method and the historical-critical methodologies: 
namely, the acceptance or rejection of criticism based on historical depictions of the 
Bible as an access to meaning.  
 What triggered this misunderstanding, according to Sailhamer, was the 
English translation of Ernesti’s Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti279 by Moses 
Stuart.280 While for Ernesti the meaning of the text rested within the text itself, 
independent of critical external historical verifications (apart from the philological 
                                                 
 
278 Ibid., 105. Ernesti is categorical in assigning the meaning of the text to the 
boundaries set forth by the words and not to outside notions. He writes: “The 
meaning, which according to grammatical principles should be assigned to any word 
of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on account of reasons derived from things or 
previously conceived opinions; for in this way interpretation would become 
uncertain.” See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 30. This is a positive 
feature of Ernesti’s approach to the text, and it goes against the critical approach to 
the text in the sense that it is the text which determines the validity of the previously 
conceived notions of the interpreter. On this Ernesti writes: “In the Scriptures, if any 
sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must call to mind the imbecility of 
human reason and human faculties; we must seek for conciliation, and not attempt a 
correction of the passage without good authority.” Ibid. 
279 Johann August Ernesti, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti (Leipzig, 1761). 
280 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 106. 
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historicity of the words themselves), Stuart “advocated the use of history to uncover 
the meaning of biblical events,”281 not realizing that this “was not the intent in 
Ernesti’s work.”282 In other words, Stuart missed the authorial intent of Ernesti’s 
grammatical method in his translation, especially in regard to how Ernesti 
understood the interrelation between history and text in the search for meaning. 
 Following this translation of Ernesti’s work, other biblical scholars 
maintained the distance between the grammatical and the historical initiated by 
Stuart. While Ernesti understood the historical and the grammatical to be one,283 
scholars applied the method as a two-step process: the first “historical,” using the 
historical tools to uncover the historical background of the text where true historical 
facts resided, and the second “grammatical,” the intended spiritual/religious 
meaning of the text.  
 Among these scholars was Karl August Keil, who, according to Sailhamer, 
originated the hyphenated form grammatical-historical in his German translation of 
Ernesti’s Latin original.284 With this simple change the method began to imply “a 




283 In addition, for Ernesti, even the tropical or figurative sense of a possible 
word has a “grammatical” meaning. See Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 
37. 
284 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 108. Sailhamer also notes that the 
change from one to two hermeneutical procedures in the historical-grammatical 
method is already indicated by the translations of Ernesti’s work. Sailhamer writes: 
“In earlier hermeneutical works, the two terms ‘grammatical’ and ‘historical’ were 
commonly connected by the Latin conjunction sive, meaning something like our 




historical, along with a grammatical, interpretation,”285 that is, a softened version of 
what later came to be known as the historical-critical method, where meaning was 
not only restricted to the text itself, but was derived to a large extent from the 
historical-critical evaluations and reconstructions of the interpreter.  
 While the historical-critical approach to the text uncovered the veracity and 
consequently the meaning of the text from critical reconstructions, the historical-
grammatical method, as modified by Ernesti’s translators, placed a partial yet 
significant importance on these historical-critical backgrounds. To arrive at the final 
meaning of a text, the interpreter had to look at both history (through modern 
historical-critical tools) and text (through critical grammatical tools).286  
 What is interesting in this small historical development is that from its 
conception, the historical-grammatical method was utilized as a way for scholars to 
advocate different sets of assumptions. It comes as no surprise, then, that today the 
method is still being shaped and modified to suit the philosophical commitments of 
                                                 
 
that was sought after. When later biblical scholars such as Karl August Keil 
connected the two terms with a dash or an et, it suggested the two terms no longer 
meant the same thing. It was now ‘the grammatical and historical’ method.” See 
Sailhamer, “Johann August Ernesti,” 195. 
285 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 108. 
286 Again, this reliance on the history behind the text and the text itself was 
already envisioned by Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza writes: “The interpretation of nature 
consists in the examination of the history of nature, and from there deducing 
definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural 
interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the intention 
of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles.” See 




each interpreter using it.  
 While Ernesti believed that “the meaning of things ought to be derived solely 
from the words,”287 Keil saw the meaning as “not in the words of the author, but in 
his mind.” It was for this reason that Keil considered “the investigation of the sense 
of words to be a historical task.”288 The interpreter was to critically reconstruct the 
historical setting where the text was written in order to arrive at the true, factual 
meaning of the text, because this was as close as one could get to the mind of the 
author. In other words, to arrive at the authorial intention (what was in the mind of 
the author), the interpreter had to critically reconstruct the text. This reconstruction 
was done in the context of a suspicion toward the historical setting depicted by the 
biblical writer. What the biblical author actually wrote in relation to history would 
take on a secondary role under this critical assessment.  
 As noted so far, Ernesti’s intention with the historical-grammatical method 
was to find the reality and meaning of the text within a somewhat uncritical 
approach to the text itself.289 Hans Frei draws out three implications of this literal, 
                                                 
 
foundation for the positivistic approach to the text, since the approach of the scientist 
and that of the theologian were quite similar.  
287 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 119. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ernesti understood that an interpreter must have the capability of 
discerning between words and things, and that to arrive at the sense of the task or the 
thing to which it refers, one must have “an accurate knowledge of languages” and 
“an acquaintance with the principles of interpretation”: in other words, the sense of 




realistic, and semi-pre-critical290 interpretation of the text: first, if a story was to be 
read literally (as Ernesti envisioned), the story “referred to and described actual 
historical occurrences”291; second, “if the real historical world described by the 
several biblical stories is a single world of one temporal sequence, there must in 
principle be one cumulative story to depict it,”292 that is, “without loss to its own 
literal meaning or specific temporal reference, an earlier story (or occurrence) was a 
figure of a later one”293; and third, because the world of the text was unified as one 
single story, “it must in principle embrace the experience of any present age and 
reader.”294  
 Now that the general tenets of Ernesti’s vision for the method in its historical 
context have been laid out, the question is: according to Ernesti’s historical-
grammatical method, how does an interpreter arrive at the meaning of the text? 
 
Historical-Grammatical Structure of Meaning 
 
 At the outset, it is important to establish the basic dimensions of meaning 
                                                 
 
290 Semi-pre-critical in the sense that while Ernesti understood the value of 
critical grammatical tools to uncover the meaning of the text within the text itself, his 
assumptions regarding the textual depictions were quite conservative. In some sense, 
the historiography provided by the biblical authors had preeminence over modern 
historiography, because Ernesti believed that the historical process recorded in 
Scripture was true. 
291 Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 2. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid., 3. 
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present in interpretation in order to analyze Ernesti’s approach to the text. Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer correctly notes that the production of a text involves at least three 
dimensions: “Interpreters testify to what acts an author performed in inscribing just 
these words (content) in just this way (form) on just this occasion (context).”295 He 
concludes that the “meaning of a text pertains to all the things the author was doing 
in attending to his or her words.”296 With this in mind, how does the historical-
grammatical methodology relate to content, form, and context? 
 So far, I have attempted to demonstrate how Ernesti understood that to arrive 
at the meaning of the text, one must not necessarily subjugate it in favor of 
extrabiblical critical categories. Ernesti’s emphasis on the importance of the text to 
arrive at meaning derived from his understanding that the exegetical approach to 
Scripture needed to be “identical to the newly developed philological approach taken 
                                                 
 
295 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, 
and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 5. The 
historical developments in biblical hermeneutics are marked by changes in emphasis 
on these three areas, and more specifically in this study, on the interpretation of 
“context.” I chose Vanhoozer at this stage since I am analyzing in broad strokes the 
basic elements present in the interpretation of a text. For a more detailed analysis of 
text and meaning, see Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts, 57–76. 
296 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 5. If one was to add another dimension to 
Vanhoozer’s basic scheme it would be that of the reader, that is, the possibility of the 
reader being involved in the generation of meaning in the text. Even so, because this 
particular study is aimed at the historical-grammatical method, I will keep this fourth 
dimension out of the evaluation of the method, especially because the historical-
grammatical method gives no role to the reader in the generation of meaning apart 
from the methodological steps to find the meaning within the text itself. This way, I 
will limit myself to the definition of meaning set forth by Vanhoozer as centered on 
everything “the author was doing to his or her words,” even though I believe such 
definition lacks the crucial dimension of the reader. 
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in the study of other ancient literature.”297 Ernesti’s approach was not based on any 
inner reasoning within the text, but on the philological approaches of his time. What 
informed his understanding that “the text can have no other meaning than its 
grammatical, or historical, sense”298 found in the individual words was his reliance 
upon this philological background. This is why some see the grammatical and 
historical approaches to the text as foundational for the critical method, since both 
understand that any method for biblical interpretation should follow the same 
parameters found in the interpretation of any other book.299 
 Yet Ernesti’s emphasis on two of the three dimensions of meaning, namely 
content and form, creates the necessity of understanding how Ernesti viewed the 
function of language. In order to establish some parameters to analyze one’s 
philosophy of language, especially in the context of Scripture, I resort to the 
philosophy of language found in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.300 Wittgenstein’s 
work can be divided into two main periods: his early work,301 based on foundational 
                                                 
 
297 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 117. 
298Ibid. 
299 See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 
38. 
300 For an introductory perspective on the writings of Wittgenstein see Hans 
D. Sluga and David G. Stern, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Probably the best analysis of Wittgenstein’s 
work in the context of Scripture and theology is found in Labron, Wittgenstein’s 
Religious Point of View, and Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology. 
301 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). 
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theories of language that viewed the sense of language as attached to ideal Forms 
and explained by foundational categories; and his later work,302 based on a more 
pragmatic and functional approach that viewed the sense of language as attached to 
its use and practice. While the former was more Platonic in nature, with words 
pointing to pre-established realities, the latter was more Hebraic, in the sense that to 
understand language one does not need to learn the reality to which it points, but to 
understand how language functions within its context.303  
 Ernesti for his part understood that “the reason for a word’s meaning is not 
arrived at logically.” This implies that to arrive at the meaning of a word, one needs 
to see “how it functions in that language.”304 In this sense, Ernesti’s understanding of 
language comes close to Wittgenstein’s functional understanding of language,305 
                                                 
 
302 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.  
303 On the Hebraic sense of Wittgenstein’s later work, Wittgenstein himself 
writing to M. O’C. Drury asserts: “Your religious ideas have always seemed to me 
more Greek than biblical. Whereas my thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.” 
In M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, 
ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 79. The Hebraic sense is 
found in Wittgenstein’s later work and asserted as such because his later work, 
following the general tendencies of biblical writings, seems to “attach meaning to the 
historical and contemporary applications of language—the forms of life—in contrast 
to positing additional elements or foundational theories beyond normative 
practices.” In Labron, Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View, 5.  
304 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 117. Ernesti when speaking about the 
meaning of words writes: “How can the meaning in each case be found? From the 
general manner of speaking, i. e. from the common usage.” In Ernesti, Elementary 
Principles of Interpretation, 21.  
305 The main difference is that while Wittgenstein does not believe scientific 
positivism of any sort can influence the understanding of what language is, Ernesti 
will follow a rigorous philological approach to uncover the meaning of the words: 




which is closer to the Hebrew way of writing than the Greek.  
 Ernesti’s historical-grammatical approach, then, arrives at the meaning of the 
text by emphasizing the first two elements of the scheme of meaning—content and 
form. It attends to context to better understand the nature and history of the 
text/language, but not in the sense that history is the reality to which the textual 
meaning points. As mentioned earlier, in the historical-grammatical methodology 
envisioned by Ernesti, there is no role given to the reader apart from the 
methodological steps to reach a proper understanding of what was written, what 
Ernesti calls the subtilitas explicandi.306  
 The implications of a semi-pre-critical understanding of the text present in 
Ernesti’s intention for the historical-grammatical method, along with how the 
approach uncovers the meaning of the text, prepare the ground for the evaluation of 
the second macro-hermeneutical premise: ontology.  
 So far, in the analysis of the premises that relate to the issues surrounding the 
term history in the historical-grammatical method, I have pointed out that the usage 
                                                 
 
Ernesti is working in biblical interpretation, where there is no way to understand the 
usage of words without a basic grasp of the ancient languages. Even so, the similarity 
between Ernesti and Wittgenstein is evident when Ernesti speaks of the sense of 
words as follows: “The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi. This must be the 
case, because the sense of words is conventional and regulated wholly by usage. 
Usage then being understood, the sense of words is of course understood.” Ernesti, 
Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 25.  
306 Ibid., 17. 
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of the method is divided between two camps307: those who follow Ernesti and his 
original vision (the grammatical and historical are one interpretative action), and 
those who follow the translations of his work (the grammatical and historical are two 
different interpretative actions). This dual understanding of the method in the 
historical sphere will be repeated in the ontological sphere.  
 It is also important to note that both those who follow the translations of 
Ernesti’s work (two-step) and those who follow Ernesti (one-step) are looking for the 
true historical meaning of the text. In this they agree. The difference is seen in 
whether this meaning is found in critical reconstructions of the events surrounding 
the formation of the text, or in what the text itself says about the historical process it 
describes. The historical critics of the time understood that the bridge to meaning 
required careful historical-critical reconstruction of the life setting (sitz in Leben) of the 
author, along with close attention to the sources that shaped the formation of the 
text. On the other hand, Ernesti understood that philology alone was the bridge to 
meaning,308 that is, the historical meaning of the text was found within the text 
                                                 
 
307 For a sample of those who understand the grammatical-historical method 
differently than Ernesti (emphasizing the two-step application), see Hank Voss, 
“From ‘Grammatical-Historical Exegesis’ to ‘Theological Exegesis’: Five Essential 
Practices,” Evangelical Review of Theology 37, no. 2 (April 2013): 145; Milton Spenser 
Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1974), 203–4.  
308 Sailhamer also argues that Ernesti relied on his philological enterprise 
because of his Lutheran background, which relied on the verbal inspiration of the 
text (see Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 112–14), a meso-hermeneutical notion 
not lacking macro-hermeneutical commitments. Canale himself departs from a strict 
model of verbal inspiration in his work: “Both verbal and thought inspiration 






The Principle of Ontology 
 
 Now that the presuppositions that relate to history have been laid out, this 
section turns to two ontological issues that emerged from the evaluation of the 
historical premises of the historical-grammatical method. The issues that remain to 
be addressed are the issue of time in pre-critical figuration and typology and the issue 
of the dichotomy between words (verba) and things (res) in order to find the meaning 
(sensus) of the text.  
 
                                                 
 
replaced with biblical ones.” See Fernando L. Canale, The Cognitive Principle of 
Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study of the Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible 
(Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotec, 2005), 404. Even so, it is 
important to keep in mind that some argue that a full-blown notion of verbal 
inspiration and consequently the notion of inerrancy only appeared later in the 
Lutheran tradition; for Peter Leithart, only by the seventeenth century had “the 
Reformation doctrine of Scripture . . . been refined into a strong doctrine of 
inerrancy.” See Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 7. 
309 To summarize this difference in another light, while the historical-critical 
method focuses on the world of the author, historical grammarians focus on the 
world of the text; see Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics. One must realize 
that “What is the intention of the author within his own world?” is a question 
historical critics have been trying to answer for over two hundred years. Canale (as 
well as SDAs), in emphasizing the significance of history, cannot ignore the 
historical context in which God revealed himself to the biblical authors and how they 
appropriated this revelation in their historical contexts (including culture, language, 
customs, etc.). This certainly is not an endorsement of the historical-critical 
methodology and all its current ramifications. But this is a reminder that an emphasis 
on time/history at the ontological level creates several questions that must be dealt 
with at a hermeneutical level. The temptation here is to avoid and neglect these 
questions by hiding them “under the rug” of the more conservative historical-
grammatical method without a basic knowledge of what the method sets forth to do. 
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Figuration, Typology, and Time 
 
 As noted above, one of the primary features of pre-critical interpretation, 
which forms the background of the historical-grammatical method,310 is figuration or 
typology. Since the grammatical-historical method originally assumed a realistic 
reading of the text—that is, narratives that literally pointed to real past historical 
events and processes—one of the primary consequences of such reading was an 
emphasis on the unity of Scripture.311 Scripture told one single story, with older 
events serving as types/figures for newer events.  
 At the same time, it was because of figuration and typology that the reader 
could be immersed in the reality of the world of the text. Hans Frei writes that 
figuration “was at once a literary and historical procedure, an interpretation of stories 
and their meanings by weaving them together into a common narrative referring to a 
single history and its patterns of meaning.”312 Yet behind the possibility of this 
weaving of stories into one single narrative is the element of time. 
                                                 
 
310 Figural or typological interpretation that stemmed from a literal or 
grammatical approach to the Bible was also central to the hermeneutic of the 
Reformation. Frei writes: “The affirmation that the literal or grammatical sense is the 
Bible’s true sense became programmatic for the traditions of Lutheran and 
Calvinistic interpretation.” See Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37. This is yet 
another reason why some tie the premises of the historical-grammatical method to 
the hermeneutic of the Reformation, and rightly so. Both the Reformers and Frei 
resort to a literal realistic reading of the text leading to a unified narrative that opens 
itself to the reader.  
311 This is why the critical approach to the text, with its dissection of the text 
and its unity, virtually destroyed any possible realistic reading of Scripture. By 
appealing to several traditions and dividing the text along with its narrative, the unity 
of the story was compromised and the text no longer carried a unified narrative. 
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 Frei points out not only the importance of unity for a figural understanding of 
the text, but also the importance of time. He writes: “If figural or typological 
interpretation was to be successful, it required a delicate balance between the 
temporally separated occasions, a firm connection with literal or realistic procedure, 
and a clear rooting in the order of temporal sequence.”313  
 Yet while Frei emphasizes the importance of the sequence of past history for 
figural interpretation, Erich Auerbach, examining the development of the 
interpretation of Scripture in the Middle Ages, clarifies that in that particular period, 
time was secondary to the eternal/timeless divine plan.314 He writes that figural 
interpretation “is not regarded as primarily a chronological or causal development 
but as a oneness within the divine plan, of which all occurrences are parts and 
reflections.”315 In this sense, because God was understood to be omnitemporal316 or 
timeless, the element of time, or the “horizontal, that is the temporal and causal, 
connection of occurrences is dissolved.”317  
 From this, one notices two possibilities for understanding figural or 
                                                 
 
312 Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 2. 
313 Ibid., 29. 
314 Since Frei quotes Auerbach in his study, it seems that even Frei did not see 
the difference of emphasis in what Auerbach writes and its implications for 
understanding the pre-critical mindset. 
315 Erich Auerbach and Edward W. Said, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality 
in Western Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 555. 
316 Ibid., 73. 
317 Ibid., 74. 
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typological interpretation in pre-critical times. The first follows a temporal historical 
dynamic where events are incomplete, since they point to future events highlighting 
the importance of the “historical now.” The second follows a timeless dynamic 
where current events are already fulfilled in their timeless connection to future 
events, highlighting the importance of the eternal divine plan over the present 
“historical now.” Again, one is caught between two camps with different 
assumptions.  
 Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the ontological direction of pre-
critical figural interpretation, by the late eighteenth century the canonical unity 
supported by the approach was overcome by historical criticism and its divisive 
nature. While in pre-critical times the literal explicative nature of the text was 
identical with historical reference, in the hermeneutical developments of the 
eighteenth century, they were broken apart.318  
 Even so, Ernesti’s original intention for the historical-grammatical method 
implicitly emphasized the role of time and history for the unity of the text and God’s 
action in the world according to the reality depicted by the biblical authors, as 
frequently seen in the work of Fernando Canale.319 Auerbach’s evaluation of realism 
in Scripture provides insight into the context of the classical ontology of medieval 
times, a philosophical outlook that often blurs what seems to be the ontological 
                                                 
 
318 Frei, Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 28. 
319 Much, if not all, of the work of Fernando L. Canale flows from this basic 




perspective implicit in the work of the biblical authors: that is, of time, history, and 
divinity acting and working within it.  
 In sum, one of the key characteristics of a pre-critical understanding of the 
text, a characteristic also seen in Ernesti’s vision of the historical-grammatical 
method, is figuration and typology. Yet in order for the story of Scripture to be 
considered as a whole, it must be unified by the element of time and progression. As 
seen above, even in this question, scholars are divided between those who 
understand figuration and typology in a temporal chronological sense and those who 
understand it as a divine timeless plan. 
 
Verba, Res, Sensus: The Text and Truth 
 
 Besides the notions of figuration, typology, and time, a second point that 
must receive attention at this stage is the significance of the interrelation of words 
(verba), things (res), and sense (sensus) in hermeneutics, which can be traced as far 
back as Augustine’s De Doctrina Cristiana.320 This also recalls several other notions 
                                                 
 
different from the premises that shaped Christian theology. For more on his basic 
understanding of these issues, see Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason. 
320 For a thorough analysis of Augustine’s hermeneutic and its relation to 
critical methodology, see Augustine A. Gilmore, “Augustine and the Critical 
Method,” Harvard Theological Review 39, no. 2 (April 1946): 141–63. This section 
does not intend to provide a thorough investigation of Augustine’s hermeneutic for 
several reasons; among them is the fact that because his material on hermeneutics is 
so extensive, “study of his techniques can lead us into intellectual quagmire.” See 
Frederick Van Fleteren and Joseph C. Schnaubelt, Augustine: Biblical Exegete (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2001), 2. At this stage I will focus primarily on Augustine’s 
dichotomy between words and things, since it might help the reader grasp how the 
historical-critical and grammatical methodologies understand the flow of meaning in 
the text.  
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introduced earlier, since “all of Augustine’s endeavors in metaphysics, epistemology, 
and exegesis coincide with a relentless effort to define the functions and limits of 
human language.”321 This brief evaluation might help to clarify the dual approach to 
meaning (from history to text, or text to history) found in the historical-critical 
(which will be evaluated subsequently) and historical-grammatical approaches to the 
text, especially the changes made to the historical-grammatical approach. 
 For Augustine, “all doctrine concerns either things or signs.”322 The word 
thing means “that which is part of the real (res) world referred to in the Bible but lying 
outside the Bible itself,” that is, “a piece of the outside world identified specifically 
by a specific word (verbum).”323 The words of Scripture play the role of a sign 
pointing to a different reality.324 The question that arises is: what is the nature of a 
“thing” that signs point to? 
 Some argue that this dichotomy between words and things stems from 
Augustine’s conception of God and time. Among them is Eugene Vance, who 
correctly depicts Augustine’s view that “even though God created the temporal 
                                                 
 
321 Eugene Vance, Mervelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 34. 
322 “Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum” in Augustine, De Doctrina 
Christiana, 1.2. 
323 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 74. 
324 This basic idea influences his own understanding of the “real meaning” of 
a particular text. See Van Fleteren, Augustine: Biblical Exegete, 10. Van Fleteren 
pinpoints at least four spheres in which Augustine articulates these meanings: 
historical, aetiological, analogical, and allegorical, all carrying a perspective that the 
text is a sign, pointing to different things.  
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world, God remains eternally present to himself as pure Being beyond time.”325 So, 
to some extent, for Augustine, the final purpose of the words of Scripture is to 
connect the reader with that reality or thing (res) “outside” the world.326 In other 
words, “the words (verba) of Scripture are what takes us into the world of things (res), 
the real world. . . . where we comprehend (and contemplate) eternal spiritual 
realities.”327 In the end, the words are only a means, a husk,328 pointing forward to, or 
wrapping, the eternal content found in the text. 
 Historical critics at the turn of the eighteenth century questioned the 
plausibility of the premise of eternal truth existing within the text. For them, the 
“thing” (res) or reality to which the text pointed ceased to be this eternal revealed 
truth in the text (in pre-critical times), and became the historical process behind the 
formation of the text. Revelation took place in an event in the past. The text only 
testified to this event, but did not contain revelation.329 The text continued to be a 
                                                 
 
325 Vance, Mervelous Signals, 35. 
326 In relation to Augustine’s hermeneutic, Vance writes: “Augustine believed 
that the meaning of Scripture is strictly autonomous—independent of the temporal, 
verbal signs by which it is expressed, and such temporal meaning must be grasped by 
the reader in a direct process of illumination from within.” See Vance, Mervelous 
Signals, 41. 
327 Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 76. 
328 For the analogy of the text as a husk see Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 1–34. 
329 Canale traces this subjective reality to the influence of Schleiermacher 
upon the formulation of the historical-critical methodology, affirming that the 
“historical-critical methodology of exegesis necessarily implies the encounter theory 




vessel through which truth was communicated, but the truth was behind the text, not 
in it. In other words, truth was seen as grounded in the subjective experience of the 
author and in its effect upon the readers, who fit themselves within the same 
reconstructed storyline.  
 As for historical grammarians, they attempted to maintain the eternal content 
of the text (via Augustine), while at the same time sustaining the fact that the text 
was only a wrapping covering the eternal content. The reality (res) of which the 
words were signs was found within the text, making the words mere signs to be 
disposed of once the meaning was reached.330  
 Interestingly, in both approaches to the text, the Platonic dichotomy between 
words and things seen in Augustine’s work (an understanding that can be traced 
through Spinoza to Kant) remains intact at an ontological level. Both historical 
critics and historical grammarians exercise their differences under this Augustinian, 
and consequently Platonic, umbrella. The risk of a naive use of the historical-
grammatical method is just this: that the interpreter ends up unconsciously resorting 
to a hermeneutical framework that flows from Platonic ontology.331  
                                                 
 
330 Thus, on both the historical and ontological levels, the importance of the 
text for historical critics is partial: at the historical level the biblical authors used the 
text and its historiographical import to convey an earlier message, and at the 
ontological level the text is only a vessel carrying an ethical religious message 
relevant at the time of its composition. Again, the dichotomy between things as they 
appear and as they are looms in the background. 
331 This evaluation might vary if the interpreter does not resort to classical 
ontology when using the historical-grammatical methodology. Even so, because of 
the volatile nature of the method, its use renders problematic results. Ángel M. 




 In sum, the distinction between words and things that has shaped 
hermeneutical discussions for centuries—a distinction prevalent in the historical-
critical and historical-grammatical approaches—is fundamentally tied to ontological 
commitments. Although the two approaches to the text differ in practical priorities, 
the macro-hermeneutical structure remains the same.  
 Based on this brief evaluation of the formative periods of the historical-
grammatical method, it is possible to draw out the implication that the volatile 
nature of the method allows it to be applied in any way a particular interpreter wants 
under the umbrella of Platonic categories. Although the method assumes specific 
conceptions of history and ontology, the interpreter can still shape how the method 
functions based on the application of particular presuppositions concerning the 
relation of text, history, and truth. 
 The historical-grammatical method can function in a variety of ways under 
varied philosophical conditions that create varied interpretations. As for the 
historical-critical method, scholars understand that its “methodology cannot be 
claimed as a neutral discipline.”332 This is only one of the reasons why a proper 
evaluation of the macro-hermeneutical premises of the historical-critical approach is 
                                                 
 
historical-critical method. See Ángel M. Rodriguez, “The Use of the Modified 
Version of the Historical-Critical Approach by Adventist Scholars,” in Understanding 
Scripture: An Adventist Approach, ed. George W. Reid, Biblical Research Institute 
Studies 1 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2006), 339–51. Perhaps the same 
should be said of the historical-grammatical method and any of its modified versions.  
332 Eugene F. Klug, foreword to The End of the Historical-Critical Method, by 
Gerhard Maier (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1977), 8. 
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 The historical-critical method was and still is the “dominant approach in the 
academic study of the Bible,”333 including both the “Hebrew Bible and New 
Testament.”334 Dozeman writes that “most scholarship in the United States, and an 
even larger majority of work done in Europe still falls comfortably under the 
historical-critical banner.” In addition, “the method has been used almost exclusively 
by the overwhelming majority of biblical scholars, both Catholic and Protestant.”335 
The method crosses denominational lines; Keegan understands that even 
“fundamentalists have recognized the validity and power of this method and have 
used it to the extent that its results could be harmonized with their religious 
concerns.”336 The historical-critical method is overwhelmingly accepted by biblical 
scholars across geographical and denominational spectrums, but before it can be 
evaluated, it must be defined.  
 As with the grammatical method, to properly define the historical-critical 
                                                 
 
333 John Barton, “Historical-Critical Approaches,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 9. 
334 Dozeman, Methods for Exodus, xi. 
335 Keegan, Interpreting the Bible, 24. 
336 Ibid., 24–25. 
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method is a complex task.337 Historical-critical method “is a term sometimes used 
erroneously as a synonym for the whole body of critical methodologies and 
approaches related to the discipline of Biblical Criticism.”338 I intend not to fall into 
this misconception in this study. Archie L. Nations notes that many believe “the 
method is so well understood that it needs no definition,”339 asserting that in the end 
historical criticism is “not a uniform method but rather a set of assumptions thought 
to be operative in doing historical research.”340 Therefore, this section will focus not 
on the varied facets of the historical-critical method itself, but on the formation of 
what is known as “historical criticism” and the philosophical presuppositions or “set 
of assumptions” the approach inherently carries within its structure.341 Historical 
                                                 
 
337 John Barton writes: “What is the historical-critical method? Unfortunately, 
its definition is almost as controversial as its desirability.” See Barton, “Historical-
Critical Approaches,” 9. Ben F. Meyer, on the other hand, offers what he believes to 
be a stable understanding and definition: “philologically learned, critical (as opposed 
to ‘dogmatic’), and devoted to scientific (as opposed to ‘pre-critical’) interpretation 
and history.” See Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3. 
338 Soulen and Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism, 11. 
339 Archie L. Nations, “Historical Criticism and the Current Methodological 
Crisis,” Scottish Journal of Theology 36, no. 1 (1983): 63. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Nations writes that these assumptions normally align with the following 
tenets: “Criticism must be freed from dogmatic presuppositions, maintain a high 
degree of objectivity, eschew ecclesiastical controls, and accept secular historians’ 
notions of historical homogeneity, of cause and effect relationships and of the 
criticism of sources.” Ibid. Another author who speaks of the general assumptions 
within biblical criticism is Ben F. Meyer. Meyer writes that the historical-critical 
method “has now been in use for approximately 200 years” (claiming that two thirds 
of this period followed the vision set forth by Baruch Spinoza) and that throughout 




criticism will be understood in this study not as a uniform method, but as this “set of 
assumptions” implemented in the various practices within the historical-critical 
method. With this definition in mind, the origin of these assumptions within biblical 
criticism can be examined.  
 While the majority of scholars see the rise of historical criticism as best 
perceived in the context of the Enlightenment and the turn of the eighteenth century, 
Travis F. Frampton writes that “these commonly held notions are not completely 
accurate.”342 Although no one can deny that the eighteenth century was central to the 
appearance of the historical-critical approach to the text, Frampton attempts to 
convey that other circumstances should also be taken into account.343 Frampton 
asserts that “to understand the rise of modern critical approaches to biblical texts 
properly, one must at least begin with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”344 
 Frampton understands that the Renaissance and later the Reformation were 
key historical developments that led up to the historical-critical approach to the text. 
Frampton writes: 
                                                 
 
critical (as opposed to ‘dogmatic’), and devoted to scientific (as opposed to ‘pre-
critical’) interpretation and history.” See Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3. 
342 Travis L. Frampton, Spinoza and the Rise of Historical Criticism of the Bible 
(London: T&T Clark, 2006), 199. 
343 I do not want to neglect this significant point, although assessing the 
developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries falls outside the scope of 
this study. A door is here left open for further studies, particularly regarding whether 
the philosophical presuppositions present in the eighteenth century were also 
operative in the previous centuries.  
344 Ibid., 200. 
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The Renaissance contributed greatly to an increase of knowledge by a renewed 
interest in the erudition of Greco-Roman classical authors, by developing ways of 
carrying out text-critical analyses of manuscripts, and by scrutinizing received 
traditions—all of which eroded many ancient and medieval myths. Yet it did not 
challenge political and religious authorities to the extent the Reformation later 
would. The manner in which the Reformers conjoined reason and the Bible, 
setting the latter up as a new locus of authority, however, left Protestants in an 
uncomfortable and compromising position.345  
 
In other words, while the Renaissance paved the way for an emphasis on human 
reason, the Reformation counterbalanced these advancements with an emphasis on 
the authority of the text in the life of the individual. This dependence on the Bible as 
authority, and on the authority of the confessional community of believers, would be 
radically challenged at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While 
this study focuses on that transition between the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, it will not neglect the context of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
since some of the philosophical presuppositions within modern biblical criticism 
have roots in these earlier periods.  
 As in the previous section, I will evaluate two representative thinkers who are 
responsible for articulating the main philosophical presuppositions influential in 
historical criticism today,346 namely, Baruch Spinoza and Julius Wellhausen.347 To 
                                                 
 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ben F. Meyer directly connects the work of Spinoza with the historical-
critical method, since for him “‘historical-critical’ work was largely aligned with the 
tradition of interpretation and history set in motion by Benedict Spinoza.” See 
Meyer, “Challenges of Text,” 3. 
347 The majority of books on hermeneutics or Old Testament interpretation 
mention the work of Spinoza and Wellhausen. What the present analysis contributes 
to this long and common discussion is its object—the macro-hermeneutical or 










 The work of Spinoza348 was foundational for the development of what is 
today known as historical criticism. As Mark S. Gignilliat correctly points out, it is 
“important to come to terms with Spinoza because his work sets a trajectory for the 
modern-critical approach to Old Testament exegesis.”349 The particular work that is 
most influential in biblical interpretation is Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
(henceforth TTP), a work that is not exclusively hermeneutical, but “examines the 
relation between religion and political theory through interpretation of the scriptures 
                                                 
 
what is today known as historical criticism. So, the focus here will not be on the 
particulars of their work (Spinoza’s philosophical conceptions as a whole or 
Wellhausen’s detailed understanding of the sources that formed the biblical text and 
their relation to the history of Israel), but on the presuppositions they held and 
inserted into biblical criticism. In this sense, the present analysis will not be 
exhaustive and inevitably will leave much information out. It is my hope that this 
brief evaluation might convince the reader of the presence and influence of 
philosophical presuppositions within biblical interpretation.  
348 For more on Spinoza’s background and thinking, see W. N. A. Klever, 
“Spinoza’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13–60; James S. Preus, Spinoza and 
the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); E. M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Frampton, Rise of Historical 
Criticism; and the book that sets forth Spinoza’s basic ideas regarding biblical 
interpretation (already mentioned in passing), Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. From 
now on all texts from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus will be taken from the 1989 
Gebhardt edition and not from the already surpassed translation by R. H. M. Elwes.  
349 Gignilliat, Brief History, 16. 
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and the history of the Hebrew nation.”350 This section is aimed at uncovering the 
philosophical presuppositions that govern Spinoza’s hermeneutic in the TTP, since 
these presuppositions are the platform upon which modern biblical criticism is built.  
 To further elaborate on the need for an analysis of the relation between 
Spinoza’s philosophical presuppositions and his hermeneutic, I turn to Brad S. 
Gregory, who writes: “The extent to which Spinoza’s philosophy provides the basis 
for his interpretation of Scripture, especially chapters 1-6, has not been sufficiently 
recognized.”351 Furthermore, Gregory asserts: 
The TTP is rightly acknowledged as a pioneering work in the establishment of 
modern Biblical exegesis, but it is permeated by a philosophy which, despite its 
author’s claims to the contrary, plays a crucial role in the scriptural 
interpretation.352  
 
Along with his philosophy guiding biblical interpretation, scholars generally 
recognize that the terminology Spinoza uses to articulate his ideas includes biblical 
                                                 
 
350 Don Garrett, introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don 
Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. What Spinoza attempts 
to secure in TTP is freedom. Freedom is his first principle, on which both religion 
and peace in society rely. Spinoza writes: “I think I am undertaking no ungrateful or 
unprofitable task in demonstrating that not only can this freedom be granted without 
endangering piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also that the peace of the 
commonwealth and piety depend on this freedom. This then, is the main point 
which I have sought to establish in this treatise.” Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus, 51–52. 
351 Brad S. Gregory, introduction to Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, by Baruch 
Spinoza, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 41. 
352 Ibid., 42. 
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words, but carries extrabiblical conceptualizations.353 Gregory’s evaluation of the 
influences behind Spinoza’s hermeneutic is aligned with the assessment of this study 
in general, and this section in particular: that interpretative traditions carry within 
themselves extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions (such as biblical terminology 
with extrabiblical conceptualizations)354 that define the nature and scope of 
methodology, and consequently, its results.  
 Although there is no doubt that Spinoza’s philosophy guided his biblical 
interpretation, it is also important to note that many of the presuppositions to be 
mentioned next did not first appear in Spinoza’s work. As observed earlier, the 
developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cannot be neglected. So, at 
this introductory stage, I would like to briefly highlight some significant ideas that 
developed over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and provided the background 
for Spinoza’s work. Gregory identifies at least three representative authors who 
created the general direction in which Spinoza would later develop his ideas. What 
follows is a summary of these authors and the main ideas that Spinoza would later 
develop. 
                                                 
 
353 Concerning Spinoza’s definition of biblical terms, Gregory writes, 
“Spinoza’s interpretation leans on such [naturalistic] definitions despite the fact that 
they are not found in the Bible.” Ibid. 
354 This was mentioned in the previous chapter relating to Gilkey’s criticism of 
biblical interpretation being half conservative and half liberal. As one can notice, this 
interpretative dilemma in modern times has ancient roots. The difference in Spinoza 
is not that he was naïvely using biblical language to arrive at liberal conclusions: on 
the contrary, “Spinoza employs many of the same terms prevalent in traditional 
Jewish and Christian discourse . . . but he twists them and gives them new, 
unorthodox meanings that are compatible with his own philosophy.” Ibid., 42–43. 
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 First was the French millenarist Isaac La Peyrère (1596–1676), who wrote 
Men Before Adam, of which the “main thesis, based on both scriptural and extra-
scriptural evidence, was that people had existed before Adam and hence the Biblical 
account of Adam as the first man had to be modified.”355 La Peyrère was also known 
for showing “numerous textual problems in the Pentateuch in addition to denying its 
Mosaic authorship.”356  
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) wrote Leviathan and 
advocated that the authenticity of the books of Scripture, that is, the canon, “are 
determined not by tradition, scholarship or an appeal to ‘the Spirit,’ but by the 
sovereign’s [the state’s] command.”357 Along with this idea, Hobbes also criticized 
the Mosaic authorship and, consequently, the general reliability of the Pentateuch.  
The English Quaker Samuel Fisher (1606–1665), who wrote The Rustick’s 
Alarm to the Rabbies, influenced Spinoza’s work on both epistemological and 
historical levels. Gregory summarizes Fisher’s assumptions by affirming that his 
“fundamental epistemological distinction is between the Word of God and Scripture, 
an eternal, supernatural message of God on the one hand and on the other, a 
physical copy of this Word written by certain human beings at a specific time and 
place.”358  
                                                 
 
355 Ibid., 33. 
356 Ibid., 34. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid., 35–36. 
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 Leithart adds another name to the list, that of the Dutch “amateur” 
theologian Lodewik Meyer, who published Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, a book 
that would later be distributed alongside Spinoza’s Tractatus. Meyer held that “any 
number of interpretations of a passage might thus be true and the test of their truth is 
their consistency with philosophy, that is, with the clear and distinct deliverances 
that arise from Cartesian method.”359 Leithart adds that “Meyer’s book is important 
because in it he initiates a hermeneutical method that detaches the truth and 
meaning of Scripture from its verbal expression.”360  
In other words, the hermeneutical development between the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries was marked by the beginning of a detachment of truth and 
meaning from the text itself to external categories,361 a detachment this study also 
aligns with a timeless conception of reality.  
 All of the ideas listed above appear in the work of Spinoza in a highly 
developed and articulated manner. This introduction only highlights the need to take 
a closer look at how Spinoza developed his biblical interpretation in the context of 
                                                 
 
359 See Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 9.  
360 Ibid., 10. 
361 These external categories vary. Even in the Reformation, the interpretation 
of the text itself was guided by a tropological or personal/ethical orientation making 
the text conform to “canons within the canon.” See Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 13–15. 
Later on, these external categories that detached truth and meaning from the text, 
and truth from meaning itself, included reason in the context of philosophy, science, 
and historical investigation.  
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the philosophical presuppositions that influenced his project.362 I will begin by 
evaluating the principle of epistemology and ontology in Spinoza’s work, followed 
by how Spinoza arrived at the meaning of the biblical text. To this evaluation I now 
turn. 
 
The Principle of Epistemology and Ontology 
 
 Spinoza’s philosophical presuppositions concerning reality depart from an 
                                                 
 
362 As the introduction of this study indicates, the focus of this project is on 
intended philosophical presuppositions, rather than unintended presuppositions such 
as experiences, assumptions, and emotions, which are also quite influential in 
biblical interpretation. Even so, I would like to mention one significant unintended 
presupposition that highlights why Spinoza approached Scripture and religion the 
way he did: his frustration with incoherence in religion—a frustration that can still be 
experienced in contemporary times. Spinoza writes: “Matters have long reached 
such a pass that a Christian, Turk, Jew or heathen can generally be recognised as 
such only by his physical appearance or dress, or by his attendance at a particular 
place of worship, or by his profession of a particular belief and his allegiance to some 
leader. But as for their way of life, it is the same for all. . . . The very temple became 
a theater where, instead of Church teachers, orators held forth, none of the actuated 
by the desire to instruct the people, but keen to attract admiration, to criticise their 
adversaries before the public, and to preach only such novel and striking doctrine as 
might gain the applause of the crowd.” Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 52. 
This is just a glimpse at the internal frustrations Spinoza held toward religion and the 
religious way of life. So, even before I venture into an analysis of Spinoza’s intended 
philosophical presuppositions, it is important to remember that behind the ideas of a 
man is a life full of complexity, a life that cannot be objectified and assigned to 
particular categories. In addition, Spinoza himself attacked the “preachers” of his 
time with an argument that is recurrent in this study: “I do not see that they 
[religious preachers] have taught anything more than the speculations of 
Aristotelians or Platonists, and they have made Scripture conform to these so as to 
avoid appearing to be the followed of heathens. It was not enough for them to share 
in the delusions of the Greeks: they have sought to represent the prophets as sharing 
in the same delusions.” Ibid., 53. The question that is left open is: will Spinoza 
succumb to this same critique? Will Spinoza, in the end, conform the biblical text to 
Greek assumptions? Will the prophets speak Hebrew with the voice of Plato?  
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epistemological standpoint.363 Because knowledge of reality can only be acquired 
through reason, Spinoza creates a dichotomy between Scripture and philosophy: 
while Scripture can lead the individual to piety, only philosophy can lead to truth. 
This piety that Scripture proposes is a reasonable and acceptable form of religion, or 
what Spinoza calls “purified religion.” Opposed to purified religion is “superstitious 
religion,” that is, the religion set forth by the writings of Scripture itself (without the 
aid of reason) and the prophets who upheld elements contrary to the validation of 
reason, such as miracles,364 supernatural events, divine voices, etc. So, it is through 
                                                 
 
363 This study already alluded to Spinoza’s dependence upon Cartesian 
epistemology and the human subject at the center of the acquisition of knowledge 
through reason alone. That being said, two important yet corollary points must be 
made here: (1) Spinoza rejects the possibility of Scripture containing guiding 
principles. As it pertains to using Scripture to form our presuppositions in the study 
of Scripture, Spinoza believes that the author left interpreters “deprived of the 
foundations and principles of Scriptural knowledge.” See Spinoza, Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, 161. The principles that guide Scriptural knowledge must come 
from outside the text. (2) The responsibility to correct. Spinoza holds that because 
the biblical authors did not leave us principles of any sort, his main task as an 
interpreter is “to correct these faults and to remove common theological prejudices.” 
Ibid. While this study values point number two, the necessity to challenge “common 
theological prejudices,” it does not support point number one. Part of the problem in 
biblical interpretation today (varied interpretations, disagreements, projection of 
ideas foreign to the text into the text) stems from reliance upon extrabiblical sources. 
In this sense, this study differs from Spinoza’s project.  
364 Spinoza understands miracles as “that whose cause cannot be explained on 
scientific principles known to us by the natural light of reason,” and considers those 
who uphold the idea of miracles to be, in a sense, primitive, or what he calls 
“common people.” Ibid., 127. What Spinoza does endorse is a natural theology 
where Nature itself, by being eternal and immutable, communicates the very 
attributes of God: eternal and immutable. It is this conception of miracles that 
enables Spinoza to conclude: “There can be no doubt that all the events narrated in 
Scripture occurred naturally; yet they are referred to God because, as we have 
already shown, it is not the part of Scripture to explain events through their natural 




the validation of reason that the supernatural elements pointing to a biblical reality 
within the text are denied. 
 Interestingly, in separating Scripture from philosophy, Spinoza became a type 
of Reformer,365 since for him the “understanding of Scripture and of matters spiritual 
must be sought from Scripture alone,”366 and he adds that Scripture should not be 
interpreted “from the sort of knowledge that derives from the natural light of 
reason.”367 This is one of the first incoherences in the work of Spinoza. Spinoza 
claims that Scripture should be understood via Scripture and not by philosophy, but 
does not clarify that this choice stems from a philosophical standpoint. Spinoza also 
maintains that Scripture should be understood through Scripture and not by reason, 
and in this creates a second dichotomy between the words of the text and the word of 
God.368 Spinoza reduces this word of God to one simple proposition: “to obey God 
                                                 
 
Scripture some things for which we can assign no cause and which seem to have 
happened beyond—indeed, contrary to—Nature’s order, this should not perplex us. 
We need have no hesitation in believing that what truly happened, happened 
naturally.” Ibid., 133. This conception was inevitably carried into the historical-
critical approach to the text without contestation. Anyone who rejects it is 
considered “sacrilegious.” Spinoza writes: “Whatever is contrary to Nature is 
contrary to reason, and whatever is contrary to reason is absurd, and should 
therefore be rejected.” Ibid., 134. 
365 Leithart also sees the spirit of a Reformer within the work of Spinoza. See 
Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 10–13. 
366 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 54. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid., 54–55. 
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with all one’s heart by practising justice and charity.”369 So, in addition to detaching 
truth from the meaning of the biblical text, Spinoza creates a second dichotomy 
within the meaning of the biblical text itself, between the words of the text and the 
word of God. On this, Leithart adds that in the work of Spinoza “the husk of history 
and speculation can be stripped away to get to the mere kernel,”370 that is, “the letter 
is nothing; the ethical spirit of Scripture is all.”371 In sum, the epistemological outlook 
of Spinoza determined his understanding of reality, and consequently, of the relation 
between truth, meaning, and text. 
 Assuming a Cartesian epistemological framework, Spinoza attempts to 
determine what is and is not real within the text through reason, and this is how the 
possibilities of the dynamic between God and man are established. At this stage it is 
important to expand on how this epistemological outlook, which stems from a 
timeless perception of Being,372 affects Spinoza’s understanding of the text.  
                                                 
 
369 Ibid., 55. 
370 Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 16. 
371 Ibid. 
372 The effects of a timeless interpretation of Being permeate other areas in 
Spinoza’s work, such as his view of God’s involvement in the world. Spinoza 
indicates this with words such as “eternal decrees and eternal truth” as he writes: 
“By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of 
natural events; for I have said above, and have already shown elsewhere, that the 
universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are determined 
are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and 
necessity.” See Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 89. Spinoza articulates the idea 
of man within this Nature in a deterministic fashion, since for him “no one acts 
except by the predetermined order of Nature—that is, from God’s eternal direction 




 In the historical-grammatical method the text served as a vessel for the 
authorial meaning within it, and the same dichotomy is maintained in the work of 
Spinoza. The letter is subject to the eternal, universal content of the text—the ethical. 
Thus, for Spinoza, both the rational person and the common person can attain 
beatitudo, the former through philosophy, and the latter through purified religion (a 
religion that recognizes the ethical component apart from the mythological world 
picture), and as in the grammatical method, the text is left aside once this eternal 
content is unveiled.  
 Now that the basic structure of Spinoza’s approach in the context of the 
principles of epistemology and ontology has been laid out, I will address how 
Spinoza arrives at the meaning of a particular text and what this meaning consists of.  
 
Spinoza’s Structure of Meaning 
 
 The question to be addressed at this stage is: how does Spinoza arrive at the 
meaning of a text? While Meyer and Ernesti considered truth and meaning to be 
identical in the text, Spinoza departs from this notion and determines that the “Bible 
cannot be relied on for truth [this is the role of philosophy], and the goal of biblical 
interpretation is not to arrive at truth, but rather to arrive at the meaning of the 
original text.”373 In order to arrive at the meaning of the text, Spinoza takes quite a 
literalistic approach to the text, yet under the guidance of the light of reason. An 
                                                 
 
Spinoza’s understanding of the text is supported when its effects are also noticed in 
the realm of cosmology and human freedom.  
373 Ibid., 15. 
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example of this is in order: 
Maimonides and some others take the view that this and all other instances of an 
apparition of an angel—as to Manoah and to Abraham when he was about to 
sacrifice his son—occurred in dreams, on the grounds that nobody could have 
seen an angel with his eyes open. But this is mere rubbish. They are concerned to 
extort from Scripture some Aristotelian nonsense and some fabrications of their 
own; and this I regard as the height of absurdity. It was by images, unreal and 
dependent only on the prophet’s imagination, that God revealed to Joseph his 
future dominion.374 
 
While Spinoza supports what the text says in itself,375 and even criticizes others for 
introducing Greek concepts into biblical interpretation, he still infers much into what 
the text is “attempting” to convey.376 On the one hand, he is looking for the face 
value meaning of the text, but what sifts this meaning from error is what is in 
harmony with reason, that is, an extrabiblical source. It is this reliance on Cartesian 
reason that leads him to affirm that the visions of Joseph were unreal and dependent 
on an imaginative posture of the prophet.377 Because of the primitive aspects of the 
                                                 
 
374 Ibid., 63. 
375 On the literalistic approach, Spinoza uses expressions such as “the 
indisputable meaning of Scripture” to convey what the text is explicitly saying. Ibid., 
62. Another example of this: “Scripture does clearly indicate that God has a form, 
and that when Moses heard God speaking, it befell him to see God, but to behold 
only his back parts.” Ibid., 63. 
376 An example of this is in Spinoza’s remarks concerning what the text is able 
to convey. Spinoza writes: “Nor can the belief in historical narratives, however 
certain, give us knowledge of God, nor, consequently, of the love of God. For the 
love of God arises from the knowledge of God, a knowledge deriving from general 
axioms that are certain and self-evident, and so belief in historical narratives is by no 
means essential to the attainment of our supreme good.” Ibid., 105. 
377 Even if Spinoza allows for the possibility of the occurrence of revelation, 
this revelation was only for the prophet and had no universal validity. Spinoza 
makes this point in the context of the experience of Job. Spinoza writes: “These 




prophetic mind (which relied more on imagination than intellect), God had to reveal 
himself through images and words, things that for Spinoza are in his time 
unnecessary because of the light of reason.  
 This last point highlights Spinoza’s basic understanding of the God-human 
relation. Spinoza writes: “With the exception of Christ, God’s revelations were 
received only with the aid of the imaginative faculty, to wit, with the aid of words 
and images.”378 With this in mind, he adds that “it was not a more perfect mind that 
was needed for the gift of prophecy, but a more lively imaginative faculty.”379 In this 
sense, the need for words and images is disposed of once intellect is purified, that is, 
when it understands the ethical imperative. Because for Spinoza “God can 
communicate with man without mediation [words or images],”380 that is, 
communicating “his essence to our minds without employment of corporeal 
means,”381 what results is access to God and reality that bypasses the need for biblical 
words. In other words, while the interpreter might reach the meaning of a particular 
biblical text, this meaning originated from a mind led by imagination, not intellect. 
And since Spinoza’s reason emphasizes the role of the intellect in the life of the 
individual, the words of Scripture (and their meaning) are of secondary importance 
                                                 
 
him alone. They are not arguments of universal validity to convince all men.” Ibid., 
86. 
378 Ibid., 65. 
379 Ibid.  




to truth, which is found in philosophy.  
 By disconnecting Scripture from philosophy, Spinoza, then, supports an 
analysis of the text itself in order to understand its authorial meaning. Yet the 
method in which this study of the text operates is not different from any other 
scientific method. Spinoza writes: 
I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture is no different from the method of 
interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with it. For the method of 
interpreting Nature consists essentially in composing a detailed study of Nature 
from which, as being the source of our assured data, we can deduce the 
definitions of things of Nature.382 
 
While Spinoza asserts that the object of biblical interpretation is the text itself, and 
the method to interpret it is a scientific method, he opens the possibility for another 
source of information to be added to the interpretation of Scripture as an object: 
namely, history.  
 Spinoza holds that no other principles or data can be allowed in interpretation 
except “those that can be gathered only from Scripture itself and from a historical 
study of Scripture.”383 From this, one can notice that what Spinoza does is determine 
the content or data for analysis (biblical text and historical reconstructions), and 
establish the method to analyze the data to arrive at the authorial meaning: the 
scientific, positivistic method.  
 In sum,384 Spinoza’s general approach to the text in order to arrive at the 
                                                 
 
382 Ibid., 141. 
383 Ibid. 
384 What I am summarizing here is Spinoza’s general approach to the text. 




authorial meaning follows the following pattern:  
 (1) Spinoza determines what meaning is, before looking for meaning. Since 
there is no truth in the text, what one finds in the text is the authorial meaning, a 
meaning that cannot be intermixed with philosophy. For Spinoza there is no 
connection between the meaning of the text and philosophy. By separating the two, 
Spinoza sets biblical studies on a subordinate level to philosophy, and makes it 
subject to the dissecting work of historians. This is so because once there is no truth 
in the text, and no bridge between text and reality, what is left for biblical studies is 
the study of historical backgrounds to understand the formation, context, and 
meaning of the text. In other words, if there is truth in the text, this truth relates to 
how it was formed, its meaning to the original audience, and possible “ethical” 
lessons for the present.  
 (2) Spinoza determines the methodological approach to evaluate the data. For 
Spinoza, the method for looking at the text itself is like any scientific method. It 
theoretically bypasses any intentional inference from the interpreter in order to arrive 
at the objective “plain” meaning of the text. Spinoza writes: “Knowledge of all these 
things—that is, of all the contents of Scripture—must be sought from Scripture alone, 
just as knowledge of Nature must be sought from Nature itself.”385 The only problem 
here is that Spinoza’s reliance upon reason and philosophy makes him fail in his own 
                                                 
 
contradictions (Ibid., 146). But to explore these details would lead this section away 
from its main purpose—of evaluating the philosophical presuppositions that 
influence Spinoza’s approach to the text.  




 (3) Spinoza determines the data to be analyzed by the scientific method. For 
Spinoza, the data is both the text and historical reconstructions. Scripture gives the 
interpreter the textual content, but it does not provide an accurate historical account 
of what took place (since it is conceived by imagination and not intellect). Historical 
reconstructions, then, fill in the empty gaps in order for the interpreter to have a 
better grasp of what indeed took place.  
 At this stage, it is imperative to consider how Spinoza’s approach relates to 
the three dimensions of meaning (seen in the analysis of the historical-grammatical 
method): content, form, and context. For Spinoza, the emphasis in biblical 
interpretation is on textual content (ethical) that he establishes a priori via the light of 
reason.387 That is, the meaning of the text is established beforehand. Since the text is 
insufficient to give a clear account of history, Spinoza adds the dimension of history 
as data for understanding the authorial meaning; this way, the context becomes just 
                                                 
 
386 Spinoza writes: “It is not permissible for us to manipulate Scripture’s 
meaning to accord with our reason’s dictates and our preconceived opinions; all 
knowledge of the Bible is to be sought from the Bible alone.” Ibid., 144. Spinoza 
does exactly the opposite: he not only determines the meaning to be sought in the 
text beforehand, but also is heavily influenced by Cartesian philosophy with its 
emphasis on reason. Both of these points directly influence his analysis of the “Bible 
alone.”   
387 This differs from the grammatical-historical method in the sense that for 
historical grammarians, the content was not external to the text, but found within it. 
For Spinoza, the content is the ethical, and it can be found in the text, but is 
established a priori via philosophy and reason.  
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as significant as the content.388 In relation to form, Spinoza values textual depictions 
(metaphors, etc.) in biblical interpretation, but only when they can support his main 
idea in particular: that the meaning is ethical and the rest is discarded as works of 
imagination. Although important, the form is irrelevant to lead an interpreter into 
truth.389 In a sense, form is significant only when it provides insight into the 
imaginative writing of the prophets, a writing that must be “baptized” into reason, 
creating a new being—“purified religion.” 
 Spinoza’s approach to the text establishes more than a biblical method 
proper,390 but a mindset, an approach to the text that creates a dichotomy between 
truth and meaning and between the words of man and the words of God. 
Philosophical truth and the word of God lead to an ethical, peaceful, intellectual 
existence, while the meaning of a text written with the words of man must be studied 
not in order to reach truth, but in order to understand the imaginative product of a 
religion of the past.391  
                                                 
 
388 Gignilliat supports this, since he also understands that for Spinoza, “the 
search for  the text’s meaning becomes equated with the search for the text’s 
ostensive historical referent, setting, and immediate attention.” See Gignilliat, Brief 
History, 16. 
389 Spinoza emphasizes this same point: “The point at issue is merely the 
meaning of the texts, not their truth.” Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 143. 
390 Spinoza does call his method “the true method of Scriptural 
interpretation.” Ibid., 154.  
391 It is this assertion that sets historical criticism at the center of biblical study. 
When discussing miracles, Spinoza expresses this same idea: “To interpret Scriptural 
miracles and to understand from their accounts how they really took place, one must 
know the belief of those who originally related them and left us written records of 




 Now that the basic presuppositions in the work of Spinoza are laid out, I will 
address the principle of history. Spinoza created the context for historical critics to 
take center stage in biblical studies. Spinoza utilizes history in interpretation not by 
resorting to ANE literature, but by uncovering the internal inconsistencies within the 
biblical text marked by temporal development.392 So, in order to see how these ideas 
became implemented in biblical interpretation through the avenue of history, I will 







 Like the work of Spinoza, the work of Wellhausen (1844–1918)393 is not 
                                                 
 
presented to their senses.” Ibid., 135. The same principle can be applied to the 
entirety of the OT: to understand the imaginative work of the prophets, as well as 
their worldview, one must go to the historical setting around them. The reliability of 
the text is thus exchanged with the reliability of history. 
392 See particularly chapters 8–10 in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. From this 
internal analysis (as opposed to external analysis based on ANE sources), Spinoza 
concludes in relation to the Pentateuch that “it is clear beyond a shadow of doubt 
that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by someone who lived many 
generations after Moses.” Ibid., 165. 
393 For more on the life and work of Wellhausen, see John H. Hayes, 
“Wellhausen as a Historian of Israel,” Semeia 25 (1982): 37–60; Ernest W. 
Nicholson, The Pentateuch in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Julius Wellhausen 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); and Douglas A. Knight, foreword to Prolegomena to the 
History of Israel, by Julius Wellhausen (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), v–xvi. 
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independent from previous influences and ideas.394 Even so, Wellhausen is 
distinguished from his contemporaries by “his clarity and the broad scope of his 
project, namely, a new conception of Israel’s history.”395 As mentioned earlier, 
Spinoza prepared the context for the role of the historian to become central in 
biblical interpretation.396 Spinoza’s rational approach created the necessity for 
historical analysis to uncover what truly happened behind the unreliable biblical text 
filled with contradictions and myth. The contribution of Wellhausen in this context 
“was his use of literary or source criticism as a means to reconstruct Israel’s 
history.”397 While Spinoza questioned the historical reliability of the text through an 
                                                 
 
394 Gignilliat correctly assesses that “Wellhausen was not the first to notice 
sources in the Pentateuch,” since these ideas began to be developed “over a century 
before Wellhausen with the work of Jean Astruc (1684–1766) and Richard Simon 
(1638–1712).” Gignilliat adds: “Neither was Wellhausen the first to suggest that the 
prophets of Israel came before the law of Moses. Graf suggested this seminal idea 
and Wellhausen seized the notion when he first heard it.” In Gignilliat, Brief History, 
57. For a critique of these basic assumptions see Gerhard Maier, The End of the 
Historical-Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. Leverenz and Rudolph F. Norden (St. 
Louis, MO: Concordia, 1977).  
395 Ibid., 57. 
396 Wellhausen himself recognizes the influence of Spinoza in his work. See 
Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 6. 
397 Gignilliat, Brief History, 62. Even so, source criticism itself “originated well 
before Wellhausen,” since as “early as 1711, the German pastor Henning Bernhard 
Witter, noting the differences in style and content and an alternation between Divine 
names in Genesis 1–3, posited separate pre-Mosaic sources to explain them.” See 
Knight, “Foreword,” ix. The difference in the work of Wellhausen is his critique of 
the already established JEDP sources and development of a new way to organize the 
sources behind the formation of the text and consequently Israel’s history. Since this 
study is not aimed at validating or disproving these source-critical concepts, this 
introduction to the issue will suffice. For more on this particular topic see Umberto 




internal evaluation of the text, Wellhausen approached the text with the same 
rational import and with the goal to reconstruct the history of Israel: that is, to 
reconstruct the historical process that led to the formation of the text.398  
 This section will briefly probe Wellhausen’s understanding of history in order 
to uncover the basic assumptions and philosophical presuppositions (as they relate to 
the principle of history) of his project.  
 
The Principle of History 
 
 As mentioned earlier, Ernesti attempted to understand Israelite history 
through the text itself as it is presented to the reader, and the historical-grammatical 
method was established to understand history through the text. The first difference 
between the historical-grammatical method and the work of Wellhausen does not 
involve the uncovering of history through the text itself, since both Ernesti and 
Wellhausen go to the text for information, but rather the influence of reason and 
Cartesian doubt upon the evaluation of the text and the objective of that evaluation. 
While Ernesti understood Israelite history through what the text says (the 
grammatical is the historical), Wellhausen reconstructed Israelite history, following 
Spinoza, through inconsistencies within the text (the grammatical 
inconsistencies/variations point to the historical).399 In other words, “Wellhausen 
                                                 
 
398 Wellhausen’s thesis was related to “whether that law [the law of Moses] is 
the starting-point for the history of ancient Israel, or not rather for that of Judaism.”  
399 An example of this tendency in Wellhausen’s work, seen in his discussion 
of the Mosaic law: “We have no express information as to the author and date of 




reconstructed the totality of Israel’s history by means of analyzing the strata of her 
literary sources.”400 Commenting on the place of the formerly called Elohistic 
document, Wellhausen writes that this section in the Pentateuch is “historical only in 
form; the history serves merely as a framework on which to arrange the legislative 
material, or a mask to disguise it.”401 In other words, the history the text depicts is, to 
some extent, made up, and needs to be critically evaluated by reason. 
 With this general movement in mind, it is evident that the emphasis of 
historical criticism through the work of Wellhausen is not on the textual meaning 
itself (at least at first), but on the history behind the text (historical process) that 
inevitably formed the text.402 Once the Israelite background is reconstructed, the 
meaning of the text can be understood. The focus is on the sources that formed the 
text. These are windows into not only the historical processes that formed the text, 
but the meaning of the text itself.  
 The basic assumption behind Wellhausen’s project is the idea, already 
                                                 
 
such data as can be derived from an analysis of the contents, taken in conjunction 
with what we may happen to known from other sources as to the course of Israel’s 
history.” Ibid., 2.  
400 Gignilliat, Brief History, 66. Wellhausen’s credibility, though, is almost 
questioned when he writes: “I learned through Ritschl that Karl Heinrich Graf 
placed the Law later than the prophets, and, almost without knowing his reasons for 
the hypothesis, I was prepared to accept it.” See Wellhausen, Prolegomena, 3. 
401 Ibid., 7. 
402 Knight agrees, since for him “Wellhausen did not conduct source criticism 
for its own sake, nor merely to the end of understanding the literature. For him, the 
value of such examinations resided in their historiographical usefulness.” See 
Knight, “Foreword,” xi. 
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anticipated in Spinoza’s work in relation to philosophical categories, that the biblical 
text does not give the reader a proper historical account of the historical process 
behind the formation of the text. On this, W. Robertson Smith writes in the preface 
to Wellhausen’s major work Prolegomena to the History of Israel that the “Old 
Testament does not furnish a history of Israel, though it supplies the materials from 
which such a history can be reconstructed.”403  
 As it pertains to the text, the object of interest in the work of Wellhausen and 
historians after him is the historical tendenz of the writer: that is, the writer’s context, 
situation, life, and worldview. Once this is reconstructed from a critical evaluation of 
the text searching for the possible sources that shaped its formation, the history of 
Israel can be understood as well as the meaning of the text. Again, the idea here is 
that truth and reality are not presented by the text or found within the text, but are 
found, with the aid of internal textual pointers, in the formation of the text itself. As 
for the nature of this “truth,” it is not moral, spiritual, or universal truth, but the 
arrival of a clear picture of the historical process behind the text.  
 At work in this approach to the text are, at least, the following philosophical 
presuppositions: (1) as it pertains to epistemology, the Cartesian principle of doubt 
along with its reliance and dependence on human reason (what is presented in the 
text cannot be accepted at face value); (2) as it pertains to ontology, a timeless 
conception of Being that inevitably creates a dichotomy between text and reality, as 
                                                 
 
403 W. Robertson Smith, preface to Prolegomena to the History of Israel, by Julius 
Wellhausen (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994), vii. 
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well as the need for a historical-scientific evaluation of the text. In this sense, the 
interpreted historical principle within the structure of historical criticism is inevitably 
tied to specific philosophical commitments. It is not a neutral methodology: its 
structure, implementation, and results flow from these pre-established concepts. 
 Although Wellhausen’s contribution affected the flow of biblical studies for 
more than a century after him, the discipline has grown and developed several 
different critical approaches and tasks. Knight is correct is assessing that exegesis “is 
now unthinkable without form criticism, tradition criticism, and ‘new’ literary 
criticism,”404 among other exegetical disciplines that have emerged since Wellhausen. 
Even so, the task of this section was to evaluate how extrabiblical philosophical 
presuppositions are present within the very fabric of historical criticism. In the end it 
is not only a matter of the text having a “historical meaning,” but a historical 
meaning without any philosophical weight, and consequently, no import to the 
reality of the reader (apart from a moral/ethical dimension as advocated by Spinoza, 





 The evaluation of the historical-grammatical method was divided into two 
                                                 
 
404 Knight, “Foreword,” xv. 
405 For a more sensitive use of the historical-critical method (one that uses 
Ernst Troetsch’s principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation, but adds the 




main sections. The first dealt with the principle of history (as well as text and 
meaning), and the second with the principle of ontology. 
 The first section pointed out how in the formative periods of the method, and 
under the work of Ernesti, the grammatical method developed under an extrabiblical 
approach, namely, philology. No role was given to the reader apart from the rigorous 
application of the philological approach. This indicates that the mindset of the time 
followed classical epistemology, where the subject is passive in the generation of 
meaning. Although Ernesti understood the grammatical method as one interpretative 
action, that is, the grammatical is the historical, interpreters after Ernesti understood 
the method as two interpretative actions, a grammatical as well as a historical. What 
this implies is that, over time, the influence of historical criticism grew and immersed 
itself in a grammatical approach that was volatile enough to incorporate any 
presupposition into its application.  
 The second section dealt with the principle of ontology in the context of some 
features of the grammatical and pre-critical approach to the text, namely, figuration, 
typology, and conceptions of time, as well as the question of the influence of 
Augustine in the relation of text and truth. Because the words of the text (verba) were 
signs pointing to a truth or reality within the text (res), in the end, the words 
themselves were disposable. Regardless of how the grammatical method is used, this 
interpretative context created by Platonic categories of reality remains.  
 The explicit use of philosophical presuppositions within historical criticism 
began with the work of Spinoza. As mentioned earlier, what Spinoza established was 
broader than an interpretative method proper: it was a set of a priori conditions 
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under which the historical-critical method would function in the following centuries. 
These conditions are as follows: (1) the primacy of reason (as primary source) over 
the biblical text, ruling out by default any supernatural elements such as divine 
voices, miracles, and theophanies, as well as any connection between textual 
depictions of reality and reality itself406; (2) the dichotomy between Scripture (ethical 
piety) and philosophy (truth); (3) the dichotomy between the words of man (subject 
to imagination) and the word of God (conceived as the ethical content that passes the 
validation of reason); (4) the general idea that the text and its history are a wrapping 
around the ethical essence, or content.407 
 With these main ideas established, historical criticism had an open path 
ahead. Through the years, scholars developed more ways to question the credibility 
of the text as it relates both to philosophy and history. Julius Wellhausen appeared in 
the nineteenth century, articulating well how these presuppositions directly affected 
how a historian viewed and used the text.  
 Wellhausen and Spinoza advocate that the presuppositions given to the 
reader by the text are false and must be corrected by reason through different means. 
Yet what if the presuppositions of the writers of the Bible—in relation to both history 
                                                 
 
406 But, as mentioned earlier, with the exception of the “real voice of God” 
sounding from Sinai. As for textual connections to reality, I mean the possibility of 
the text presenting macro-hermeneutical principles that would engage common 
philosophical notions. This study proposes that the text carries an inherent macro-
hermeneutical or philosophical perspective that might aid not only how the 
interpreter views the reality or worldview of the biblical author/audience, but how 
the interpreter understands the notions of God, humanity, history, etc.  
 
162 
and philosophy—are correct? What would biblical interpretation look like if the 
original historical-critical approach to the text was rejected? These questions build a 
bridge to numerous possibilities hidden within the text. At this stage, it is time to 
cross the bridge to the other side, to look at the text and see how it understands the 
God-human relation, and to notice how extrabiblical assumptions influence the 
interpretation of the text.  
                                                 
 
407 For other representative figures in biblical studies, such as Peter Enns and 








CHAPTER 4  
 
THE GOD-HUMAN RELATION IN THE  





 Now that a general exposition of the philosophical presuppositions relating to 
the God-human relationship within the presuppositional framework of thinkers and 
methods has been presented, I will move to the effects of such presuppositions upon 
the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. This movement from self 
and method to the biblical text is necessary if one is to attest the influence of 
extrabiblical presuppositions in interpretation. In order to provide a basis for this 
evaluation, I will focus on the text of Exodus by way of its literary structure. From 
the literary structure of the book of Exodus, I will be able to perceive how the text 
points to its own understanding of God’s relation to humanity as well as how 
scholars understand and interpret these conceptions.  
 In order to accomplish these goals, this chapter will be divided into three 
main sections. The first will provide a brief literature review of how biblical scholars 
have interpreted the literary structure of Exodus; the second will provide a short 
presentation of the macro-structure of the book of Exodus, introducing its main 
themes and flow; and the third will outline how the extrabiblical conceptions of the 
God-human relation noted so far affect the interpretation of the God-human relation 
presented by Exodus. 
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 This final section will be organized in two parts. The first part consists of 
textual notes addressing the issues that emerge from the text relating to the God-
human relation by means of the literary structure of Exodus. The second part 
consists of God-human relation notes, that is, notes on how scholars perceive and 
interpret the issues the text raises concerning the God-human relation.  
 
Review of Literature 
 
 As observed in previous chapters, the interpretation of the book of Exodus—
like any other book within the Torah—has been severely influenced by the 
documentary hypothesis.408 Discussions relating to the literary structure of Exodus 
normally form the backdrop for more detailed developments and theories concerning 
the sources scholars assert to be present within the book. As Umberto Cassuto 
correctly observes in his evaluation of the history of interpretation of Exodus, “the 
                                                 
 
408 From the publishing of Brevard S. Childs's The Book of Exodus to newer 
commentaries such as Thomas B. Dozeman’s Exodus, the majority of studies on 
Exodus follow the general tenets of the documentary hypothesis. Differences in 
opinion are common, yet these take place within the parameters set forth by the 
documentary hypothesis. For a brief review of how scholars understand the 
composition of Exodus, see Duane A. Garrett, A Commentary on Exodus, Kregel 
Exegetical Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 2014), 15–20. Garrett is 
among the few who reject the documentary hypothesis as a framework to understand 
the contents of Exodus, and concludes that “continually flogging the dead horse of 
the documentary hypothesis is pointless.” Ibid., 20. For more on his position on the 
documentary hypothesis, see Duane A. Garrett, Rethinking Genesis: The Source and 
Authorship of the First Book of the Pentateuch (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1991). For at 
least three others who question the authority of the documentary hypothesis as a 
framework to understand the Torah, see Cassuto, Documentary Hypothesis; Isaac M. 
Kikawada and Arthur Quinn, Before Abraham Was: The Unity of Genesis 1–11 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1985); and in the context of the book of Exodus, Douglas 
K. Stewart, Exodus (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2006), 29–34. 
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study of sources takes precedence over that of the book as we have it.”409 As a result 
of this tendency—based on extrabiblical philosophical conceptions—investigation of 
any intentional literary structure of the book as a whole is rarely entertained.  
 The general mindset within current biblical scholarship is that “the tasks of 
the biblical critic are purely excavative and thus irrelevant to constructive 
projects.”410 Even an analysis of the structure of the book is required to follow the 
tutelage of the different sources scholars identify within the text.411 Thus, because the 
text is made up of different sources possessing different worldviews,412 the possibility 
of a unified conception of how God relates to humanity in the book as a whole along 
with any proposal of a macro-structure of the book is overlooked by scholars in 
general.413 As a result, any theological or philosophical proposal that considers the 
                                                 
 
409 Cassuto, Commentary on the Book of Exodus, 1. 
410 Benjamin D. Sommer, “Revelation at Sinai in the Hebrew Bible and in 
Jewish Theology,” Journal of Religion 79 (1999): 422. 
411 See, for instance, George W. Coats, Exodus 1–18, Forms of the Old 
Testament Literature IIA (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 3–8. 
412 One of the primary sources in the development of the book of Exodus for 
source-critical scholars is the Priestly or P source. For more on the particular 
perspective of the world according to the P source, see Philip Peter Jenson, Graded 
Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World, JSOT Supplement Series 106 
(Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1992). 
413 Hazony agrees with this assessment as he writes: “In light of this picture of 
a corrupt and fragmented Bible, the idea that the biblical texts could be capable of 
advancing a consistent view on any subject has come to seem far-fetched in the eyes 
of many scholars.” Hazony, Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 19. Because of the 
traditional perspective of a fragmented text, “the ideas that find expression in the 
Bible—the metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy, of the 
biblical authors—have all too often eluded the interest of academic scholars of [the] 
Bible.” Ibid., 19. 
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book as a whole is considered not only naïve, but impossible.414 
 Due to the issues outlined above, scholars—whether they follow the source-
critical orientation or not—generally organize the final form of the book either by its 
evident geographical markers (e.g., Egypt—Wilderness or Egypt—Wilderness—
Sinai) or by theological subheadings (e.g., Redemption—Covenant/Law—
Tabernacle).415 From these two general choices, then, at least four ways to organize 
the contents of Exodus can be perceived in the majority of the studies on Exodus: (1) 
two-part or “bifid” structures; (2) three-part or “tripartite” structures; (3) four-part 
structures; and finally (4) multi-part structures.416 Below are some representative 
                                                 
 
414 Traditionally, critical scholars understand that the book of Exodus carries 
three distinct traditions: Yahwist (J), Elohist (E), and Priestly (P). For more on the 
different sources assigned to Exodus, see Thomas B. Dozeman, Exodus, Eerdmans 
Critical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 31–43. In recent years, 
some of these conceptions have been challenged, since for some the source-critical 
assessment of at least Exodus 19–24 has “proved less than satisfactory.” See T. D. 
Alexander, “The Composition of the Sinai Narrative in Exodus XIX 1–XXIV 11,” 
Vetus Testamentum 49, no. 1 (1999): 2. In this study, the authorship of the text is 
secondary to the evaluation of the philosophical presuppositions found within the 
text regarding the God-human relation. That being said, approaching the text as it is, 
I will suspend the assumption that the text has several sources as well as the 
assumption that it has a single author. 
415 At least one problem that stems from these descriptive headings must be 
highlighted here. While these literary structures of the book—that assume a 
descriptive geographical or theological reduction—serve as an organizing scheme of 
its contents, they do not provide any inner reasoning as to why the structure takes 
that particular form in the text, nor do they present any textual support to show 
authorial intentionality (even if this intentionality would come from a final redactor). 
They are just descriptive schemes deprived of any depiction of authorial or editorial 
intention that would give sense both to the scheme itself and to the book as a whole. 
416 Multi-part structures are literary structures that organize the material of the 








 a. Benno Jaco simply divides the book into a “first half” (Exod 1–19) and 
“second half” (Exod 20–40).418  
 b. William H. Propp divides the book by the following theological themes: 
“double revelations to Moses and Israel” (Exod 1–15) and “double covenant” (Exod 
16–40).419 Peter Enns follows the same textual markers, but with a more geographical 
justification for his structure: “departure from Egypt” (Exod 1–15) and “journey and 
arrival at Sinai” (Exod 16–40).420 
 c. Carl F. Keil and Franz Delitzsch divide the book within the theological 
scheme of “liberation” (Exod 1–15:21) and “adoption of Israel as the people of God” 
(Exod 15:22–40).421 Thomas B. Dozeman follows the same textual division, but 
under the two theological themes of “divine power” (Exod 1–15:21) and “divine 
                                                 
 
instance, presents an outline of twenty-four sections. See Brevard S. Childs, The Book 
of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974). 
417 I am deeply indebted to the research of Richard M. Davidson on the way 
scholars perceive the literary structures of Exodus in this section. 
418 Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the Bible: Exodus, Part 1 (Hoboken, NJ: 
Ktav, 2007). 
419 William H. Propp, Exodus 1–18: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1999). 
420 Peter Enns, Exodus, NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2000). 
421 Carl F. Keil, Franz Delitzsch, and James Martin, Biblical Commentary on the 
Old Testament: The Pentateuch (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1864). 
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presence” (Exod 15:22–40).422 Willem H. Gispen also divides the book with the same 
textual markers, and is among those who combine geographical descriptions with 
theological themes in his bifid structure: “Departure from Egypt” (Exod 1–15:21) 
and “Covenant” (Exod 15:22–40).423 Mark S. Smith follows the same textual 
markers, but with geographical subheadings: “Egypt” (Exod 1–15:21) and “Sinai” 
(Exod 15:22–40).424 
 d. Carol Meyers proposes at least two bifid structures to organize the material 
of Exodus. The first is through the descriptive-theological themes of “slavery to 
freedom” (Exod 1–15) and “Sinai experience” (Exod 16–40); the second, through the 
geographical markers of “Midian-Jethro frame” (Exod 1–18) and “theophany at 
Sinai” (Exod 19–40).425 Paul Wright shares the textual markers of Meyer’s second 
scheme, following theological concepts such as “Israel’s redemption and 
preservation” (Exod 1–18) and “Israel’s ratification of the covenant/law and 
preparation for worship at Sinai (Exod 19–40).”426  
 
                                                 
 
422 Dozeman, Exodus. 
423 Willem H. Gispen, Exodus (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982). 
424 Mark S. Smith, The Pilgrimage Pattern in Exodus (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 1997). 
425 Carol L. Meyers, Exodus, New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
426 Paul A. Wright, “Exod 1–24 (A Canonical Study)” (PhD diss., University 





 a. Umberto Cassuto organizes the book around the following descriptive 
scheme: “bondage and liberation” (Exod 1–17), “Torah and precepts” (Exod 18–24), 
“tabernacle and services” (Exod 25–40).427 
 b. John Durham divides the book into three geographical points: “Egypt” 
(Exod 1–13:16), “wilderness” (Exod 13:17–18:27), and “Sinai” (Exod 19:1–40).428 
 c. Walter C. Kaiser Jr. divides his tripartite structure into three theological 
headings pointing to three main divine actions: “divine redemption” (Exod 1–18), 
“divine morality” (Exod 19–24), and “divine worship” (Exod 25–40).429 Tremper 
Longman follows the same textual markers and a similar theological descriptive 
scheme: “God saves Israel from Egyptian bondage” (Exod 1–18), “God gives Israel 





 a. Nahum Sarna simply divides the book into four parts: Exod 1–15:21; 
                                                 
 
427 Cassuto, Commentary on the Book of Exodus. 
428 John I. Durham, Exodus, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word, 
1987). 
429 Walter C. Kaiser Jr., “Exodus,” in The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, ed. 
Tremper Longman and David E. Garland, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2006). 
430 Longman, How to Read Exodus.  
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15:22–18; 19–24; and 25–40.431 David Dorsey also divides the book into four 
sections, but in the following way: Exod 1–6:13; 6:14–13:16; 13:17–19:2; 19:3–40.432 
 b. R. Alan Cole provides a mixture of geographical and theological-
descriptive in his reading of the literary structure of Exodus: “Egypt” (Exod 1–
11:10), “exodus to Sinai” (Exod 12–18), “covenant and law” (Exod 19–31), and 
“rebellion and revival” (Exod 32–40).433 
 c. Gerald Janzen organizes the content of the book around four parts and two 
main themes: covenant and presence. His structure is laid out in the following way: 
“Oppression, redemption, covenant” (Exod 1–24); “Planning a place for presence” 
(Exod 25–31); “Sin, redemption, covenant” (Exod 32–34); and “preparing a place for 




 a. J. P. Fokkelman organizes the book of Exodus into five different sections: 
Exod 1:1–6:27; 6:28–15:21; 15:22–18:27; 19–31; 32–40.435 Claus Westermann also 
divides the book into five sections, which highlight divine action and human 
                                                 
 
431 Nahum M. Sarna, Exodus: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS 
Translation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991). 
432 David A. Dorsey, The Literary Structure of the Old Testament: A Commentary 
on Genesis-Malachi (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1999). 
433 R. Alan Cole, Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1973). 
434 Gerald J. Janzen, Exodus (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997). 
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response: “God’s Saving Act: Deliverance out of Distress” (Exod 1–14); “Man’s 
Response in Praise” (Exod 15:1-21); “God’s Action: Preservation” (Exod 15:22–
18:27); “Man’s Response in Obedience” (Exod 19–31); “Transgression and 
Renewal” (Exod 32–40).436 
 b. James Bruckner outlines the book in six separate parts under descriptive 
geographical and theological terms: “Exodus” (Exod 1–14); “Journey to Sinai” 
(Exod 15–18); “Decalogue and Book of the Covenant” (Exod 19–24); “Tabernacle 
Plans” (Exod 25–31); “Golden Calf” (Exod 32–34); and “Tabernacle Constructed” 
(Exod 35–40).437 Ross Blackburn also uses a six-part division of Exodus in his 
structure of the book and organizes the contents similarly to Bruckner: 
“Redemption” (Exod 1–15); “Wilderness” (Exod 16–18); “Law” (Exod 19–24); 
“Tabernacle Instruction” (Exod 25–31); “Golden Calf” (35–40); and “Tabernacle 
Constructed” (Exod 35–40).438 
 c. Duane A. Garrett organizes the book into seven main sections in the 
following manner: “Until Moses” (Exod 1:1–2:10); “Unlikely Savior” (Exod 2:11–
7:7); “The Twelve Miracles of the Exodus” (Exod 7:8–15:21); “The Journey to God” 
(Exod 15:22–19:25); “The Sinai Covenant” (Exod 20:1–24:11); “The Worship of 
                                                 
 
436 Claus Westermann and Robert Henry Boyd, Handbook to the Old Testament 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1967). 
437 James K. Bruckner, Exodus (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008). 
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God” (Exod 24:12–31:18); “Sin and Restoration” (Exod 32:1–40:38).439 
 d. Terence E. Fretheim provides a detailed structure of the book in nine main 
sections. Like his predecessors, he organizes them based on descriptive geographical 
and theological themes: “Growth and Bondage in Egypt” (Exod 1–2); “Moses and 
God: Call and Dialogue” (Exod 3:1–7:7); “The Plagues” (Exod 7:8–11:10); “From 
Passover to Praise” (Exod 12:1–15:21); “The Wilderness Wanderings” (Exod 15:22–
18:27); “Law and Covenant” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “The Plan for the Tabernacle” 
(Exod 25:1–31:18); “The Fall and Restoration of Israel” (Exod 32:1–34:35); “God 
Fills the Tabernacle” (Exod 35:1–40:38).440 
 e. John Sailhamer organizes the contents of Exodus into ten descriptive 
theological themes: “The Oppression of the Israelites” (Exod 1:1-22); “The 
Preparation of a Deliverer” (Exod 2:1-25); “The Call of Moses” (Exod 3:1–4:31); 
“The Deliverance from Egypt” (Exod 5:1–15:21); “Wilderness Wanderings” (Exod 
15:22–18:27); “The Covenant at Sinai” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “The Tabernacle” (Exod 
25:1–31:18); “The Golden Calf” (Exod 32:1-35); “The Restoration of Israel” (Exod 
33:1–34:35); “The Construction of the Tabernacle” (Exod 35:1–40:38).441 
 f. Victor Hamilton presents a compact fifteen-part structure that covers the 
main scenes within the book under one heading: “Oppression” (Exod 1–2:25); 
“Trepidation” (Exod 3:1–4:31); “Rejection” (Exod 5:1-23); “Reaffirmation” (Exod 
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6:1-30); “Confrontation” (Exod 7:1–12:30); “Liberation” (Exod 12:31–14:31); 
“Celebration” (Exod 15:1-21); “Itineration” (Exod 15:22–17:15); “Administration” 
(Exod 18:1-27); “Legislation” (Exod 19:1–24:18); “Specifications” (Exod 25:1–
31:18); “Deviation” (Exod 32:1–33:23); “Reconciliation” (Exod 34:1-35); 
“Construction” (Exod 35:1–40:33); “Glorification” (Exod 40:34-38).442 
 Now that an overview of the ways in which scholars organize the contents of 
Exodus has been presented, I will introduce what I perceive to be the macro-structure 
of Exodus as it presents itself to the reader: namely, a parallel-panel structure.443 This 
structure is not conditioned by the extrabiblical conceptions ingrained in the critical 
methodologies mentioned above, as it assumes and functions upon the intentional 
organization of the text in its final form as it presents itself to the reader. 
 
                                                 
 
441 John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological 
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992). 
442 Victor P. Hamilton, Exodus: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: 
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443 The organization of the literary structure to be presented here followed the 
descriptive methodology outlined in the introduction to this study. The structure  
does not provide the reader with an exhaustive assessment of the God-human 
relation in Exodus (especially because much more is at stake in the book than just the 
God-human relation). In this study, the structure provides a textual basis upon which 
the issues relating to the God-human relation within the book itself might be 
identified and addressed. The reader is not obligated to accept the validity of the 
structure in order to understand the issues that the book is presenting.  
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The Parallel-Panel Structure of Exodus: An Introduction444 
 
 The general division of the panel structure follows the hypothesis that the 
book of Exodus emphasizes the experience of Moses on one side, and the Israelites 
on the other.445 Like many other leaders in the Hebrew Bible, Moses must go through 
that which the people will eventually go through. Both Moses and Israel are rescued 
from the water; both Moses and Israel are led out into the wilderness and meet God 
at Sinai. A second theme that emerges from the general division of the panel 
                                                 
 
444 The ideas to be proposed here were perceived and developed in 
community. I am deeply indebted to the insights and support of Christian Vogel and 
Richard M. Davidson in this section. Christian Vogel noticed the possibility that the 
macro-structure of Exodus was fashioned in a parallel-panel structure. Vogel 
proposed that this parallel-panel structure sets out to—among other things—show 
the similarities and differences between the life of Moses and the life of the Israelites, 
as well as the physical Exodus from Egypt and the spiritual Exodus from sin. With 
these basic ideas in place and an initial outline, Richard M. Davidson pointed out 
that if the author of the book intended to lay out the contents of the book in a 
parallel-panel structure, the beginning and ending of the book should provide the 
necessary pieces of information for its correct framing. Davidson asserted that the 
book ends with the imagery of God’s presence in a cloud filling the tabernacle and 
leading the people onward, and that the ending of Exodus 13 presents the same 
imagery. This insight uncovered the starting and ending points of the parallel-panel 
structure. In the process, Davidson also identified seven different micro-structures 
within the book. With these initial insights and a rough outline of the possible 
parallel-panel structure, I charted the contents of the book to find further textual 
confirmations for these ideas and to reorganize the initial outline according to the 
natural literary development of the book. What emerged from the text not only 
confirmed the initial hypothesis of a parallel-panel structure functioning as the 
macro-structure of the book, but uncovered significant theological insights that could 
be useful in different areas. The results of this joint effort will be published in a 
forthcoming article. This chapter will continue the work initiated in that article.  
445 This idea has been perceived by other scholars as another theme that 
emerges from the narrative of Exodus, but I have not found any scholar who noted 
the development of the literary structure of the book based on this idea. Some 
scholars who point out significant similarities between Moses and Israel that will 
reappear in this chapter are Fretheim, Exodus, 41–46; Enns, Exodus, 83. 
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structure is the relation between the physical Exodus from Egypt on one side and the 
spiritual Exodus from sin on the other. In the lives of Moses and Israel, and in the 
Exodus from Egypt and from sin, it is God who is in control; it is God who leads; it 
is God's presence that guides. The presence of God provides the theological context 
in which these themes are unfolded in the book. For Moses and Israel, in the Exodus 
from Egypt and from sin, God's presence guides in different ways. With these main 
themes shaping the flow of the book as a whole, the parallel-panel structure of 
Exodus unfolds in seven stages or sections.446 
The first section consists of A (Exod 1:11–2:15a) and A' (Exod 14:1–15:21), 
and highlights both Israel's entrance into Egypt and subsequent oppression under an 
unnamed Pharaoh and Israel's exodus out of Egypt and subsequent persecution by 
another unnamed Pharaoh. 
 The second section consists of B (Exod 2:15b–25) and B' (Exod 15:22–18:27), 
and includes both Moses' entrance into the wilderness after killing an Egyptian and 
Israel's entrance into the wilderness after Egypt is destroyed.  
The third section consists of C (Exod 3:1–4:31) and C' (Exod 19–24:11), and 
emphasizes God's remembrance of the covenant as YHWH calls and commands 
Moses and what is known as "the Book of the Covenant," which includes God's call 
                                                 
 
446 The parallel-panel structure of Exodus contains seven sections. There are 
no textual markers that justify the transitions between these sections. Because of this, 
I arranged the flow of the literary structure taking into consideration significant 
turning points within the narrative. The sections are organized so that the reader can 




and commands to both Moses and the people. 
The fourth section consists of D (Exod 5–7:2) and D' (Exod 24:12–32:30). D 
comprises Pharaoh's building project without Shabbat, God's command to let his 
people go, and Pharaoh's disobedience. D', on the other hand, shows God's 
commands in relation to his own building project, which would include Shabbat, and 
Israel's disobedience (through the episode of the golden calf). 
 
 
Table 1. Seven sections of Exodus 
 
Part I: God’s Presence with Israel in 
Egypt: Deliverance from Egypt  
(Exod 1–13) 
Part II: God’s Presence with Israel in the 
Wilderness and Mount Sinai: Deliverance 
from Sin  
(Exod 14–40) 
A. Children of Israel Come to Egypt and 
Are Oppressed by Pharaoh (1:1–2:15a) 
A'. Children of Israel Depart from Egypt 
and Are Delivered from Pharaoh (14:1–
15:21) 
B. Moses Goes into the Wilderness (2:15b-
25) 
B'. Israel Goes into the Wilderness (15:22–
18:27) 
C. God Remembers His Covenant (3:1–
4:31) 
C'. Book of the Covenant (19–24:11) 
D. Pharaoh's Building Project without 
Shabbat: God's Command and Pharaoh's 
Disobedience (Part I) (5–7:2) 
D'. God's Building Project with Shabbat: 
God's Command and Israel's Disobedience 
(Part I) (24:12–32:30) 
E. Pharaoh's Building Project without 
Shabbat: God's Command and Pharaoh's 
Second Disobedience (Part II) (7:2-13) 
E'. God's Building Project with Shabbat: 
God's Command and People's Obedience 
(Part II) (32:31–36:7) 
F. De-Creation Through Plagues (which 
include other commands in the context of 
disobedience) and Preparation for 
Deliverance from Egypt (7:14–12:32) 
F'. Re-Creation Through Tabernacle (which 
include other commands in the context of 
obedience) and Preparation for Deliverance 
from Sin (36:8–40:33) 




 The fifth section consists of E (Exod 7:2-13) and E' (Exod 32:31–36:7). E 
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includes God's second command to Pharaoh to let the people go and Pharaoh's 
renewed disobedience; Pharaoh’s second refusal to liberate the people leads into the 
ten plagues found in the next section. In E' Moses pleads for the people, new 
commands are given with the intention to provide Israel with another chance to 
obey, and it ends with Israel's eventual obedience to God's commands. This 
acceptance of and obedience to the divine commands leads to the ten phases of the 
sanctuary construction in the following section (Exod 36:8–39:43).  
 The sixth section consists of F (Exod 7:14–12:32) and F' (Exod 36:8–40:33). F 
highlights the result of Pharaoh's disobedience: the de-creation of the earth through 
the ten plagues. F' attempts to show the results of Israel's obedience to God's 
commands, which lead to the re-creation of the world through the establishment of 
the tabernacle (interestingly, in ten different stages).  
 The seventh and final section consists of G (Exod 12:33–13) and G' (Exod 
40:34-38) and highlights the actual exodus from Egypt and the potential exodus from 
sin marked by the consecration of the tabernacle through God's presence. This final 
section ends, as mentioned earlier, with the imagery of the cloud, the fire, and God's 
presence leading the people onward on both sides of the panel.  
 One of the features of the way the book presents itself is the imbalance 
between the two sides of the panel. While one would expect a panel structure of a 
book of forty chapters to be divided somewhere in the middle, the structure moves 
from chapters 1–13 and then from 14–40. This does not show a lack of authorial 
intentionality, but the opposite. At least two elements in this structural imbalance 
can testify to the intentionality behind its weaving.  
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 The first insight from the imbalance is that while the deliverance of the people 
from Egypt is a great divine act, God’s greatest challenge is not this physical 
deliverance, but in reality, the spiritual deliverance of the people from sin.447 The 
second part of the panel—God’s plan to deliver the people from their sin—takes up 
the majority of the chapters. The plan of salvation established on the right side of the 
panel through the construction of the sanctuary was not to be limited to the Israelites 
in the wilderness, but was to be central to all the subsequent generations. The 
sanctuary, from the book of Exodus onward, becomes the central divine plan of 
salvation for all people. After all, a salvation plan that is given in the desert—that is, 
the land of no one—should be accessible to everyone. The rest of the Hebrew Bible 
testifies to this basic insight that can already be seen in the imbalance of the parallel-
panel structure of Exodus. 
 The second insight that justifies this imbalance would be that while the left 
side of the panel emphasizes, to some extent, the actions and experience of Moses, 
the right side focuses on God’s provision for the people. As an example, on the left 
side of the panel Moses provides deliverance and water for the daughters of Jethro, 
while on the right side of the panel God does not limit himself to deliverance or the 
provision of water, but also provides food, protection, and other signs of care for the 
people. In other words, while Moses is the representative of God to deliver and lead 
the people, he is only a shadow of the God of deliverance, who is leading the people 
                                                 
 
447 Hamilton correctly observes that if “the book of Exodus is about the 
exodus event, then the book should be concluded by the end of chap. 14.” Hamilton, 
Exodus, xxi.   
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onward, showing even more care and goodness.448 God on the right side of the panel 
is not only a better Pharaoh—he is a better Moses. Both of these insights tied 
together allow the reader to grasp the significance of the imbalance within the panel 
structure and the overall theological angle of the book as a whole.  
Now that this basic overview of the literary structure of Exodus has been 
presented, I will plunge into each of these sections to explore how the book presents 
the God-human relation, and how scholars under the influence of extrabiblical 
conceptions of the God-human relation interpret such dynamic. 
 
The God-Human Relation in Exodus 
 
 This study will approach the biblical text to uncover its understanding of the 
God-human relationship through a descriptive analysis of the literary structure of 
Exodus, as already introduced in Chapter 1. From the literary structure of the book, 
it may be possible to determine how the contents of the book were organized and 
derive insights relating to how the divine-human relation is depicted in the book as a 
whole. This presentation will serve as a basis to identify both the issues relating to 
the God-human relation that emerge from the text and how scholars interpret them 
under the influence of extrabiblical assumptions.449  
 As mentioned earlier, each of the seven sections of the literary structure will 
                                                 
 
448 I am indebted to my colleague Christian Vogel for this crucial insight.  
449 To provide a proper analysis of the God-human relation in the book as a 
whole falls beyond the scope of this project. As I assess the scholarly interpretation of 




be evaluated in two ways: first, I will provide textual notes that highlight the general 
literary flow of the structure as it points to issues concerning the God-human relation 
in the text; and second, I will provide notes on how the text depicts the God-human 
relation in the context of how scholars understand and interpret these themes 
through a different presuppositional framework.450 These two steps will show the 
reader how extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions relating to the God-human 
relation directly influence interpretations of the depiction of God’s relation to 
humanity proposed by the text through its literary development. 
 




 The first section, A (1:1–2:15a) and A’ (14:1–15:21), contains at least three 
important developments: (1) the introduction of the book with Israel’s entrance into 
Egypt as well as Israel’s departure from Egypt; (2) Pharaoh’s attempt to destroy 
Israel through oppression and murder and a second attempt to destroy Israel by a 
different Pharaoh in the Red Sea; (3) Moses’ and Israel’s deliverance out of water 
and departure from Egypt. Each of these developments is evaluated below. 
                                                 
 
on how the text might provide insight for a proper theology/philosophy of God’s 
relation to humanity.  
450 Because this section covers the book of Exodus as a whole, the issues to be 
selected in the text will be those that both are discussed by commentators and relate 
to the question of the God-human relation. The presuppositions regarding the God-
human relation will be seen in the backdrop of the textual depiction of the God-
human relation. Also, I will not be able to present an exhaustive account of what has 
been written concerning each issue, but I will provide an overview of the insights 





Table 2. A and A’ textual notes 
 
A. Children of Israel Come to Egypt and 
Are Oppressed by Pharaoh (1:1–2:15a)  
Aʹ. Children of Israel Depart from Egypt 
and Are Delivered from Pharaoh (14:1–
15:21) 
• Children of Israel come to Egypt (1:1-7) • Children of Israel leave Egypt and come to 
the Red Sea (14:1-2)  
• Pharaoh tries to destroy Israel/Moses (1:8-
22) 
 
• Pharaoh Speech #1: “the children of Israel 
will go up from the land” (1:9-10) 
 
• Pharaoh Speech #2: “why have you done 
this?” (1:15-19) 
 
• Pharaoh acts/Speech #3: “commanded all 
his people” (1:22) 
• Pharaoh tries to destroy Israel (14:3-10) 
 
 
• Pharaoh will say: “the children of Israel are 
wandering in the land” (14:3) 
 
• Pharaoh and people: “why have we done 
this?” (14:5) 
 
• Pharaoh acts: “he took his people” (14:6) 
• Moses is saved from water 
- Moses is left “by the bank of the Nile” 
(2:3) 
- Moses cries out (2:6) 
- Miriam questions Pharaoh’s daughter - 
(2:7) 
- Pharaoh’s daughter replies: go ahead 
(2:8-9) 
- Moses drawn out of the water (2:10) 
 
• Moses sees the oppression of the Egyptians 
and acts without divine aid (2:11-12) 
 
• Hebrews and Moses (do not recognize him 
as authority—“prince or judge”) (2:13-14a) 
 
• Moses fears and flees (2:14b-15a) 
• Israel is saved from water 
- Israel is left “camping by the sea” (14:9) 
- Israel cries out to the Lord (14:10) 
- Israel questions Moses/God (14:11-12) 
- God replies: go forward (14:15-18) 





• Moses sees the approach of the Egyptians 
and acts with divine aid (14:21, 26-27) 
 
• Israel and Moses (recognize him as 
authority—“servant”) (14:31) 
 




 The first development in A introduces the book with a summary of the people 
who entered Egypt with Jacob. The text adds a note about the death of Joseph and 
the subsequent multiplication (ד ד ְמא ֹ֑ ְמא ֹ֣ ַַּֽעְצ֖מּו בִּ ּו ַוַי ַּֽיְִּׁשְר֛צּו ַויְִּרבּ֥ ֧רּו ַו  of the people (cf. Exod (פָּ
 
182 
1:7). In A’ the people turn to the sea in their departure from Egypt with a ב ֶרב ַר֖ ּ֥  ע 
“mixed multitude” (cf. Exod 12:38). While on the one hand the people enter Egypt 
and multiply in the shadow of the death of Joseph, on the other, the people are 
depicted as accompanied by a mixed multitude who appear at the shadow of the 
death of the firstborns, that is, a multitude formed immediately after the last plague. 
Death leads to multiplication in both A and A’.  
Each section is also marked by attacks upon Israel by Pharaoh. In both 
sections, these attacks appear as reactions against two of the divine imperatives 
found in Gen 1:28: multiplication and filling the earth. In A, once the people begin 
multiplying in Egypt, a Pharaoh who does not know Joseph begins his plan to 
control this growth through forced labor, murder at childbirth, and finally, open 
genocide of infants. In A’ the threat of death appears as the people begin spreading 
out of Egypt into the wilderness and Canaan.451 Several textual connections are 
significant in this section. Three elements in three different speeches of Pharaoh in 
the first chapter of Exodus are seen again in Exodus 14. These connections seen in 
the following scene justify the relation between chapter 1 and 14 and the possibility 
that the events within the book not only unfold, but are organized in a parallel-panel 
manner.  
 In the second development in A, the first speech of Pharaoh (Exod 1:9-10) 
                                                 
 
451 This ties the literary developments in the events of Exodus to those of 
Genesis. In Genesis 11 the people come together under a unified building project and 
god intervenes. In Exodus, the people are forced to remain in Egypt to continue a 
building project and God, once again, intervenes. The issue of the relation between 
Genesis and Exodus will be further explored below.  
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mentions the threat of the children of Israel (ל א ֵ֔ ֹ֣י יְִּשרָּ ֶַּֽרץ) going up from the land (ְבנ  אָּ  .(הָּ
In the second speech (Exod 1:18), in response to the Hebrew midwives who did not 
kill the Hebrew boys, Pharaoh asks: “Why ( ַּוע ן) have you done (ַמדּ֥ יֶת֖  ”?(ַהֶזֹ֑ה) this (ֲעשִּ
The final speech (Exod 1:22) simply expresses Pharaoh’s final command to “all his 
people” (ו  In A’, these same elements are found in Pharaoh’s reasoning and .(כָּל־ַעמ ֖
subsequent persecution of the people toward the Red Sea.  
 The first textual connection is seen in God’s command to Moses to take the 
people toward the sea (Exod 14:3): “Pharaoh will say of the sons of Israel (ל א ֵ֔ ֹ֣י יְִּשרָּ  ,(ְבנ 
‘they are wandering aimlessly in the land (ֶרץ ֹ֑ אָּ  The reasoning behind the second ”’.(בָּ
attempt to annihilate the people follows the same rationale and textual elements as 
those found in A: the people (ל א ֵ֔ ֹ֣י יְִּשרָּ ֶרץ) and the land (ְבנ  ֹ֑ אָּ  The second connection is .(בָּ
found in another question uttered by Pharaoh concerning the liberation of the people 
from the land (Exod 14:5): “Why (ַמה) have we done (ינּו שִֵּ֔ את) this (עָּ  The question ”?(ז ֹ֣
led to the resolution of pursuing the Israelites, once again leading Pharaoh to take 
“his people ( ַּֽמו  .(with him in this new objective (Exod 14:6 ”(עִּ
 The third and final development in sections A and A’ presents more 
similarities, and serves as an introductory example of how the story of Moses in A 
foreshadows the story of Israel in A’. Both Moses and Israel are left “by” a body of 
water: Moses by the “banks of the Nile” or ר ת ַהיְא ַּֽ ַעל־ and Israel “by the sea” or ַעל־ְשַפּ֥
ם  Exod 2:3, 14:9). Also, both Moses and Israel are rescued from the water (Exod) ַהיֵָּ֔
2:10, 14:19–31). The leader of Israel goes through that which the people will later 
experience. Being left by water and rescued from it shows how the existence of 
Moses and Israel depends upon divine action. These divine actions might appear 
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through the actions of other people in A,452 or through God’s own visible deeds in A’.  
 This dependence upon the divine is not a theme exclusive to Exodus but runs 
through the entire Hebrew Bible. This could point to the reason why the actions of 
Moses in what follows in A could be seen as problematic (Exod 2:11-12). Moses sees 
the oppression of the Egyptians and kills an Egyptian without any divine indication 
for that to take place.453 Because of his actions, the Hebrews question Moses’ ability 
to lead or act as their “prince” (ר ַׂ֤  Exod 2:13-14a), leading Moses) (ש ֵֹׁפט) ”or “judge (ש 
to flee Egypt once his murder is discovered (Exod 2:14b-15). In A’, the text 
demonstrates how Moses is still learning how to depend on God as the people go 
through that which he went through in the past. Because Moses trusts God to deliver 
the people from the Red Sea, the people recognize him as an authority (Exod 14:31). 
Yet the authority Israel recognizes in Moses is not that of a prince, or a judge, but of 
a servant (ֶעֶבד). Because of this obedience to YHWH’s instructions, both Moses and 
Israel cross the Red Sea, and A’ presents the first major difference from A in adding 
a large section of poetry known as the “Song of Moses.” 
                                                 
 
452 Moses’ rescue from the Nile is the third instance in which a woman serves 
as a type of YHWH within the book of Exodus. The midwives of the Hebrews, as 
well as Moses’ mother with Miriam, already appeared in the book. Each of these 
women act in their contexts as God would later act in the book. The midwives of the 
Hebrews save the Hebrew boys from injustice; Moses’ mother and Miriam preserve 
life in the midst of oppression; and the daughter of Pharaoh rescues the child from 
the water and cares for him. 
453 Similarly, in Genesis 12, after Abraham accepts the imperative to leave his 
family and land behind, he arrives at the “promised land” where famine has taken 
over. Without any divine revelation, Abraham journeys to Egypt. Both in the 





God-Human Relation Notes  
 
 Several notes illuminating the relation between the first section of the literary 
structure of Exodus and conceptions of the God-human relation are in order. As 
indicated earlier, this section will focus on how extrabiblical conceptions of the God-
human relation influence the interpretation of the literary content of the Hebrew text. 
Two particular issues that emerge from the first section of the literary structure of 
Exodus will be analyzed: (1) the relation between Genesis and Exodus; (2) the 
relation between the Hebrew text and history. 
 
The relation between Genesis and Exodus 
 
 One of the first issues that arises in any commentary on Exodus is the relation 
between the texts of Genesis and Exodus. Scholars are generally divided on the 
understanding that Exodus is a separate literary unit from Genesis.454 Moshe 
Greenberg comments on literary continuation between Genesis and Exodus: 
The beginning and the end of the book indicate that it was designed as a distinct 
                                                 
 
to obey an explicit divine command—especially because there was no command in 
both stories—but acting without waiting on God’s word.  
454 For a summary of recent developments in the study of the relation between 
Genesis and Exodus, see Dozeman, Exodus, 18–20; D. M. Carr, “Genesis in Relation 
to the Moses Story. Diachronic and Synchronic Prespectives,” in André Wénin, 
Studies in the Book of Genesis: Literature, Redaction and History (Leuven, Belgium: 
Leuven University Press, 2001), 273–96; Thomas B. Dozeman, God at War: Power in 
the Exodus Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 171–83. I would 
agree with Sarna in his balanced position that “while the book [Exodus] is more or 
less a self-contained literary unit, it is incomprehensible except as a sequel to the 
Book of Genesis.” Nahum M. Sarna, Exploring Exodus: The Origins of Biblical Israel 
(New York: Schocken, 1996), 5. 
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literary unit. Exodus 1:1 does not pick up where Gen 50:26 left off. The first 
verses of Exodus recapitulate the main event of the last chapters of Genesis: the 
descent of Jacob’s family to, and their settlement in, Egypt. Into the 
recapitulation the true start of the new narrative has been interwoven (Exod 1:6-
7). This manner of opening the narrative means that an author (or creative 
redactor) regarded the events about to be narrated as making a sufficiently 
important break with the past to merit a new start. He therefore provided them 
with a prologue signifying a new literary unit.455 
 
As noted by Jeffrey Tigay in the prologue to this same volume, Greenberg’s 
reasoning in approaching the book of Exodus—like that of most scholars who 
sustain a complete or partial disconnection between Genesis and Exodus—is deeply 
influenced by the documentary hypothesis.456  
 By default, this conception does not consider the possibility that the Torah is 
a single literary unit based on the evidence outlined in the second chapter of this 
study. Such a reasoning not only would go against the seemingly intentional unity of 
the book as a whole—as outlined by the literary structure above—but would also 
exclude significant theological points that could help in uncovering the author’s 
perception of the God-human relation.457 The thematic arrangement of the book 
                                                 
 
455 Moshe Greenberg, Understanding Exodus: A Holistic Commentary on Exodus 
1–11, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 2. 
456 Tigay writes that Greenberg’s contribution inevitably incorporates modern 
scholarship, something that would “naturally include the results of biblical criticism, 
particularly the Documentary Hypothesis.” Jeffrey H. Tigay, foreword to 
Understanding Exodus: A Holistic Commentary on Exodus 1–11, by Moshe Greenberg, 2nd 
ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), ix. 
457 One of the significant transitions in the parallel-panel structure of Exodus is 
that the beginnings of sections A and A’ find conclusions in G and G’. A begins, as 
noted earlier, with the people entering Egypt, while A’ begins with the people leaving 
Egypt. In G, the people begin their journey into the wilderness under the leadership 




favors the possibility of a unity, be it from one single author or from one or several 
redactors who arranged the themes of the book in its final form with a unified vision.  
 Among these themes that portray unity—something mentioned in passing 
above—is divine action. The difference between A and A’ is that while in A’ God is 
visibly present and active in the physical deliverance of the people from Egypt, in A 
God is seemingly active yet elusive. Traditionally scholars explain the differences by 
way of critical tools, yet if the narrative is allowed to flow naturally, a richness of 
meaning is uncovered. One could attest to the possibility that God is acting in 
Exodus 1 by tracing the signs of blessing that stem from covenant faithfulness. The 
description of the people multiplying and spreading out in the land—as noted by 
other scholars—is filled with creation language.458 The multiplication of the people 
implies that the principle of life stemming from humanity’s connection with the 
divine imperative to procreate and inhabit the land is a reality in Exodus. Even so, 
God is seemingly absent in A. The first mention of his name is at the end of chapter 
1, with an explicit reference to God’s blessings upon the Hebrew midwives who 
preferred to sustain life by risking their own. This absence is significant because it 
                                                 
 
onward with the cloud and fire. The beginning and the ending of the book are 
intimately connected. Even so, Greenberg, sustaining the principles of the 
documentary hypothesis, questions the possibility of such connections: “The book 
thus has an epilogue marking its conclusion no less definitely than the prologue 
marks its beginning.” Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 2. 
458 Victor P. Hamilton observes, for instance, that “the climax of Genesis 1 is 
Exodus 1.” Hamilton, Exodus: An Exegetical Commentary, 5. Sailhamer writes that the 
first chapter of Exodus “follows the prophetic word about Israel’s future given to 
Abraham in Genesis 15:13.” Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 241. 
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connects the narrative of Exodus to the narrative that immediately precedes it, in the 
book of Genesis.  
 The God of the patriarchs—contrary to the God depicted in the majority of 
books on Christian doctrine—was not omnipresent, nor was he wholly absent, 
“dwelling” in a timeless realm.459 The extrabiblical roots that lead to these 
conceptions were outlined in the previous chapters. In the Hebrew Bible, YHWH 
speaks to Abraham in Gen 18 concerning the fate of the inhabitants of Sodom and 
Gomorrah. As soon as YHWH finishes speaking, the Hebrew text says ה ֶֹ֣לְך יְהוֵָּ֔  the“) י 
Lord departed”; Gen 18:33). And this God, who speaks in particular and departs, is 
promised to return before the book of Genesis ends. Twice Joseph mentions the 
return of God to his people through the use of the verb פקד (“to visit”). Joseph at his 
deathbed says, “I am about to die, but God will surely visit you and bring you up 
from this land” (Genesis 50:24, 25) and in the following verse the promise is 
reiterated when Joseph asks the sons of Israel to swear: “God will surely visit you.” 
 The book of Exodus begins in the shadow of this promise, in the void of 
divine absence. When will the Lord visit his people? Why is he absent before the 
rising oppression of the Egyptians? In the first section of the literary structure of 
Exodus, the reader is confronted with two different Pharaohs attempting to thwart 
                                                 
 
459 Even some Exodus scholars are uncomfortable with the notion. Carol 
Meyers, for instance, writes that “the idea of divine omnipresence is not entirely 
convincing.” Meyers, Exodus, 134. And Baruch A. Levine writes: “Rarely does the 
biblical spokesman, be he priest, prophet, or Psalmist, assume the omnipresence of 
God.” Baruch A. Levine, “On the Presence of God in Biblical Religion,” Religion in 
Antiquity, ed. J. Neusner (1968), 72. 
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life. The first instance of death is found in the destruction of the infant boys in the 
Nile; the second through the annihilation of the entire people in the Red Sea. A 
battle between the forces of life and death serves as the introduction to the book. The 
question of the visitation of YHWH left unanswered in Genesis is answered in Exod 
3:16 when YHWH asks Moses to gather the elders of Israel and tell them:    י ְדתִּ ַקַ֨ ד פָּ ק ֹ֤ פָּ
ם  I have surely visited you!”). God has seen what has been done, and now God“) ֶאְתֶכֵ֔
will act upon it.  
 The philosophical principles behind the documentary hypothesis prevent the 
reader from seeing these significant literary and theological developments from one 
book to the other, which directly influence a possible philosophical reading of God’s 
actions in the book of Exodus.460 While scholars in the critical tradition of 
interpretation assign different sources and agendas to different sections of the book—
shifting the unified perspective of God’s actions to several distinct perspectives—the 
flow of the narrative provides the reader with a unified conception of the God-
human relation with little room for conflicting agendas.  
 
The relation between the Hebrew text and history 
 
 The issue of the relation between the Hebrew text and history was introduced 
in the second chapter of this study. The historiography of the writer of Exodus is 
conceived by scholars as either a truthful depiction of the events narrated in the 
                                                 
 
460 To develop an ontology of the God-human relation is beyond the scope of 
this study. At this stage the focus is on how an extrabiblical conception of the God-
human relation prevents the reader from seeing the principles that could lead to a 
biblical portrayal of the God-human dynamic.  
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book, or a historiography based on Hebrew faith that is truthful but not as it pertains 
to the events themselves (Geschichte).461  
 Among the scholars who address the issue of the relation between the Hebrew 
text and history is Nahum M. Sarna. Sarna’s evaluation of the historiography given 
by the writer of Exodus is as follows: 
If it [Exodus] has so profoundly affected peoples of widely different cultures, this 
is hardly because the biblical narrative is a straightforward account of an 
historical event; it is not. . . . It is a document of faith, not a dispassionate, secular 
report of the freeing of an oppressed people. . . . Not the preservation and 
recording of the past for its own sake but the culling of certain historic events for 
didactic purposes is the intent.462 
 
Sarna goes on to say that the various episodes the writer of Exodus narrates “project 
Israelite concepts of God and of His relationship to the world; that is, they embody 
the fundamental tenets and crucial elements of the religion of Israel and of its 
worldview.”463 
 Sarna uses the theological expression “God’s relationship to the world” in his 
commentary, but without reference to the reality to which it points: God’s actual 
relation to the world. He speaks of God’s relationship to the world as depicted in the 
                                                 
 
461 For more on the different arguments regarding the problem of the 
historicity of the book, see Douglas K. Stuart, Exodus, The New American 
Commentary, Vol. 2 (Nashville, TN: B&H, 2006), 23–26; Durham, Exodus, xxiv-
xxvi; J. Currid, Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997); 
J. Hoffmeier, Israel in Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Dozeman, 
Exodus, 21–26.  
462 Sarna, Exodus, xii–xiii. 
463 Ibid., xiii. For the sake of clarity, the expression “religion of Israel” here 
implies a pre-scientific, primitive view of the world, and consequently, of God’s 
relation to humanity.  
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text, yet denies its factuality, since according to him this report from the writer of 
Exodus is an account of faith, not an attestation of a real event. Ontological claims 
such as “God chooses to enter into an eternally valid covenantal relationship with 
His people”464 are written within the context of a historiography that is divested of its 
relation to the events, and consequently, of the philosophical outlook of the biblical 
writer who is presenting the reader with a description of the events.  
 This reality is attested when Sarna writes that “the biblical narratives are 
essentially documents of faith, not records of the past.”465 And as documents of faith, 
the biblical narratives have the function of communicating matters of faith “through 
the forms of history.”466 This implies that the content of the biblical text is the 
cultural creation and development of Hebrew faith expressed in historical language 
and form. Again, the presupposition hidden in the distinction between faith and 
history is that the content the text addresses cannot be determined by the text, but 
must be supplied by modernistic philosophical principles that deny any agency of 
God, at least as recorded by the text. 
 So far, I have mentioned how Sarna incorporates presuppositions concerning 
the nature of history into his interpretation of Exodus. At this stage, it is important to 
balance the discussion with a representation of scholars who are more moderate 
when speaking of the historicity of Exodus, since they emphasize not the “Hebrew 
                                                 
 
464 Ibid. 




faith” of the biblical author but the “historicity” of the book proper. Among these is 
John I. Durham. 
 Durham writes: 
What we cannot do, without more specific data than we have, however, is 
provide historical confirmation for anything or anybody mentioned in the Book 
of Exodus, . . . this is not of course to say that the events and persons referred by 
Exodus are not historical, only that we have no historical proof of them.467 
 
Durham adds that it “is far better to speak of the narrative of Exodus in History 
rather than as history and to be content with the general historical context we can 
have rather than longing for specific historical proof we cannot have.”468 Although 
this is a more balanced approach to the accuracy of the historiography of Exodus, it 
is still open to critical interpretation. In other words, this approach is open to the 
possibility that until empirical or archaeological data is provided, Exodus is to be 
understood as a “document of faith” in history rather than a description of faith as 
history. The truthfulness of the text is not in the text, but external to it, in empirical 
archaeological evidence. 
 In sum, this presupposition concerning the nature of history has significant 
implications for biblical interpretation. A modernistic scientific approach to the 
biblical text leads to the understanding that the biblical text serves the purpose of 
portraying a primitive perspective of the God-human relationship, deprived of any 
ontological significance when compared to modern philosophical or scientific 
                                                 
 




conceptions of the same relationship.469  
 With these conceptions in mind, I will now outline how the Hebrew text 
might address the issue of history and faith. Historical events in Exodus recur.470 The 
literary structure is organized in a way that communicates meaning,471 but this 
construed meaning is not independent from life, or the actual events. While the 
author of Exodus has control over what he chooses to write about, he cannot control 
the events themselves. In this sense, the writer of Exodus is not a mere recorder of 
events, but a witness of recurrent events.  
 The parallel-panel structure narrates in A and A’ how Moses goes through the 
very same things that Israel will eventually go through. This is not primarily a 
literary device: it is the way in which the historical events unfold. In this sense, the 
flow of history and God’s actions within it are theological. The recurrent events 
happened before the author wrote about them. The author is not a historian in the 
sense that he is organizing the events at a distance from them; he is a witness to the 
                                                 
 
469 John H. Walton has argued that Gen 1–2 was written “for us” but not “to 
us.” See Walton, Lost World of Genesis, 9. In this way, Walton attempts to 
accommodate what the text affirms to the scientific perspective of the time. He adds, 
“Israel understood its God in reference to what others around them believed.” See 
Walton, Lost World of Genesis, 13. Because Walton sustains a modernistic scientific 
approach to the text, his reading of the text is affected by the conditions the approach 
creates.  
470 I will not call these repetitions typological at this stage. For more on the 
issue of typology, see Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture: A Study of 
Hermeneutical Typos Structures (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981); 
and Leithart, Deep Exegesis.  
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development of historical events that are inherently theological. The story repeats 
itself in the text because history repeated itself in reality. The author’s recording of 
history implies a theological viewpoint, yet at the same time, the events unfolded 
theologically. 
 Apart from the fact that in this sense historical events and their recording take 
place in the realm of time and history, two additional elements can be noted. The 
first is the possibility of interpreting history theologically. This is attested by the 
promise of the visitation of God mentioned above. One looks toward the future, 
toward the historical events to come theologically, that is, waiting for the promise of 
God to be fulfilled. The second element is the possibility that within a divine 
promise, with its inherent anticipation of future events, history is still open. God 
does not determine actual events—which would eliminate human freedom and 
choice—but only his actions. What the text portrays is the dynamic of God in 
freedom and history with man in freedom and history, acting and interacting toward 
the fulfillment of the promises of God within an open conception of history.  
 The literary structure highlights changes of events. Sometimes an event in A 
or A’ has no counterpart on the other side. For example, in A Moses flees to the 
desert in silence after killing an Egyptian, acting without divine aid, and the story 
moves into the scene in Midian and a problem with water. In A’, because Moses and 
the people trust in God, before they are led into the desert the text diverts to chapter 
                                                 
 
471 There were certainly more historical events than those recorded in the 
book. I do not believe that the author provides a window into everything that 
happened. History writing implies selectivity. 
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15, with the “Song of Moses.” This change in the flow of the book highlights how 
history is not closed. There is no counterpart to the “Song of Moses” in A.  
If indeed history was determined, the structure of Exodus would reflect an 
unreal organization of events in perfect parallel to each other. Yet the text portrays 
the fact that humanity can freely interact with God in a historical flow that is open to 
change based on free will and action, and this affects the very structure of the book. 
God determines his actions; he promises; he saves; he visits. And at the same time, 
humanity is free to act in the flow of history and within the determined acts of God 
for their salvation. This will not be the first time that the relation between God and 
man in freedom and history is central to the development of the narrative.  
 




 The second section in the literary structure of Exodus, B (2:15b-25) and B’ 
(15:22–18:27), contains two important scenes: (1) Moses and Israel in the wilderness, 
the imagery of water, and additional signs of divine care for Israel; and (2) Moses’ 
family. The comparison between the experiences of Moses and Israel continues from 
A and A’ into B and B’. The number of similarities between B and B’ here is beyond 
mere coincidence.472 
  
                                                 
 
472 While some could assign the same source to these similar sections, 
frequently scholars assign different sources to sections that are seemingly parallel to 
each other.  
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Table 3. B and B’ textual notes 
 
B. Moses Goes into the Wilderness (2:15b-
25) 
Bʹ. Israel Goes into the Wilderness (15:22–
18:27) 
• Moses goes into the wilderness (2:15b) 
 
• Women and water (2:16-17a) 
 
• Moses is challenged (2:17b) 
 
• Moses provides water (Israel cries out in 
Egypt) (2:17b–2:23) 
 
• God “hears the cry of Israel” (2:23-24) 
 
 
• God remembers His covenant and 
“knows” Israel (2:24–25) 
• Israel goes into the wilderness (15:22a) 
 
• Israel and water (15:22b–23) 
 
• Moses is challenged (15:24) 
 
• God/Moses provide water (Moses cries 
out to the Lord) (15:25a) 
 
• Israel to “hear the voice of the Lord God” 
(15:25b–26) 
 
• God makes a statute/regulation and tests 
Israel (15:26–27) 
 • Additional signs of divine provision (16:1–
17:16) 
- God provides bread (16:1–7) 
- God provides bread/meat (16:8–21) 
- Shabbat and bread (16:22–36) 
- God/Moses provide water (17:1–7) 
- People question the presence of God 
(17:7b) 
- Battle against Amalek (17:8–16) 
• Jethro (2:16, 18) 
 
• Egypt (2:19) 
 
• Daughter Zipporah (2:21) 
 
• Gershom (2:22) 
 
• Meal (“eat bread”) (2:20) 
• Jethro (18:1) 
 
• Egypt (18:1) 
 
• Daughter Zipporah (18:2) 
 
• Gershom and Eliezer (18:3–4) 
 
• Meal (“eat bread”) (18:12) 
 
  
Now in the wilderness, both Moses and Israel encounter the problem of lack 
of water (Exod 2:16-17a and 15:22b-23). In both instances Moses is challenged: the 
first time by the shepherds (רעה) in Midian (Exod 2:17), and the second by the very 
people of Israel (Exod 15:24). In Midian Moses’ actions—like God’s actions in 
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Exodus 14:13, 30 and 15:2—are considered acts of “salvation,” indicated by the use 
of the verb יׁשע (“to save”). Moses provides water for the women, and in partnership 
with God in Exodus 15:25a also provides water for Israel. 
Exodus 2 ends with God remembering the covenant and a note on His 
knowledge of the suffering of the people (2:23–25). After the provision of water to 
Israel, YHWH sets statutes (ח ק) and regulations (ְׁשפָּט  indicating the conditions of (מִּ
His relation to the people. YHWH’s covenantal relation to Israel in B provides the 
context for the actions that follow. At the same time, the statutes and regulations 
YHWH establishes for Israel as they enter the desert in B’ also provide the context 
for the actions that will follow.  
 As noted earlier, B’ provides additional signs of divine care for Israel in the 
wilderness. The reason for this is perhaps to show how YHWH is a greater Moses. 
While Moses provides the women in Midian with water, YHWH demonstrates his 
care for the people by providing water, food, and protection throughout their 
journeys.  
 The second main section in B and B’ points to Moses’ relatives on both sides 
of the parallel-panel. As Moses in B and Israel in B’ begin settling in the wilderness, 
the names of Jethro (Exod 2:16, 18 and 18:1), Zipporah (Exod 2:21 and 18:2), 
Gershom (Exod 2:22 and 18:3-4), and a reference to Egypt (Exod 2:19 and 18:1) are 
mentioned.473 In both instances, the meeting with Jethro ends with a meal (Exod 2:20 
                                                 
 
473 Because this is an issue that goes beyond the depiction of the God-human 
relation in the text, it is important to mention that scholars trace the appearance of 




and 18:12), with them eating (אכל) bread (לֶָּחם). When Israel questions the existence 
of YHWH in Exod 17:7 by saying ַּֽיִּן ם־אָּ נּו אִּ ֖ ְרב  ֛ה ְבקִּ ׁ֧ש יְהוָּ  is YHWH among us or“) ֲהי 
not”), the first battle against a foreign enemy takes place.  
 
God-Human Relation Notes  
 
 At least two important issues relating to the God-human relation in Exodus 
must be pursued in this section in the context of how scholars perceive and interpret 
them: (1) God’s actions in relation to Israel in Egypt and in the wilderness, and (2) 
Israel’s response to God’s actions. 
 
Divine action: Egypt and wilderness 
 
 The actions of YHWH for Israel on both sides of the parallel-panel are 
sparked by his covenant faithfulness. In B, God is reminded of the covenant made 
with Abraham, and acts in accordance with what he promised (cf. Gen 15:13–16). 
This is also the first time the expression ית  .covenant”) appears in Exodus“) ְברִּ
Scholars have no difficulty seeing this idea in the text. Greenberg writes: “They 
[Israel] cried out because of their labor, and their cry reached God. Mindful of his 
                                                 
 
relations between Israel and the Midianites that are reflected in the story of Moses 
are consonant with the account in Genesis 25:2 that traces the lineage of Midian 
back to Abraham. They also accord with the later report in Exodus Chapter 18 of 
Midianite influence upon the organization of the Israelite judiciary system. This 
amicable situation must be both authentic and quite early because toward the end of 
the period of the wilderness wanderings, and during the period of the Judges, 
relations between Israel and Midian were thoroughly hostile.” Sarna, Exploring 
Exodus, 35. If indeed the mentions of the Midianites in Exod 2 and Exod 18 are from 
the same source, their being tied together in the literary structure of Exodus implies 
that the final redactor (or R) had exquisite capabilities to organize source materials 
into a meaningful whole.  
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covenant, God took note of the people’s distress and considered what he must do.”474 
This is yet another text in the narrative of the Exodus that attests to YHWH’s 
intimate involvement in what is taking place in Egypt.475 Remembering his covenant, 
at the right time,476 he acts. In B’, the unusual episode after the deliverance at the Red 
Sea ends with God’s establishment of statutes in covenant language.477 These terms 
inform Israel about how God will act toward them in the subsequent chapters. The 
                                                 
 
474 Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 41.  
475 God had already fulfilled part of His promise to Abraham—the 
multiplication of the people—in the first chapter of Exodus. Greenberg observes: 
“When God is said in verse 24 to have remembered his covenant with the patriarchs, 
the reference is to its second part, the promise of a land for their descendants. (Its 
first part, the promise to make them numerous, had already been fulfilled.)” 
Greenberg, Understanding Exodus, 44. This enhances the possibility that though 
elusive in the first chapters of Exodus, God was active in providing the conditions for 
his covenant promises to be fulfilled.  
476 Another anticipation of the actions of God in Exodus seen in Genesis—
apart from the idea of “visitation” mentioned earlier—is God’s promise to Abraham 
in Gen 15:13. God tells Abraham that his descendants will be enslaved and 
oppressed as strangers in a foreign land for a total of four hundred years. 
Furthermore, in Gen 15:16 God reiterates this prophetic insight as he promises that 
in the fourth generation the people will return to the land. To discuss the dating of 
Exodus and the historical background of these numbers is beyond the scope of this 
study. What is in the interest of this section is the fact that God anticipated in 
Genesis, through covenant, how he would proceed in the future events of the 
Exodus. As mentioned earlier, the book begins with this expectation of God’s 
visitation, as well as the fulfillment of the promise. History flows freely within God’s 
promises.  
477 Frank H. Polak sees covenantal language in this section: “The notion of 
imposing ‘law and justice’ may remind one of the covenant theme, and especially of 
the ceremony at Shechem (Joshua 24:25). This suggestion would be in line with the 
sequel, which opens with a summary statement of the covenant idea (15:26a), 
followed by a conditional blessing (v. 26b).” Frank H. Polak, “Water, Rock, and 
Wood: Structure and Thought Pattern in the Exodus Narrative,” Journal of the 
Ancient Near Eastern Society 25 (1997): 21.  
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general pattern of how God acts for the people does not change from B to B’. 
YHWH’s actions for the people follow promises, statutes, regulations, and covenant.  
 Even so, scholars are generally divided in assigning a particular source to the 
two sides of this section. Recent research sees the addition of statutes and regulations 
in B’ (Exod 15:26) as pointing to a possible deuteronomistic source.478 At the same 
time, scholars understand that YHWH’s remembrance of the covenant in B—the 
counterpart to this section—pertains to the priestly source.479 Again, the assumption 
of the documentary hypothesis diverts the attention of the reader to speculation 
rather than to the natural flow of the book. Once two different sources are assigned 
to the two sections (B and B’), any continuous or harmonious portrayal of God’s 
relation to humanity is dismissed by extrabiblical commitments established a priori. 
Through such a conception, the God who remembers the covenant in B is different 
from the God who establishes statutes and regulations in B’. This makes it 
impossible to trace a pattern of divine action based on His covenant promises in 
Genesis and Exodus.  
 YHWH’s actions based on covenant and promise raise additional questions 
about the nature of God’s actions in the book: namely, the epistemological question 
                                                 
 
478 See A. Schart, “Moses und Israel in Konflikt,” Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 
98 (Freiburg-Göttingen, 1990), 173–77; Childs, Exodus, 266–67. Dozeman 
understands that this section pertains to non-P History: Exodus, 371–74. Durham 
summarizes the source-critical predicament in this section: “The tendency of the 
source critics has been to assign different motifs to different sources, or at least to 
different layers in the same source.” For his summary on how scholars interpret this 
section, see Durham, Exodus, 212. 
479 See Dozeman, Exodus, 92; Childs, Book of Exodus, 28; Durham, Exodus, 25. 
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of the knowledge of God and the ontological question of the location of the presence 
of God.  
 In regard to God’s knowledge, in Exod 2:23–25 “four terms give voice to 
Israel’s suffering: ‘groaning,’ ‘cried out,’ ‘cry for help,’ ‘moaning’; and four verbs 
express God’s response.”480 God hears the cry of the people, God remembers his 
covenant, God sees the people, and God knows. The Hebrew text unusually presents 
no object for this divine knowing. Dozeman notes that there is “no object for the 
divine knowledge, creating a parallel with the Israelite cry in v. 23,”481 which also has 
no object.  
 Dozeman understands that the objectless knowledge of God matches the 
objectless cry of Israel and “underscores the anguish of their situation and most likely 
their lack of knowledge of God.”482 In other words, even though the people of Israel 
forget God in the context of their suffering, God still remembers them. Conservative 
scholars assert that the cry of Israel was a prayer, even though no object is given.483 
Even so, not much is said by commentators about God’s knowledge or the nature of 
his actions, apart from the fact that they are triggered by the cries of Israel and that 
they anticipate the next section in the narrative. The general consensus is that God 
                                                 
 
480 Sarna, Exodus, 13. 
481 Dozeman, Exodus, 91. 
482 Ibid., 93. The problem with this perspective is that the Hebrew text does 
indicate knowledge of God (in the episode of the Hebrew midwives who “feared 
God” in Exod 1:17), and the results of covenant blessing (in the multiplication of the 
people in the first chapter).  
483 Stuart, Exodus, 102. 
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acts because the people cry, and no attention is given to the significance of the 
knowledge of God in the text.  
 Each of these readings assume a particular conception of God and of Israel’s 
condition. Dozeman’s conclusion is based on the assumption that Israel had no 
knowledge of God: their cry is objectless because, like the Pharaoh who did not 
know Joseph, Israel also forgot Joseph and his God. Stuart’s perspective that the 
objectless cry of the people rises up to the heavens as a prayer is based on the 
assumption that the people still maintained a connection with God.  
 The Hebrew text presents the information that the people simply cry (זעק), this 
cry raises up to God as a cry for help (ַׁשְועָּה), God remembers his covenant, and acts. 
The action of God is not primarily based—as indicated by the majority of scholars—
on their cry, but on God’s remembrance of the covenant. God acts in favor of a 
people who—as indicated by Dozeman—might not have even called upon his name. 
What precedes divine action is his own promise, his covenant stipulations, as well as 
a sensitivity toward the condition of the people.  
 Again, to tear the text apart into different sources with different conceptions 
of the divine-human relation would lead the reader away from the unified emphasis 
on God’s action in the context of a covenant that is introduced in the early Genesis 
accounts and still valid in Exodus. To reduce conceptions of God and his actions to 
the agenda of the redactors in each source period neglects the complexity of the God 
who acts in the context of covenant. To simplify God and his actions into formulas 
pertaining to different sources misses the richness of what the text is presenting.  
 In regard to God’s presence, it is significant to note that the first time God is 
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explicitly mentioned—apart from Exod 1:17, 20-21 in the context of the blessing 
upon the midwives—is in Exod 2:23. The Hebrew text says that the cry of Israel 
“rose up to God” ( ים ֖ ֱאֹלהִּ ם ֶאל־הָּ ֛ תָּ ַעל ַׁשְועָּ  God is not in Egypt, not in Midian, but 484.(ַוַת֧
upward. Commentaries are generally silent on the location of the divine in this text. 
Donald Gowan correctly observes that the “theme of the presence of God has been a 
popular subject in Old Testament studies, but its opposite has been generally 
neglected.”485 The significance of this text is that before God manifests himself in the 
next section, the first two chapters are marked by divine absence.  
 As indicated in the first chapters of this study, theologians normally begin 
their evaluation of the actions of God with an already established idea of who God 
is. God’s actions are then understood and interpreted in the context of the reality of 
God, thus onto-theology. If the theological construct begins with what the text 
presents in relation to God, the picture changes. The ontological question about the 
divine location in the book of Exodus provides insight on the discussion by 
highlighting God’s awareness of what is taking place in Egypt from this upward 
location, and his subsequent action through revelation to Moses in the world and 
within the flow of history. Reflection on the reality of who God is—if it is a proper 
object of reflection—must begin with an evaluation of the text itself that primarily 
depicts his actions, thus theo-ontology. The reader understands who God is through 
                                                 
 
484 I already mentioned the dialogue between Abraham and YHWH that 
preceded YHWH going up. The idea of the divine being located in the heavens can 
be found throughout the Hebrew Bible (1 Sam 5:12, Jonah 1:2, Jer 16:2, etc.). 
 
204 
the textual depiction of how he acts.486 The Hebrew text in B, then, presents the 
reader with an understanding that although absent, God is aware, and will act in the 
world and for man because of his covenant. In B’, God is fully present and 
interacting with Israel throughout their journeys. 
 
Israel’s rebellion: wilderness 
 
 So far, this section has focused on God’s actions in relation to Israel. At this 
time, I will explore the human side of the God-human relation with a focus on the 
battle of the Amalekites depicted in B’ (Exod 17:8-16). Because the battle of the 
Amalekites appears at the backdrop of the question of divine presence, it seems an 
appropriate setting to continue the exposition of the God-human relation in the text. 
 For several scholars, the battle with the Amalekites appears in the text for 
varied reasons, so different theories abound.487 The preceding narrative (Exod 17:1-7) 
                                                 
 
485 Donald E. Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a 
Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 7.  
486 It is also important to note that this same dynamic functioned for the 
Israelites. As readers of the text, the Israelites were not given a description of who 
God is in any section of Exodus. They only experienced the acts of God. The acts of 
God gave the people a glimpse into what we now consider the ontological question 
of the nature of God. The focus of the text is not on the nature, but on the acts, in the 
context of divine faithfulness to the covenant God established with the patriarchs.  
487 Stuart and Durham see the reason as historical and trace the relation of 
Israel and Amalek to the book of Genesis; see Stuart, Exodus, 387; Durham, Exodus, 
234. Garrett writes that the reason for the attack was the vulnerability of a people 
deprived of water. See Garrett, Commentary on Exodus, 433. Sarna agrees with this 
assessment, which is in harmony with Deut 25:17–19; Sarna, Exodus, 95. Meyers 
writes that, like the lack of water, this is yet another challenge in the wilderness; see 
Meyers, Exodus, 134. And finally, Hamilton sees no apparent reason for the attack. 
See Hamilton, Exodus, 269. 
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indicates another problem with water. Israel grumbles, Moses turns to God, and God 
indicates that He will “stand before” (ם ּ֥ יָך שָּ נֶַ֨ ד ְלפָּ  Moses and a rock that is to be (ע מ 
struck (Exod 17:6). The text, contrary to the beginning of the book, makes explicit 
God’s presence with the people in this particular scene. According to the text, this is 
not a speech act or an illusion. The Hebrew language cannot communicate 
something in a clearer fashion: God was present there and then. Whether interpreted 
as myth or reality, this is the perspective of the author. It is surprising, then, that in 
the conclusion of this episode, the people—who are unaware of the dialogue between 
God and Moses—question the presence of a God who was there. The people ask, “Is 
the Lord in our midst, or not?” (ַּֽיִּן ם־אָּ נּו אִּ ֖ ְרב  ֛ה ְבקִּ ׁ֧ש יְהוָּ  Exod 17:7b).488 ;ֲהי 
 It is important to note that in this instance, what determines God’s actions is 
not any particular covenantal commitment—apart from the fact that he is still 
leading the people to the promised land—but Moses’ intercession for the people. 
This movement between Moses and God will continue throughout the book and 
serves as another argument against the idea of a timeless God outside of time and 
space. God interacts with Moses in time, and these altercations change the flow of 
the narrative.  
 The questioning of the divine presence leads not only to Moses’ intervention, 
but to the seemingly unexplainable appearance of the Amalekites. This is the only 
                                                 
 
488 The people question God’s presence here, and in chapter 32 they will 
question Moses’ presence in their midst. There seems to be an underlying theme 
relating to the people’s need for a divine figure constantly present with them. By 
questioning and fashioning a divinity that will be present at all times, they sin.  
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time in Exodus that a foreign nation attacks Israel. Because scholars generally assign 
the section of Exod 17:1-7 to P and 17:8-16 to J or E,489 any proposal in the narrative 
that assumes a continuation from one section to the other is rare.490 Even so, it seems 
natural to see that there would be challenges in the wilderness journey toward Sinai: 
water, and now war. The people’s reaction of questioning the divine presence is 
significant not only because it provides another window into the freedom God and 
humanity have in their interactions in history, but because it provides insight into the 
way Israel evaluates God’s actions. Although the reader is informed of God’s 
presence in the provision of water—through the dialogue between God and Moses—
the people do not associate the water with the immediate provision of a God who 
acts for them in the wilderness.  
The human perception of the divine continues to be in focus in the next 
section, regarding YHWH’s appearance to Moses through the burning bush.  
 




 The third section of the literary structure of Exodus, C (Exod 3:11–4:31) and 
C’ (Exod 19–24:11), develops in three distinct parts: (1) Moses’ approach to the 
mountain of God and Israel’s approach to the mountain of God (both including 
                                                 
 
489 Childs, Exodus, 306, 312–13. 
490 Because Dozeman has a different source-critical approach, he does allow 




theophanies); (2) the dialogue between Moses and God both the first (plan to deliver 
people) and the second time (Decalogue and mishpatim) he goes up the mountain;  
 
 
Table 4. C and C’ textual notes 
 
C. God Remembers His Covenant (3:1–
4:31) 
Cʹ. The Book of the Covenant (19–24:11) 
• Moses comes to Horeb (with the flock of 
Jethro) (3:1) 
 
• God “called to him from the bush” (3:4) 
 
 
• God: “I have come down” (3:8) 
 
 
• The cry of the people was “brought to me” 
(3:9) 
 
• Moses commissioned (3:10) 
 
• Moses questions God (3:11) 
 
• Sign: Israel will worship Me on this 
mountain (3:12) 
• Moses comes to Sinai (with the flock of 
God) (19:1-2) 
 
• God “called to him from the mountain” 
(19:3) 
 
• God: “I have bore you on eagles’ wings” 
(19:4a) 
 
• Israel I “brought to myself” (19:4b) 
 
 
• Moses commissioned (19:6) 
 
• Moses obeys God (19:7) 
 
• Israel prepares to worship God at the 
mountain (19:7-25) 
• God reveals His name “I AM” (3:13-15) 
 
• Promised signs of God’s Presence (3:16–
4:17) 
• God reveals His character “I AM”: 
Decalogue and Mishpatim (20–23:19) 
 
• Promised sign of the Angel’s Presence 
(23:20-33) 
• Moses makes preparations to depart (4:18-
23) 
 
• Covenant neglected: cutting foreskin and 
blood (4:24-26) 
 
• Moses, Aaron, and Elders worship God 
(4:27-31) 
• Moses makes preparations to go up (24:1-
4a) 
 
• Covenant established: cutting covenant and 
blood (24:4b-8) 
 




 (3) Moses’ preparation to return to Egypt with a scene of covenant and 
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worship, and Moses’ preparation to go up the mountain as God instructed along 
with a second scene of covenant and worship. Several other interesting links between 
C and C’ relating to Moses and Israel are significant here. In both episodes, Exod 3:4 
and 19:3, God calls Moses. In the first instance, God calls from the midst of a small 
bush (as Elohim): ה וְך ַהְסנֶֶ֗ תֹ֣ ים מִּ יו ֱאֹלהִִּ֜ לַָּ֨ א א   In the second instance—and the only .ַויְִּקרָּ
time God has called him since that first instance—God calls Moses from the 
mountain itself (as YHWH): ר ֹ֣ הָּ ן־הָּ יו יְהוָּה   מִּ ֹ֤ לָּ א א   While in Exod 3:9 God tells Moses .ַויְִּקרַָּ֨
that the cry of the people was “brought” to him (י ֹ֑ לָּ ָאה א  ֹ֣ ל בָּ ֖ א  ת ְבנ י־יִּשְ רָּ  the first thing ,(ַצֲעַקּ֥
brought to God himself after that is the Israelites themselves, in Exod 19:4b ( א ּ֥ וָָּאבִּ
ַּֽי לָּ ם א   This first scene in C and C’ ends with the sign of the worship of God at the .(ֶאְתֶכ֖
same mountain—mentioned in passing—in Exod 3:12 and the preparations for the 
people to worship God at the mountain in Exod 19:7-25.  
 The second scene is largely composed of divine speeches. While in C God 
presents Moses with the knowledge of his name (Exod 3:13-15), along with signs of 
his future care and commitment to Israel (Exod 3:16–4:17), in C’ God reveals his 
character by giving Israel, through Moses, the Decalogue (Exod 20:1-17), a series of 
commands (Exod 20:22–23:19), and the promise of his care and presence through his 
angel (Exod 23:20-33). The relation between narrative and law and possible reasons 
for the differences between C and C’ will be pursued in the next section, dealing with 
how scholars understand this dynamic in the text. 
 The final scene in the third section of the literary structure deals with 
preparations. While in C Moses prepares to return to Egypt to confront Pharaoh 
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after speaking with God on the mountain (Exod 4:18-23),491 in C’ Moses prepares 
himself to go up the mountain to confront God (Exod 24:1-4a). The text of Exodus 
not only presents a contrast between Moses as a leader and God as a leader, but a 
contrast between God as king and Pharaoh as king. This section begins the 
comparison.  
What follows in C is one of the most complicated sections of the book (Exod 
4:24-26). Moses is faced with an angel seeking his death, and Zipporah acts quickly 
to intervene for her husband by cutting (כרת) the foreskin of their child. The mention 
of blood (ם  in this scene is also important. Scholars generally point out the unusual (דָּ
appearance of this episode in the narrative, and this is why the events in C’ might 
provide insight into the resolution of the many problems the text presents the reader. 
As in C, the text of C’ presents the reader with the “cutting” (כרת) of a covenant 
(Exod 24:8), and the mention of blood (ם  Before Moses goes to Egypt to confront .(דָּ
Pharaoh, he neglects the covenant marked by circumcision, in a scene filled with 
blood. Before Moses goes up to meet God, he establishes a covenant with the elders, 
in a scene also marked by blood.  
 
God-Human Relation Notes 
 
 One of the main issues touching upon the God-human relation in this section 
was addressed in the introduction of this study: how the interpretation of the Hebrew 
                                                 
 
491 For more on this particular text in Exod 4, see Athena E. Gorospe, 
Narrative and Identity: An Ethical Reading of Exodus 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
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Bible hinges upon the understanding of what happened in the “Sinai event.”492 The 
general idea is that if something in the descriptions of the book of Exodus did happen 
in history, it happened in the Sinai narratives with God revealing himself to the 
Israelite people. This revelation of God to Israel resulted in the creation of what is 
termed the “book of the Covenant.”493  
 Some scholars observe that the event of Sinai is traditionally understood “as 
the exclusive and normative model for subsequent revelation in Judaism”494 and that 
this conception is a “longstanding”495 presupposition. While this perception has 
never been questioned, this long held presupposition is starting to be overcome in 
scholarly writings.496 So far, this study has aimed at expanding this movement of 
noticing important divine-human events beyond Sinai. Although the depiction of the 
                                                 
 
492 In the introduction I presented this issue through the work of Langdon B. 
Gilkey. At this stage, as I move into the text, examples closer to biblical studies are 
in order. For more on this particular issue, see Sommer, “Revelation at Sinai.” 
493 For specific studies on this section in particular, see: Martin Ravndal 
Hauge, The Descent from the Mountain: Narrative Patterns in Exodus 19–40 (Sheffield, 
England: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001); Thomas B. Dozeman, God on the 
Mountain: A Study of Redaction, Theology and Canon in Exodus 19–24 (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1989). For the relation of revelation, narrative, and law, see Nanette Stahl, 
Law and Liminality in the Bible (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 
51–73. 
494 George J. Brooke, Hindy Najman, and Loren T. Stuckenbruck, 
introduction to The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and Divine Revelation in 
Judaism and Christianity (Leiden: Brill, 2008), ix. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Some even conclude that some events outside of Exodus were more 
important than the Sinai event, affirming that “the Mosaic discourse in year 40 [in 
the book of Deuteronomy] is more important than the Sinai/Horeb event.” Ibid. 
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God-human relation is pivotal at the Sinai event, it is not the only significant 
instance of divine action/revelation in the book of Exodus that deserves serious 
consideration.497 After all, the Sinai event follows another Sinai event between God 
and Moses in Exod 3.  
 With these issues in mind, a few themes within the context of C and C’ 
relating to the God-human relation must be taken into consideration at this stage: (1) 
the Sinai event and law, and (2) the Sinai event and revelation. 
 
The Sinai event and law 
 
 Because the textual depiction of the God-human dynamic centered at the 
Sinai event creates the Book of the Covenant,498 the first issue to appear in scholarly 
considerations is the relation between the Sinai event and law.499 The general premise 
within scholarship—already mentioned in passing when this study dealt with the 
issue of history—is that God did not reveal himself in history to Israel at Sinai. 
Although this is what the text says, this is not what actually happened. Von Rad 
                                                 
 
497 Although I agree with the movement beyond Sinai, I must emphasize yet 
again that I do not share the historical-critical inclinations or source-critical 
motivations of these scholars. Instead, I intend to uncover how other instances of 
divine revelation are just as important as Sinai. This partial conclusion is based on 
how the literary structure of the book of Exodus presents the focus of the author 
going beyond just the Sinai event.  
498 Stahl describes these critical moments between God and humanity as 
“liminal moments,” and argues that the appearance of law within the biblical 
narratives indicates a significant transition. See Stahl, Law and Liminality, 12–13. 
 499 For more on this see Baruch J. Schwartz, “The Priestly Account of the 




summarizes the idea well as he writes that nowhere “else in Old Testament is there 
to be found such a huge presentation of traditions, made up of so many strands, and 
attached to one single event (the revelation at Sinai).”500 So the question is: where 
does the idea of law come from, if God did not actually speak to Israel in the 
wilderness as the text indicates?  
 Marc Zvi Brettler phrases it well as he says that the “problems involved with 
the narrative description of revelation, and the connections between the narrative 
and the law, seem truly intractable.”501 The question remains: how “did it happen 
that Israel’s laws came to be attributed to the authorship of a deity, YHWH 
himself?”502 Unfortunately, the answers given to the question do not stem from any 
textual, theological, or even philosophical understanding, but are generally formed 
through a source-critical analysis of the text within its ANE background (in the 
parameters set forth by the presuppositions delineated earlier).503  
                                                 
 
Manahem Haran, ed. M. V. Fox et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1996), 104–
34. 
500 Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology: The Theology of Israel’s Historical 
Traditions, Vol. 1 (London: SCM, 1975), 187. 
501 Marc Zvi Brettler, “‘Fire, Cloud, and Deep Darkness’ (Deuteronomy 
5:22): Deuteronomy’s Recasting of Revelation,” in The Significance of Sinai: Traditions 
about Sinai and Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, ed. George J. Brooke, 
Hindy Najman, and Loren T. Stuckenbruck (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 16. 
502 James L. Kugel, “Some Unanticipated Consequences of the Sinai 
Revelation: A Religion of Laws,” in The Significance of Sinai: Traditions about Sinai and 
Divine Revelation in Judaism and Christianity, ed. George J. Brooke, Hindy Najman, 
and Loren T. Stuckenbruck (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 4. 
503 Dozeman argues that the source-critical approach to Exod 19–24 has 




 James L. Kugel, for instance, proposes that the origin of the idea of “divine 
law” came “not at some conclave at the foot of Mt. Sinai, but in the hill country of 
ancient Canaan, as different tribes and ethnic groups in Canaan sought to pull 
themselves together, through a common code of conduct and a common deity, into 
some sort of tribal coalition.”504 In other words, the discussion moves from law in the 
context of a possible divine revelation—common in pre-critical interpretations but 
not present in current exegetical discussions—to law as a cultural product of 
                                                 
 
approach emphasized how redactors were “passive tridents, whose primary aim was 
to preserve tradition, rather than creative theologians who critically transformed 
tradition.” Dozeman, God on the Mountain, 2. Among those who subscribe to this old 
approach are Wellhausen, Gressmann, and Von Rad. Dozeman and others propose 
a more positive perspective of the work of the redactors. Yet these new solutions still 
function under the philosophical parameters set forth by the documentary 
hypothesis. For instance, Perlitt argues that what the redactors did was a creative 
endeavor, the turning of an account of theophany into that of legislation. See L. 
Perlitt, Bundestheologie in Alten Testament, Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum 
Alten und Neuen Testament 36 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969), 
156–238. Another significant contribution to those who argue for the human creation 
of the covenant code is found in David P. Wright, Inventing God’s Law: How the 
Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). The change from a negative to a positive assessment of the 
role of the redactors still functions under the umbrella of extrabiblical assumptions 
leading to the idea that the text is a collection of writings from different authors, in 
different periods, with different worldviews and agendas. Dozeman proposes a 
model of interpretation that traces the growth of the Sinai narrative in three stages: 
pre-exilic Mountain of God tradition, a late pre-exilic/exilic deuteronomistic 
redaction, and finally an exilic/early post-exilic priestly redaction. Again, the 
dynamic changes, but the platform remains the same.   
504 Kugel, “Some Unanticipated Consequences,” 5. Von Rad also negates the 
historicity of the event as he writes that “this narrative sequence does not derive 
directly from historical events, but is probably the ‘festival legend’ belonging to a 
major cultic celebration, the old festival of the renewal of the covenant.” See Von 
Rad, Old Testament Theology, 189. 
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Hebrews in Canaan during the “period of the Judges.”505 
 With this movement from divine action/revelation to human product, the 
nature and function of law within Exodus are established upon extrabiblical 
parameters. In short, divine law becomes human law: that is, a human creation to 
establish the idea that the divine-human relation is only possible through the keeping 
of law. Kugel concludes:  
The religion of laws, although never envisaged as such when God first spoke at 
Sinai, turned out to be no less an effective way of keeping the deity at arm’s 
length. He was way up there, and we humans were way down here; what 
connected us was not direct contact but a set of clearly established ground rules—
or, one might say, a set of clearly visible electric wires along which the current of 
divine-human relations was to flow.506 
 
The problem here is that, for Kugel and others, there is no electricity in the wire; 
there is no real connection between humanity and God because such a reality is 
dismissed via the presuppositions of historical criticism. Once the origin of divine 
law is established as human, the reality of covenant and law and their relation to the 
narrative of Exodus becomes not only intractable textually and historically, but 
unrealistic theologically and philosophically. The historical-critical outlook 
determines what is and is not realistic in the text, and with this basic structure in 
place, the apparent contradictions and differences within the text are used to 
continuously support the critical structure, never to challenge it.507  
                                                 
 
505 Kugel, “Some Unanticipated Consequences,” 5. 
506 Ibid., 13. 
507 Whenever an apparent contradiction is found within the text, the 
immediate procedure is to consider the source-critical aspect of the contradiction. 




 Before I continue unpacking the presuppositions that shape the understanding 
of the event of Sinai, it is important to point out that the critical use of myth in the 
robes of history to communicate an idea (in this case, the idea of law) is inherently 
Platonic. Critical scholars, through the use of the documentary hypothesis, project 
upon the text—and the authors of the text—their own biases. They assume, a priori, 
that the text with its reconstructed history devoid of divine action is a means to 
communicate a message (be it from the J, D, E, or P source). This movement is 
Platonic at its root, since Plato as an idealist began his description of reality with a 
myth that would communicate an already set system of ideas. The myth is used to 
carry the system. In this classical framework, any possibility of the text 
communicating actual historical events is denied in favor of the message or idea they 
are trying to communicate through the fabrication of historical myth. The idea to be 
conveyed precedes myth and consequently history.508 So, the use of the documentary 
hypothesis, the idea of sources with agendas, and the fabrication of myth/history to 
communicate theological viewpoints are, at their roots, Platonic.509 
 These extrabiblical premises, then, limit the creation of law to some human 
                                                 
 
contradictions (which vary in many ways) outside the source-critical approach. This 
study will attempt to find alternate ways of dealing with the portions of Exodus that 
have been considered problematic.  
508 I am thankful for the classes I took with Jacques B. Doukhan, who 
constantly pointed out the dependence of critical scholarship upon classical literature 
that assumed a Platonic foundation.  
509 This same mindset is found in the positivist philosophy of Descartes, where 
the idea/thinking precedes existence/history. So, in the documentary hypothesis, 
Platonic and Cartesian philosophical frameworks harmonize.  
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production that would grant authority to the priests who serve the God of the law, as 
well as their “divinely given” agendas. This perspective entirely subverts what the 
text is attempting to convey. Stahl is correct in assessing that “in their concise 
presentation in the Decalogue, the laws are a distillation of the entire legal corpus of 
the Bible, and they emblematize—in their iconic inscription on the tablets—the 
importance of law in their relationship between God and Israel.”510 To reduce the 
law and its theological weight to ideas conveyed by myth, as an ahistorical human 
fabrication, is to miss the richness of what the law implies for the divine-human 
relation.  
 When evaluating the textual flow indicated by the literary structure of 
Exodus, the reader can see how the text transitions into law only in C’. The point of 
Moses’ meeting with God in C is related to the Exodus of the people from Egypt. In 
this instance, God speaks to Moses and acts for Israel. In C’, the sign given to Moses 
finds its fulfillment, and God’s intention is to not only act for the people, but speak to 
them directly. The experience of Moses anticipates that of the people. Although the 
people cannot stand the direct revelation of God and Moses has to resume his role as 
intercessor, the appearance of law here indicates a change in the dynamic of the 
book. Now that they are delivered from Egypt, God will expound on how they will 
be delivered from their bondage to sin. Yet, as indicated previously, God will not act 
without parameters: he will continue to act through covenant. Cassuto correctly 
observes that the Ten Words function in the narrative as an introduction to the 
                                                 
 




The Ten Words are not the substance of the covenant, nor its conditions, but the 
introduction to it. Before the particulars and terms of the covenant are conveyed 
by the intermediary, God himself makes a prefatory declaration that establishes 
the basic principles on which the covenant will be founded.511 
 
 In this sense, there is no distinction between narrative and law. What leads up 
to the law is a series of divine actions in favor of the people depicted in narrative 
form. The law is the climax and new starting point for more divine actions based on 
grace. The appearance of law throughout the book indicates the conditions under 
which God will act for the people. Here, they anticipate the way God will deliver the 
people from their sin. Writing about Deuteronomy, Daniel Block is correct in 
observing that the law is a “gift of grace to guide the redeemed in the way of 
righteousness, leading to life.”512 This idea will continue in the subsequent sections 
dealing with the construction of the sanctuary. 
 
The Sinai event and revelation 
 
 So far, I have outlined how the interpretation of the Sinai event affects the 
interpretation of Exodus in the context of the creation of law (either as revelation or 
human product). A second question that presents itself in this section of the book of 
Exodus considers the relation between the Sinai event and revelation. 
 The source-critical understanding that within Exodus there is a conflict of 
                                                 
 
511 Cassuto, Exodus, 239. 
512 Daniel I. Block, The Gospel According to Moses: Theological and Ethical 
Reflections on the Book of Deuteronomy (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2012), 4. 
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worldviews or philosophies, especially as it pertains to the God-human relation, also 
stems from conceptions of the relation between revelation and text. Above I have 
shown that for historical critics, the “electric wire” between God and humanity is a 
law that is human, not divine. There was no divine revelation (promulgation) of law, 
just the creation of laws that provided a means of connection between humanity and 
an elusive god. Others, especially within the Jewish tradition, understand that divine 
revelation did take place, yet without any content. The biblical text is a reporting of 
this contentless revelation, but not revelation in itself.513   
 Sommer, for example, writes about the Sinai event as he attempts to 
harmonize the texts of the books of Exodus and Deuteronomy and asserts that the 
revelation at Sinai “imparted specific content; it was not only an overwhelming 
event,”514 and that the people heard a voice “articulating sounds in order to 
communicate meaning.”515 However, even though this seems an appropriate 
evaluation of the biblical text, Sommer concludes, based on internal inconsistencies 
within Exodus as well as between Exodus and Deuteronomy, that the people “heard 
no words, just as they saw no form, because there were no words to hear.”516 Because 
of this assessment and lack of ontological import as well as cognitive communication 
in the Sinai event, Sommer indicates that the Torah and all the writings within 
                                                 
 
513 Sommer, “Revelation at Sinai,” 424. 
514 Ibid., 433. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid., 445. 
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Jewish tradition are “tradition, commentary, and reflection.”517  
 In addition to this assessment, Sommer underscores, following a timeless 
conception of Being, that in reality there are two Torahs: a phenomenal Torah (the 
Torah of Moses) and a noumenal Torah (the Torah of God). The latter, he explains, 
“cannot be limited by rational categories of time and space.”518 So, as one can notice, 
even the perspectives that come as close as possible to what the text is presenting are 
not exempt from extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions that shape them.  
 The biblical text leaves no space for a differentiation between a revelation in 
space and time and a meaning beyond time. In C, Exod 3:3 presents Moses 
approaching the burning bush and calling it a “marvelous sight” (ל ה ַהגָּד ֖  .(ֶאת־ַהַמְרֶאּ֥
Moses is unaware of the presence of God. Visible manifestations by themselves are 
not enough for Moses to be sure of divine presence. What allows Moses to 
understand that he is indeed in the presence of God is divine speech. Once God 
speaks, Moses realizes he is in the presence of God. This divine longing to 
communicate with humanity is also attested in C’, but as indicated earlier, the people 
respond negatively to this divine approximation.  
 Yet the text leaves no room for contestation: the realm of the heavens is not in 
another dimension, but close enough that people can hear the voice of God. Exodus 
20:22 says, “You yourselves have seen that I have spoken to you from heaven” ( ם ַאֶתֹ֣
ֶכַּֽם מָּ י עִּ ְרתִּ ַב֖ יִּם דִּ ַמֵ֔ ן־ַהשָּ י מִּ ם כִִּּ֚ יֶתֵ֔  Any other evaluation of this dynamic forces the text to .(ְראִּ
                                                 
 




say something it is not presenting about how God relates to humanity according to 
the perspective of the author of Exodus.  
 




 The fourth section of the literary structure of Exodus, D (Exod 5–7:2a) and D’ 
(Exod 24:12–32:30), develops in what can be summarized as two main scenes: (1) 
God’s command to Pharaoh in D and God’s command to Israel in D’, and (2) 
Pharaoh’s disobedience in D and Israel’s disobedience in D’.  
 
Table 5. D and D’ textual notes 
 
D. Pharaoh’s Building Project without 
Shabbat: God’s Command and Pharaoh’s 
Disobedience (Part I) (5–7:2a) 
Dʹ. God’s Building Project with Shabbat: 
God’s Command and People’s 
Disobedience/Obedience (Part I) (24:12–
32:30) 
• Moses in the presence of Pharaoh (5:1–5) 
 
• God’s command : “Let my people go” 
(5:1) 
• Moses in the presence of God (24:12–18) 
 
• God’s command: “Let them make me a 
sanctuary” (25:1–31:18) 
 
• The “Lord spoke to Moses” (7x) dividing 
God’s building project into seven sections, 
with the last section about the Shabbat 
(25:1–31:18), paralleling the six days of 
creation followed by the Shabbat (cf. Gen 
11:–2:4a) 
 
Section 1 (25:1–30:10) 
Section 2 (30:11–16) 
Section 3 (30:17–21) 
Section 4 (30:22–23) 
Section 5 (30:34–38) 
Section 6 (31:1–11) 








• Pharaoh’s response (disobedience): “who 
is the Lord, I do not know the Lord, I will 
not let Israel go” (5:2–3) 
• People’s response (disobedience): “Come 
make us a god who will go before us, and 
as of Moses we do not know what has 
become of him” (32:1–2) 
• Pharaoh’s building project involves seven 
commands and seven verbs (or verb pairs), 
beginning with Pharaoh’s rejection of the 
Shabbat (5:4–9) 
 
Command 1: Shabbat is denied (5:4–5) 
Command 2: “give/add” (yasaph) (5:7a) 
Command 3: “go” and “gather” (halak 
and qashash) (5:7b) 
Command 4: “lay/put” (sim) (5:8a) 
Command 5: “diminish” (raga`) (5:8b) 
Command 6: “let be heavier” (kabad) 
(5:9a) 
Command 7: “pay attention” (sha`ah) 
(5:9b) 
• People’s building project initiated and 
divine reaction (32:3–10) 
 
• Pharaoh says to Israelites: “Go and work” 
(5:18)  
 
• Moses questions God: “Why (lamah) have 
You brought trouble on this people?” 
(5:22-23)  
 
• God speaks: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and 
Covenant (by the Lord I did not make 
myself known) (6:1-8) 
 
• Moses speaks and people do not hear 
(6:9a) 
 
• Israel’s “cruel bondage” to Pharaoh (6:9b) 
 
• Israelites “rose up to play” (32:6) 
 
 
• Moses questions God: “Why (lamah) does 
Your wrath burn hot against Your 
people?” (32:11) 
 




• Moses speaks and God hears (32:14) 
 
 
• Israel “breaks loose” (para’) in debauchery 
and bondage to sin (32:25) 
• Summary of God’s command to Israel and 
Pharaoh though Moses and Aaron (6:12–
13) 
 
• Credentials (family history) of God’s 
spokespersons to Israel and Pharaoh (6:14–
27) 
 
• Conflict between Moses and God: Moses 









• Conflict between Moses and Aaron: Calf 





Yet within these commands one notices a contrast between God as a leader of 
the people and Pharaoh as a leader of the people. In D’ the commands of God 
relating to the sanctuary extend from Exod 25–31 with no interruption. In these 
chapters, God lays out the plan for the construction of the sanctuary in seven 
different stages, as seen in Table 5. The commands of God relating to the 
construction of the sanctuary, then, follow the creation rhythm of seven ending with 
rest or ַׁשבָּת. God’s “building project” has the purpose of God dwelling with people, 
and its construction is not forced, but voluntary (Exod 25:2), and includes rest (Exod 
31:12-18).  
 Pharaoh’s response to God’s command to let go of the people is negative. He 
questions the very existence of God and initiates a “building project” of his own. 
Like God’s building project, Pharaoh’s project also contains seven stages indicated 
by seven verbs and verb pairs. It is the very reversal of any creative act that respects 
life. In the course of these commands of forced labor upon the people, Pharaoh 
denies any possibility of rest/ceasing to labor or ַׁשבָּת (in Exod 5:5 Pharaoh asks, 
“You would have them cease from their labor?”). In the idea of a building project 
marked by a rhythm of seven and an emphasis on rest or lack thereof, the contrast 
between Pharaoh and God is set. 
 Yet as Pharaoh responds negatively to God’s command in D, the people in D’ 
also reject the principles of God’s commands that they heard from the mountain. 
Ignorant of the dialogue between God and Moses relating to a building project taking 
place on the mountain, the people initiate a rebellious building project of their own: 
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the construction of the golden calf.519 Like Pharaoh in Exod 5:2 saying, “I do not 
know the Lord” (  י ְעתִּ א יַָּדַ֨  ,the people express themselves in Exod 32:1b by saying ,(ֹלֹ֤
“We do not know what has become of him [Moses]” ( ְענּו א יַָּד֖  The similarities .(ֹלּ֥
between Pharaoh and the people here are significant. The contrast between their 
experiences will be evaluated in the next section on E and E’. 
 
God-Human Relation Notes 
 
 The history of interpretation of Exod 25–31 is as vast as it is complex.520 Yet 
the main issue that relates to the God-human relation within D and D’ is the 
construction of the sanctuary and consequently, the conception of sacred space.521 
Biblical scholars normally evaluate the text and its history without giving heed to the 
reality it points to. If the author/redactor were allowed to speak without the 
                                                 
 
519 This connection between the two building projects has been noted by other 
scholars such as Terrence Fretheim. See Fretheim, Exodus, 267. 
520 Jews and Christians have attempted to make sense of this portion of 
Exodus in different ways. Scott M. Langston writes that “Christians used these 
chapters to exalt the church, Jews to glorify Torah.” Langston, Exodus through the 
Centuries, 227. For more see Childs, Exodus, 547–50. 
521 Daniel C. Timmer recognizes that there are several noteworthy issues 
surrounding the text of Exod 25–40: “sacred space, sacred time, divine presence, and 
creation.” Daniel C. Timmer, Creation, Tabernacle, and Sabbath: The Sabbath Frame of 
Exodus 31:12–17; 35:1–3 in Exegetical and Theological Perspective (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 32. Definitions of sacred space also carry within 
themselves philosophical assumptions. The common conception among scholars can 
be summarized in the idea that sacred spaces are “religious centers at which the 
heavenly and earthly meet, sites that act as bridges between the human and divine 
worlds. They are locations at which the divine ruptures through the mundane and 
reveals itself to humans.” Ron Eduard Hassner, War on Sacred Ground (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), 22. For more on this particular theological issue see 
John Inge, A Christian Theology of Place (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003). 
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suspicion of a predetermined agenda, what would the description say about God, 
humanity, and their relation? Traditionally, the description of the text is not enough, 
and an interpretative inference must be made to make sense of the description in the 
reality of the reader.  
 As indicated earlier, the interpretative task is descriptive. Yet when scholars 
do speak of what the text is attempting to convey, when they jump to the inference of 
“what it means” in regards to sacred space,522 the works of two authors appear as 
common references: Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane523 and R. E. 
Clements’s God and Temple.524 Daniel C. Timmer writes that “any discussion of 
sacred space must take account of the work of Mircea Eliade, which has been no less 
influential in biblical studies than in anthropology.”525 In regard to the influence of 
Clements, some key works in the interpretation of Exodus and Old Testament 
                                                 
 
522 Here I imply scholars dealing with the book of Exodus or Torah. For a 
thorough analysis of temples and divine presence in the context of the God-human 
relation in the Ancient Near East see Michael B. Hundley, Gods in Dwellings: Temples 
and Divine Presence in the Ancient Near East, ed. Amélie Kuhrt, SBLWAW Supplement 
Series 3 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013). 
523 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1959). 
524 R. E. Clements, God and Temple (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965).  
525 Timmer, Creation, Tabernacle, and Sabbath, 32. This does not imply that 
scholars unanimously follow the work of Eliade. For other perspectives of sacred 
space see J. Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987); S. Japhet, “Some Biblical Concepts of Sacred Place,” in Sacred 
Space: Shrine, City, Land, ed. B. Z. Kedar and R. J. Z. Werblowsky (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998), 55–72. 
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theology support his writings.526  
The works of Eliade and Clements are quite influential when biblical scholars 
attempt to articulate the understanding of sacred space in the text. The philosophical 
assumptions that form these works will be the focus of this section, since they 
directly affect the subsequent interpretation of the Hebrew text. In addition, I will 
attempt to show how the ideas proposed by Eliade and Clements are found within 
interpretations of Exod 25:8. 
 
Sacred space in the work of Mircea Eliade and R. E. Clements 
 
 Eliade sees manifestations of the divine as “hierophanies”527 and writes: “the 
sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from ‘natural’ 
realities.”528 This supernatural revelation is depicted by Eliade as “a reality that does 
not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural ‘profane’ 
world.”529 It is this distinction between the sacred and the profane that allows Eliade 
                                                 
 
526 Dozeman writes that “Clements argued that the center of ancient Israelite 
religious is Yaweh dwelling in a sacred cultic site,” and adds that “the more recent 
work of J. Milgrom on the complex theologies of the sacred and the profane . . . 
reinforce the insight of Clements, alerting us to the important role of the sanctuary in 
Exodus.” Dozeman, Exodus, 5. Kaiser also relies on the work of Clements to write 
about divine presence and the sacred in Exod 25:8. See Kaiser, Old Testament 
Theology, 120. 
527 Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 11. 




to categorize differences in spaces as modes of being.530 These introductory insights 
assume a dualistic conception of reality that stems from the dualistic conception of 
the world found in the writings of Plato.  
 For Plato, the idea of the sacred and the profane is expounded in the 
articulation of the concept of the holy, which is quite similar to Eliade’s distinction of 
sacred and profane. Commenting on Plato, Thomas L. Pangle writes:  
The “sacred” (hieron) is what is filled with the divine presence, what the gods 
reserve to themselves; the “pious” (hosion) is what they allocate to, or require of, 
humans. Hence, a temple and the space around it, the place of the god, is called 
“sacred” (hieron) rather than “pious” (hosion); the rest of the city is “pious” or 
“profane” (hosion), but not “sacred” (hieron).531 
 
Other scholars also see the relation between the work of Eliade and the principles of 
Plato. Among them is John Daniel Dadosky, who writes:  
Eliade, in the fashion of the idealist tradition which goes back to Plato, views the 
world dualistically: there is appearance, and there is reality. Reality is 
unchanging, eternal, sacred, and as a consequence meaningful. Appearance is 
inconstant, ephemeral, profane and therefore, meaningless.532 
 
It is this philosophical orientation, then, that provides the context for Eliade to write: 
“When the sacred manifests itself in any hierophany, there is not only a break in the 
                                                 
 
530 For example, when speaking about the difference between the church and a 
common street, Eliade writes: “The threshold that separates the two spaces also 
indicates the distance between two modes of being, the profane and the religious.” 
Ibid., 25. 
531 Plato and Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 518. 
532 John Daniel Dadosky, The Structure of Religious Knowing: Encountering the 
Sacred in Eliade and Lonergan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2004), 105. Dadosky also mentions the places in Eliade’s work where Eliade himself 
recognizes his debt to Plato.  
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homogeneity of space; there is also revelation of absolute reality, opposed to the non 
reality of the vast surrounding expanse.”533 
 In addition to the Platonic conception of the world, the manner in which 
Eliade articulates hierophanies indicates a panentheistic perception of reality.534 In 
describing the manifestation of the sacred, Eliade argues that “by manifesting the 
sacred, any object becomes something else, yet it continues to remain itself, for it 
continues to participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu.”535 In other words, “for 
those who have a religious experience all nature is capable of revealing itself as 
cosmic sacrality . . . the cosmos in its entirety can become a hierophany.”536 This idea 
of the sacred supernatural manifesting itself within the natural is the basis for 
panentheistic conceptions of the world and has implications toward how God relates 
to humanity. If the temple is understood according to the terms and philosophical 
principles Eliade sets forth, then it represents “an opening in the upward direction 
and ensures communication with the world of the gods.”537 This conception subverts 
the textual presentation of the temple that supports a downward movement from 
God in heaven to people. 
                                                 
 
533 Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 21. 
534 Panentheism, in short, is “the incarnational presence of the divine in 
embodied reality.” Jane Erricker, Cathy Ota, and Clive Erricker, Spiritual Education: 
Cultural, Religious, and Social Differences, New Perspectives for the 21st Century 
(Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2001), 96. 
535 Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 12. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid., 25–26. 
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 An evaluation of the text as it presents itself to the reader indicates—
beginning with the voice from the heavens that is heard in the world—a proximity 
between heaven and earth without the essential dichotomy between sacred and 
profane that stems from a Platonic conception of reality. In the Hebrew text of 
Exodus, the object of sanctification provides insight into the discussion, since space 
(Exod 3:5), time (Exod 16:23; 20:11), people (13:2), and even God himself can be 
objects of sanctification (if Num 20:12 is taken into consideration). Thus, a proper 
evaluation of how the text presents the idea of sacredness without the extrabiblical 
philosophical principles that shape current studies of the issue is necessary.538  
 After examining the basic premises within Eliade’s understanding of sacred 
space—premises that influence the interpretation of Exodus—I will turn my 
attention to the work of Clements, which is also commonly referenced in the 
scholarly understanding of sacred space. While Eliade’s work is indebted to Platonic 
cosmology, the work of Clements centers on ANE reconstructions to articulate the 
understanding of sacred space. Clements writes: “To obtain an understanding of the 
immediate background of Israel’s religion, with its ideas of divine presence, it is 
instructive to examine closely the ideas of the divine dwelling-places which were 
current in Canaanite mythology.”539 Furthermore, he states that “the religion of 
Canaan undoubtedly formed a strong and persistent influence upon the Israelite 
                                                 
 
538 Perhaps such a study would begin by rejecting the Platonic assumption that 
the world or matter is evil, or profane. The world is good, and within this good world 
the divine manifests itself. Sacredness cannot be defined in contrast to the profane, 
but with the biblical assumption that creation is good. 
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tribes, and its sanctuaries provided an environment of vigorous religious activity 
which the Israelites could hardly ignore.”540  
 To evaluate the text in the context of the ANE is not problematic. Yet how 
and to what extent these sources are used to explain the text could become 
problematic. To deny the significance of the ANE context in the formation of the 
book of Exodus is naive. Yet to assert that the main sources from which to 
understand the significance and theology of the sanctuary and sacred space are 
extrabiblical ANE sources is to depart from the pointers in the text itself. One 
representative of those who see this intimate relation between the ANE theological 
import and the biblical temple is John H. Walton. For Walton, the ANE sources 
provide the key to understand the nature and function of the temple. Walton writes:  
When Israel was instructed to build the tabernacle, and thus define sacred space, 
ancient Near Eastern concepts were behind the entire undertaking, and they gave 
shape to the theology of sacred space. The orientation toward the east, the 
centering of the most important objects, the creation of zones of increasing 
sacredness, the ideas about what materials would be most appropriate to sacred 
space, and the rules for access to sacred space—all these draw heavily from the 
ancient Near East and comprise the theology of the temple.541 
 
In this sense, what determines the meaning of the temple, its nature and function, is 
both the text and a deep correlation of ANE sources. 
                                                 
 
539 Clements, God and Temple, 4. 
540 Ibid., 11. 
541 John H. Walton, “Ancient Near Eastern Background Studies,” in 
Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al. 
(London: SPCK, 2005), 42. For an example of a more balanced relation between 





Sacred space in the interpretation of Exodus 
 
 The work of Eliade and Clements provides at least two ways to understand 
sacred space: through a Platonic cosmology with possible panentheistic implications, 
and through a close relation between ANE sources and the text. These two 
approaches are commonly seen in commentaries on the book of Exodus.  
 Signs of a Platonic understanding of the world influencing the interpretation 
of Exodus can be traced as early as the formation of the LXX. The subjective 
influence upon the text as it relates to the interpretation of words and concepts is also 
known as theological tendenz, or theological tendency. Staffan Olofsson defines this 
theological influence or “exegesis” of the translator as the “interpretation of a phrase 
or a term in the Hebrew that is at variance with the literal meaning.”542 This tendency 
in interpretation—one that was highly influenced by the effects of Hellenization on 
culture and thinking—can be noticed in the interpretation of the verb ׁשכן (“to dwell”) 
in the book of Exodus by LXX translators. Since the idea of the divine God dwelling 
with man is difficult to harmonize with a Platonic conception of the world, 
translators intentionally changed the meaning of the word in order to fit their 
conceptions of reality. Table 6 illustrates the point.  
                                                 
 
Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005). 
542 Staffan Olofsson, God Is My Rock: A Study of Translation Technique and 
Theological Exegesis in the Septuagint (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 
1990), 2.  
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Table 6. Translations of ׁשכן 
 






Exod 24:16   ן ֵֹ֤ וַּיְִשכ
ר  ַ֣ ל־הַּ ְכבֹוד־יְהוָּה   עַּ
י  ִסינִַּ֔
καὶ κατέβη ἡ 
δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ 
ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος τὸ 
Σινα 
And the glory of 
the Lord dwelt 
on mount Sinai. 
And the glory of 
God came down 
upon mount 
Sinai. 
Exod 25:8   י ׂשּו ִלֵ֖ ָ֥ ְועָּ
י  נְִתֵ֖ כַּ ש ְושָּ ָּ֑ ִמְקדָּ
ֶּֽם   ְבתֹוכָּ




And they will 
build for me a 
sanctuary, so 
that I may dwell 
in their midst. 
And you will 
make me a 
sanctuary and I 
will appear 
among you. 
Exod 29:45  ַ֣י ֹוְך ְבנ  י ְבתֵ֖ נְִתִ֔ כַּ ַ֣ ְושָּ
ל ָּ֑ א   יְִׂשרָּ
καὶ 
ἐπικληθήσομαι ἐν 
τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραηλ 
And I will dwell 
in the midst of 
the children of 
Israel. 





Exod 29:46    י ֲאִנֵ֤י יְהוָּה ְויְָּד֗עּו ִכַ֣
ר  ם ֲאש ֶ֨ יה ִ֔ ה  ֱאלַ֣
ץ  ר  ָ֥ א  ם מ  ָ֛ אִתי אֹתָּ ֵ֧ הֹוצ 
ְכִנַ֣י  יִם ְלשָּ ֵ֖ ִמְצרַּ
ם ָּ֑  ְבתֹוכָּ
καὶ γνώσονται ὅτι 
ἐγώ εἰμι κύριος ὁ 
θεὸς αὐτῶν ὁ 
ἐξαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς 
ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου 
ἐπικληθῆναι 
αὐτοῖς 
And they will 
know that I am 
the Lord their 
God who 
brought them 
from the land of 
Egypt so that I 
will dwell in their 
midst. 
And they will 
know that I am 
the Lord their 
God who 
brought them 
forth out of the 
land of Egypt to 
be called upon by 
them. 
Exod 40:35    ה לָּבֹוא ל מֹש ֗ ַֹ֣ ְולא־יָּכ
ד ִכֶּֽי־ ל מֹוע ִ֔ ה  ַֹ֣ ל־א א 








αὐτὴν ἡ νεφέλη 
And Moses was 
not able to enter 
into the tent of 
meeting because 
the cloud dwelt 
over it. 
And Moses was 














Moisés Silva illustrates the context of LXX translators well as he writes that “in 
making linguistic decisions, translators had no choice but to rely upon the exegetical 
traditions of their day,”543 namely, the Alexandrian method of exegesis.544 Modern 
interpreters of Exodus do not break from the philosophical categories that create a 
dichotomy between sacred and profane in the articulation of sacred space in the 
context of the ANE background. In commentaries on Exodus, the idea of the 
tabernacle as the actual dwelling of God is undermined by both philosophical 
commitments and reliance upon ANE sources as a key to understand it.  
 Dozeman and Jacob Milgrom follow the insights of Eliade in this manner. 
Dozeman writes that the “descent of God into the tabernacle and the approach of the 
priestly representatives into the tent of meeting bridge the gap between the sacred 
and the profane, which was not possible during the original theophany on Mount 
Sinai.”545 Jacob Milgrom follows a similar dynamic in asserting that the entrance of 
God and the entrance of humans are different based on the same categories.546  
                                                 
 
543 Karen H. Jobes and Moisés Silva, Invitation to the Septuagint (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2000), 92. 
544 For more on the historical roots and Platonic philosophy of Alexandrian 
exegesis, see David S. Dockery, Biblical Interpretation Then and Now: Contemporary 
Hermeneutics in the Light of the Early Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1992); Maren 
R. Niehoff, Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria (Cambridge, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
545 Dozeman, Exodus, 599. Such an idea bypasses the theophany at Sinai in 
Exod 3, and the reality that Mount Sinai also has grades of holiness, like the 
sanctuary.  




 Apart from the explicit use of an ontological dichotomy between the sacred 
and the profane, other scholars opt to deny the literalness of the Sinai theophanies or 
the idea of an actual divine dwelling in a place. As indicated in the previous chapters, 
the negation of any literal component in the description of the theophany leading to 
a spiritualized or analogical reading of the text also stems from a timeless conception 
of Being that stems from a Platonic ontology. As an example, Sarna writes that “the 
sanctuary is not meant to be understood literally as God’s abode.”547 Meyers shares a 
similar perspective, as she writes that the “idea of the tabernacle as a dwelling may 
be more metaphoric than literal”548 and concludes that it “does not necessarily mean 
that God was believed to be literally or physically present in it.”549 These 
conclusions, again, do not stem from what the text presents in itself, but from 
methodological commitments that assume extrabiblical philosophical categories.  
 




 The fifth section of the literary structure of Exodus, E (Exod 7:2–13) and E’ 
(Exod 32:31–36:7), presents the reader with an apparent repetition of the previous 
section. As Moses enters Pharaoh’s presence in D and God’s presence in D’, he will 
do so again in E and E’. The two main scenes in this section, then, are: (1) Moses in  
                                                 
 
547 Sarna, Exodus, 158. 




Table 7. E and E’ textual notes 
 
E. Pharaoh’s Building Project without 
Shabbat: God’s Command and Pharaoh’s 
Second Disobedience (Part II) (7:2-13) 
Eʹ. God’s Building Project with Shabbat: 
God’s Command and People’s Obedience 
(Part II) (32:31–36:7) 
• Moses and Aaron enter Pharaoh’s 
presence (7:2a) 
 
• God’s command to let the Israelites go, 
and prediction of judgments upon Pharaoh 
for disobedience (7:2b–4) 
 
 
• Egyptians will know that YHWH is the 
Lord (7:5) 
 
• God reveals His power to Pharaoh: sign of 
























• Pharaoh’s response (disobedience): heart 
hardened after second chance to obey 
(7:13) 
 
PHARAOH’S DISOBEDIENCE LEADS 
TO WHAT FOLLOWS: DE-CREATION 
THROUGH PLAGUES 
• Moses intercedes in God’s presence (32:31-
34) 
 
• God’s command for Israel to remove their 
ornaments, with Israel under judgment for 
disobedience (God’s presence no longer in 
their midst); Israel obeys (32:35–33:11) 
 
• Moses longs to know YHWH more 
intimately (33:12–17) 
 
• God reveals His glory/goodness/name to 
Moses (33:18–34:9) 
 
• Covenant re-established and renewed 
chance of obedience (34:10–36:1) 
 
• Emphasis on God’s initiative: “I will do” 
(34:10) 
 
• Cultic “Decalogue” with emphasis on 
worship, Shabbat, and sanctuary (34:11–26) 
 
• God commands Moses to write down 
these words and closing remarks (34:27-28) 
 
• Moses’ face shines on the way down 
(34:29-35) 
 
• Moses assembles the people and says the 
commands of God: 
a. Shabbat (35:1–3) 
b. Contributions of different materials, 
spices, and oils (35:4–9) 
c. Convocation of skillful men (35:10–19) 
 
• People’s response (obedience): people bring 
contribution and are restrained from 
bringing more (35:20–36:7) 
 
OBEDIENCE OF PEOPLE LEADS TO 





the presence of Pharaoh and God; and (2) what results from this meeting. 
 As indicated above, the first scene in E and E’ is similar to the beginning of D 
and D’. In the previous section a command is given to both Pharaoh and Israel, and 
both Pharaoh and Israel disobey God’s commands. In E, Moses appears in the 
presence of Pharaoh once again, with a renewed chance for obedience. This renewed 
chance for obedience appears in the repetition of the original command to let the 
people go in Exod 7:2. In order for Pharaoh and Egypt (Exod 7:5) to know (ידע) 
God, the second command is given with a revelation of the power of God through 
signs (Exod 7:6-12). E ends with Pharaoh’s response to the renewed chance for 
obedience and the signs: disobedience indicated by a hardened heart (Exod 7:13).  
 Like D’, E’ begins with Moses in the presence of God once again after the 
disobedience of the people in the episode of the golden calf. Moses enters the 
presence of God to intercede for the people, causing God to give the people a 
renewed chance for obedience. Like Pharaoh, the people also receive a revision of 
the original command given to them. In this context God reveals himself to Moses, 
who, unlike the Egyptians, is willing to know (ידע) God (Exod 33:13). Exodus 34 
revises many of the legislative elements seen throughout the book already, along with 
the ordinances that would provide the people with rest (Exod 34:11-26 and 35:1-3).550 
Moses assembles the people and speaks as God told him to. The speech that begins 
                                                 
 
550 The discrepancies between E and E’ are due to the fact that God’s 
commands to Israel in the context of the covenant were significantly more detailed 
than God’s command to Pharaoh. The revision of the commands seen in E’ has no 
counterpart in E because the context of the God-human relation is different.  
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in Exod 35 includes a renewed convocation of skillful Israelites who will work on 
God’s building project. Like E, E’ ends with a renewed opportunity for obedience. 
Unlike Pharaoh in D and E, Israel obeys God in E’ (Exod 35:20–36:7). The chapter 
ends with the people willingly obeying the word of God through Moses and 
contributing to the construction of the sanctuary.  
 The significance of this section to a possible construction of the God-human 
relation in the book of Exodus is that Pharaoh’s and Israel’s responses in E and E’ to 
the commands of God shape what happens next in the book. Pharaoh’s disobedience 
to God’s command to liberate the Israelites (implying life) leads into the undoing of 
creation in F. At the same time, Israel’s obedience to the commands of God (also 
implying life from the seven stages in which the commands were given) leads into 
the re-creation of the world through the construction of the sanctuary in F’.  
 
God-Human Relation Notes 
 
 Since the previous section focused on the scholarly interpretation of sacred 
space sparked by the text of Exod 25:8, this section will focus on the scholarly 
interpretation of the dynamic between God and Moses on the mountain in the text of 
Exod 33:12–34:8.551 I will begin by assessing something only mentioned indirectly so 
far: the scholarly interpretation of the notion of God’s presence.552  
                                                 
 
551 For a few studies on this particular subject see Dozeman, God on the 
Mountain, and Hauge, Descent from the Mountain. 
552 As indicated before, the theme of presence is crucial in the book of Exodus. 
The book begins with divine absence; then God visits the people, delivers them, and 





Divine presence: God and Moses on the mountain 
 
 Baruch A. Levine is correct in noticing that a “concern with the presence of 
God and his nearness is a major theme”553 in the Hebrew Bible. A brief look at the 
literary structure above proves that this is not different in Exodus, especially in the 
context of chapters 33–34. Childs writes about the divine presence in these chapters, 
“The most definite thing which one can say is that all these stories revolve about the 
one theme of God’s presence.”554  
 The concept of God’s presence is introduced—not for the first time in the 
book, but in this particular section—in Exod 32:34. After the sin of Israel with the 
golden calf, God tells Moses that he will send an angel to go ahead of the people into 
the land, as he promised. This information about the angel going with the people yet 
without divine presence is repeated in Exod 33:2-3, causing the people to mourn in 
an act of contrition (Exod 33:4-6).555 The text pauses to insert a note—that is one of 
                                                 
 
possibility of divine absence again, but after Moses’ intercession for the people and 
covenant renewal, the people can enjoy God’s presence again through the 
construction of the sanctuary. Durham correctly observes—yet without the insight 
that the book begins with absence—that Exod 33:17 “is at the very center of the 
composite narrative of Presence-Absence-Presence which provides the theological 
center of Israel’s struggle to belong to Yahweh.” Durham, Exodus, 446. 
553 Levine, “On the Presence of God,” 72. 
554 Childs, Exodus, 585. Dozeman sees two main themes: the divine guidance 
in the wilderness and the revelation of God at the mountain. Dozeman, Exodus, 717. 
And Noth sees that the central theme in the section is the presence of God in the 
midst of the people. See Martin Noth, Exodus: A Commentary (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1962), 253. 
555 Dozeman argues that the stripping away of jewelry here indicates a 
possible divorce between God and the people. Dozeman, Exodus, 722–23. 
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the major issues in the interpretation of this text for the majority of scholars—about 
the tent of meeting, adding the information (Exod 33:11) that God spoke to Moses 
“face to face” (ים נִֵּ֔ ֹ֣ים ֶאל־פָּ נִּ  What follows is the textual presentation of God’s .(פָּ
presence in at least three ways: the significance of the presence of God leading the 
people (Exod 33:12-16), Moses’ request to see the glory (כָּבוד) of God (Exod 33:17–
18), and God’s response to Moses’ request by revealing His name (ם  and actions (ׁש 
for Israel (Exod 33:19–34:8).  
 Childs observes that there are at least two ways in which this text is 
interpreted.556 The first emphasizes that what is being revealed is the essence of 
God,557 while the second emphasizes that what is being revealed are the attributes of 
God. Sarna—favoring the former—writes that the glory (כָּבוד) “often signifies God’s 
self-manifestation, some outward, visible sign of His essential presence,”558 that is, 
not the disclosure of the divine essence itself, but only a sign. This interpretation of 
the text inevitably assumes the impossibility of grasping any essential element of 
God’s being in time or history. What humanity perceives are only signs of something 
beyond human experience. This partial rendering of meaning implies an analogical 
                                                 
 
556 Normally what organizes the interpretative context for these passages are 
the abundant source-critical considerations. I could observe these considerations as 
other signs of the influence of extrabiblical assumptions operating in biblical 
interpretation. But since I have already pointed this out before, I will focus on the 
two alternatives proposed by Childs.  
557 Childs writes that the “classic Jewish and Christian commentators of the 
medieval period were fully agreed that no mortal man can see the essence of God 
and live.” Childs, Exodus, 598. 
558 Sarna, Exodus, 213–14. 
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reading of the text that stems from a timeless conception of reality (analogia entis). 
 Childs correctly equates the attributes of God proclaimed in the text with his 
essential nature: that is, the only way to know the essence of God is through his 
attributes.559 These insights in the text provide a fascinating window into any 
ontological discussion of the divine nature. Again, the text enforces the reality that 
there is no dichotomy between the appearance and acts of God and his essence and 
nature. In this sense, the text creates a condition in which any timeless conception of 
Being—that implies the manifestation of God’s presence through fire, glory, and 
name as “signs” of a timeless reality—becomes incompatible with the text itself. 
What the text indicates once again is the unified perspective of God’s nature and 
actions in the context of his movement with the people in history and time. There is 
no dichotomy between appearance and reality; the appearance is the reality. God’s 
actions for the people are a window into his being.  
 Another point about divine presence must be made here. The breaking of the 
covenant in Exod 32 implies that the people no longer adhere to the stipulations that 
allow God to be present among them and act for them, leading God to present them 
with the threat of absence. Durham correctly observes, in regard to the significance 
of divine presence, that “the people had somehow not realized this until they were 
under the prospect of Yahweh’s Absence; then it became all too terribly clear, and 
they were overwhelmed by bitter grief.”560 To break the covenant implies living 
                                                 
 
559 Childs, Exodus, 596. 
560 Durham, Exodus, 447. 
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without the presence of a God who is present and acts in and through the covenant 
relationship. Anxiety about the divine absence in their bondage in Egypt would turn 
into anxiety about the divine absence in their bondage to sin. So, once again, in the 
narrative the significance of divine presence is attested in a situation where divine 
absence is a real possibility.  
 To conclude this brief evaluation of the scholarly interpretation of divine 
presence, it is significant to point out that the influence of extrabiblical 
presuppositions in biblical interpretation does not imply that biblical scholars are 
constantly aware of them in their work. As noted in this section, several biblical 
scholars are able to grasp what the text is saying without inferring any extrabiblical 
categories to interpret it. Yet this volatile interpretative environment only enhances 
the fact that philosophical presuppositions within exegetical methods and within the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars are unaccounted for in the process 
of interpretation.  
 




 The sixth section of the literary structure of Exodus, F (Exod 7:14–12:32) and 
F’ (Exod 36:8–40:33), presents the reader with at least two different scenes: (1) the 
result of Pharaoh’s second disobedience (de-creation through the plagues) and the 
result of Israel’s obedience (re-creation through the construction of the sanctuary); 
and (2) the specifications for the Passover (symbol of Israel’s deliverance from Egypt) 




Table 8. F and F’ textual notes 
 
F. De-Creation through Plagues (which 
include other commands in the context of 
disobedience) and Preparation for 
Deliverance from Egypt (7:14–12:32) 
Fʹ. Re-Creation through Tabernacle 
(which include other commands in the 
context of obedience) and Preparation for 
Deliverance from Sin (36:8–40:33) 
• Plague 1 (Water into Blood) (7:14-25) 
 
• Plague 2 (Frogs) (8:1-15) 
 
 
• Plague 3 (Insects) (8:16-19) 
 
• Plague 4 (Flies) (8:20-32) 
 
 
• Plague 5 (Cattle Die) (9:1-7) 
 
 
• Plague 6 (Boils) (9:8-12) 
 
 
• Plague 7 (Hail) (9:13-35) 
 
 
• Plague 8 (Locusts) (10:1-20) 
 
 
• Plague 9 (Darkness) (10:21-29) 
 
 
• Intro to Plague 10 (Death of Firstborn) (11) 
• Construction Step 1 - Curtains (36:8-19) 
 
• Construction Step 2 - Boards, Sockets, and 
Veil (36:20-38) 
 
• Construction Step 3 - The Ark (37:1-9) 
 
• Construction Step 4 - The Table (37:10-16) 
 
• Construction Step 5 - The Lampstand (37:17-
24) 
 
• Construction Step 6 - The Altar of Incense 
(37:25-29) 
 
• Construction Step 7 - The Altar of Burnt 
Offering (38:1-7) 
 
• Construction Step 8 - The Laver of Bronze 
(38:8) 
 
• Construction Step 9 - The Court Items (38:9-
20) 
 
• Construction Step 10 - The Priestly Garments 
(39:1-31) 
 
People finish the work done “according to 
what the Lord had commanded Moses” / 
Moses evaluates the work and blesses them 
(39:32-43) 
• God details the procedure for the Passover 
(symbol of people’s deliverance from 
Egypt): 
 
a. God speaks in the land of Egypt 
(Pharaoh’s Land) (12:1) 
b. First month of the year (hakhodesh) 
(12:2) 
c. Passover instructions (12:2-27a) 
• God details the procedure for the erection 
of the tabernacle (symbol of people’s 
deliverance from sin): 
 
a. God speaks in the desert (No Man’s 
Land) (40:1) 
b. First day of month (hakhodesh) (40:2) 







• The people worship and do according to 
what “the Lord had commanded Moses” 
(12:27b-28) 
• Place of worship established and Moses 
does according to what “the Lord 
commanded Moses” in seven-day pattern: 
 
1. Pillars, sockets, and tent (40:17-19) 
2. Ark of the Testimony (40:20-21) 
3. Table and bread (40:22-23) 
4. Lampstand and light (40:24-25) 
5. Altar of incense (40:26-27) 
6. Veil and altar of burnt offering with 
sacrifice (40:28-29) 
7. Laver of bronze and washing (40:30-32) 
• Conclusion: Plague 10 (Death of Firstborn): 
Pharaoh evaluates the finished work of 
God, obeys, and asks for blessing (12:29-32) 
• Conclusion: Moses finishes the work, erects 
the court and hangs up veil for gateway: 




deliverance from sin). 
 
 In F’ a different dynamic takes place. In contrast to Pharaoh, Israel obeys 
God’s commands at the end of section E’. The people freely give from what they 
have, and the stage is set for the construction of the sanctuary. Because of the 
people’s obedience, the narrative moves into a scene of re-creation. The relation 
between the construction of the sanctuary and the creation has been noted by several 
scholars.561 Already at the beginning of section D’ the reader is able to attest that, like 
                                                 
 
561 See Peter J. Leithart, “Making and Mis-Making: Poiesis in Exodus 25–40,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 2, no. 3 (November 2000): 313; Joseph 
Blenkinsopp, “The Structure of P,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1976): 275–
92; Peter J. Kearney, “Creation and Liturgy: The P Redaction of Ex 25–40,” 
Zeitschrift für die alttestameutliche Wissenschaft 89 (1977): 375–87; Sarna, Exploring 
Exodus, 213–14; Joshua Berman, The Temple: Its Symbolism and Meaning Then and Now 
(Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1995), 14–15; Fretheim, Exodus, 269–71. 
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the creation, the plan to construct the sanctuary unfolds in seven sections ending 
with shabbat (Exod 25:1–31:18),562 and this same seven-stage pattern is seen in the 
inauguration of the sanctuary in Exod 40:17-32.563 In F’, paralleling the undoing of 
creation in F, the construction of the sanctuary takes place in ten different stages. 
Just as in F creation was undone in ten steps because of disobedience, in F’, because 
of Israel’s obedience, it takes ten steps to re-create the cosmos in a wilderness setting. 
 In addition to these parallels, at the end of the undoing of creation in F (Exod 
12:32) Pharaoh asks for a blessing (ברך), and at the end of the redoing of creation in 
F’ Moses blesses (ברך) the people (Exod 39:43).  
 The second scene in this text is marked by specifications for the Passover in F, 
and for the erection of the sanctuary in F’. This parallel emphasizes one of the main 
thematic elements in the book: the Exodus from Egypt and God’s plan to liberate the 
                                                 
 
562 Although I am emphasizing the element of creation in the construction of 
the sanctuary, I am aware that it is not the only thematic element that emerges from 
its presentation in the text. Myung Soo Suh focuses on the military nature of the 
sanctuary and writes that in the construction of the tabernacle “the Israelites form a 
cultic-military community in the wilderness.” Myung Soo Suh, The Tabernacle in the 
Narrative of Israel from the Exodus to the Conquest (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 1.  
563 It is significant to note another parallel between Exodus and the creation 
account here. It is common knowledge that the creation account in Gen 1 is 
organized in a parallel form emphasizing the forming and filling dynamic of 
creation. While the first three days of creation gave form to what had no form, the 
second set of three days filled that which now had form. In Exodus, Bezalel gives 
form to the sanctuary in ten different stages (Exod 36:8–39:31), and Moses walks 
into the sanctuary and fills it with the elements it needs to function (Exod 40:17–32). 
The understanding of the plagues as a war against the deities of Egypt would fit in 
well with such a perspective. One should also keep in mind that the creation 
account—as noted by other scholars—also serves as a polemic against the deities of 
Egypt, so the elements of creation and war/polemic are not mutually exclusive.  
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people from sin through the sanctuary. In both F (Exod 12:2) and F’ (Exod 40:2), the 
expression “the first day” is used (ֶדׁש  shedding even more light on the relation ,(ַהח ֧
between both sections. Ten plagues lead to the demarcation of “the first day” of the 
year, and the ten steps in the construction of the sanctuary lead to the demarcation of 
the “first day” of the month. As indicated earlier, F ends with the conclusion of 
God’s work of de-creation in the death of the firstborn of Egypt (Exod 12:29-32), and 
F’ ends with the final touches upon the sanctuary and the blessing of Moses upon the 
people (Exod 40:33). 
 
God-Human Relation Notes 
 
 There are at least two issues that touch upon the God-human relation in F 
and F’: (1) the way scholars interpret and explain the plagues, and (2) the divine 
movement in the Passover. 
 
Divine action: plagues and Passover 
 
 The section of the plagues beginning in Exod 7:8 is traditionally taken as a 
proper example “on which to demonstrate the role of sources.”564 Yet Childs 
recognizes the insufficiency of source- or form-critical analysis to penetrate the 
meaning of the encounter before Moses and the king as he writes, “It is apparent that 
the essential problem with which we began is not ultimately form-critical in nature, 
                                                 
 
564 Childs, Exodus, 130. Among those who see a unified structure in this 
section is Cassuto, Exodus, 92. 
 
245 
but profoundly theological.”565 As noted so far, God reveals his nature through his 
acts within the covenant toward Moses and Israel. The plagues should not be seen as 
separate from this general idea, for they also reveal the character of a God who 
responds to evil through action.566  
 Yet in this theological setting, the extrabiblical assumptions within the 
presuppositional frameworks of biblical scholars shift their perception of the textual 
indicators of a theological explanation of the plagues. The focus is turned to the 
exegetical elements that would justify the possibility of a natural cause for the 
plagues.567 For example, Pharaoh’s lack of response to the first plague (Exod 7:14-25) 
is interpreted as a “slight exegetical basis for seeing some relation between the 
tradition of the first plague and the natural seasonal reddening of the Nile.”568 
Lawrence Boadt agrees and adds that the “first nine plagues all have natural 
                                                 
 
565 Childs, Exodus, 149. 
566 The actions of God for Israel and for Egypt also carry the intent to impart 
knowledge of God, a knowledge that is sometimes obeyed and sometimes rejected. 
Dru Johnson points out that “in Exodus, we are able to clearly distinguish knowing 
and error from each along several lines: knowers who refuse to listen to the 
authenticated authority and knows who listen yet fail to embody the authority’s 
instructions to the degree required.” Johnson, Biblical Knowing, 65. What this study 
shows so far is that different human reactions to God’s commands lead to different 
divine actions toward humanity and the land. Obedience leads to life; disobedience 
leads to the advancement of death. Once again the flow of the narrative shows its 
dependence upon the creation and fall narratives. For more on the emphasis of 
knowing in Exodus, see Blackburn, God Who Makes Himself. 
567 Fretheim is one scholar who goes beyond the natural/supernatural debate 
and proposes that the plagues represent a hypernatural situation where nature is 
presented in excess. See Fretheim, Exodus, 109. 
568 Childs, Exodus, 154. 
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explanation in conditions found even today in Egypt.”569 Sarna follows this lead and 
asserts that while the possibility of natural causes has been proposed by several 
scholars, the “entire account has a didactic and theological purpose, not a 
historiographic one.”570 The idea that the “J and E authors are responsible for eight 
plagues, and P has added two others”571 as well as the possibility of natural causes 
takes away any realistic reading of the text,572 and inevitably affects the text’s 
theological portrayal of a God of war who acts against the forces of evil in the 
world.573  
 Regarding God’s involvement in the Passover, much can be said. F and F’ 
begin with an emphasis on time. While the Passover marks the beginning of all 
months (Exod 12:2), the tabernacle is to be set up on the first day of the first month 
(Exod 40:2). God’s involvement in and appointment of periods of time in the text 
is—as noted several times in this study—incompatible with the timeless conception 
                                                 
 
569 Lawrence Boadt, Reading the Old Testament: An Introduction (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1984), 167. One of the main proposals for the natural development of 
the plagues is seen in Greta Hort, “The Plagues of Egypt,” Zeitschrift für die 
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 69 (1957): 84–103; 70 (1958): 48–59. 
570 Sarna, Exploring Exodus, 76–77. 
571 Boadt, Reading the Old Testament, 167. 
572 The obvious issue that arises when the natural theory is proposed is that 
without “God’s intervention Moses and Aaron could not have foreseen the coming 
of these disasters with such precision.” Herbert Wolf, An Introduction to the Old 
Testament Pentateuch (Chicago: Moody, 1991), 161. 
573 For more see Thomas B. Dozeman, God at War, 15–24. 
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of God entertained in theological writings.574 Yet apart from the evident 
compatibility between God and time/history, another issue deserves attention at this 
stage.  
 So far I have touched upon conceptions of divine presence and sacred space 
in the context of sanctuary and ritual.575 The focus of this section will be on at least 
                                                 
 
574On the actions of God in history, Neil B. MacDonald correctly observes 
that “Von Rad’s insight that Israel’s foundational experience of YHWH was of a soteriological 
identity implied a historical experience of YHWH acting in their life then and there . . . If one 
looks at Augustine through Anselm and Aquinas to Calvin, one sees that all of them 
presuppose a God acting from eternity predestinating all that was to happen in 
human history from eternity. If Von Rad is right this cannot be the appropriate 
hermeneutical category for the locus of divine action in the life of Israel.” MacDonald adds, 
in the context of Exodus, that the “Exodus narrative is quite clear that God speaks to 
Israel and Moses in particular then and there; the narrative-agent that is God is not 
speaking from eternity.” MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel, xiii, xiv. 
Although MacDonald is right in his observations concerning the actions of God in 
history as portrayed by the text, his solution to make sense of these explicit assertions 
assumes the same philosophical assumptions he criticizes. MacDonald writes: “I 
argue that the witness of the Old Testament, and Old Testament narrative in 
particular, is that YHWH  is essentially a judging yet desisting forbearing self. But 
this God may remain an essentially fictional self, condemned to remain within the 
literary confines of the narrative unless we can find some way for this God to break 
into historical reality.” Ibid., xiv. The dichotomy between the reality presented in the 
text and history—as noted before—co-appears with a timeless interpretation of 
Being: the same framework that allows Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin to construct 
their theology. 
575 Because sacred space was dealt with earlier in the context of sanctuary and 
ritual, in this study the idea of place will be distinguished from it. Craig G. 
Bartholomew argues that “place is part of our lived, everyday experience, whereas 
space, especially in our modern world, is a theoretical concept and as such an 
abstraction from the lived experience of place.” Craig G. Bartholomew, Where Mortals 
Dwell: A Christian View of Place for Today (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 
3. Whether the text supports these distinctions or not is a question for further studies. 
What can be noted at this time is that there is one distinction between the presence of 
God in the context of what scholars call sacred space and in place: in the sanctuary, 
God intends to “dwell” (ׁשכן) with Israel by his own initiative (and not by any 




one example of how extrabiblical assumptions influence the scholarly interpretation 
of God and place. The rationale of divine involvement in the event of the Passover 
(Exod 12:12-13) is expressed by the text through the imagery that God would “go 
through the land of Egypt” (  ְצַריִּם י ְבֶאֶַּֽרץ־מִּ ֹ֣ ַבְרתִּ ם) ”but would “pass over (עָּ ֶכֹ֑ י ֲעל  ֖ ַסְחתִּ  (ּופָּ
those who chose the appointed plan of escape (Exod 12:3-11). As in the beginning of 
the book, the location of divine presence is significant for the Passover to take place.  
 Because of the extrabiblical conception of a timeless God—a conception that 
permeates critical and uncritical commentaries of both Christian and Jewish origin—
scholars vary in their interpretation of how God moves through places. Sarna, for 
instance, to justify the textual portrayal of God’s movement, interprets the “moving 
through” the land as an “anthropomorphism, or ascription to God of human 
activity, in order to make His active Presence in history more vividly and 
dramatically perceived.”576 In other words, because God cannot move in space/place 
due to philosophical commitments established a priori, the way to justify the 
language of the text is through the inference that God is “made” historical by the 
writer through anthropomorphism. The language of the text is made compatible with 
the reality of the reader via the assumption of a biblical writer who “makes” God 
historical.  
 
                                                 
 
places never implies dwelling. In Exod 12, God “moves through” (עבר) the land. The 
former carries the imagery of Bedouin living; the latter, warfare. See Dozeman, 
Exodus, 269. 
576 Sarna, Exodus, 56. 
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The seventh and final section of the literary structure of Exodus, G (Exod 
12:32–13) and G’ (Exod 40:34–38), presents the reader with the transitional point of 
the parallel-panel structure in G and with the conclusion of the book in G’. 
 
 
Table 9. G and G’ textual notes 
 
G. Exodus from Egypt (God with People) 
(12:33–13) 
G’. Exodus from Sin (God with People) 
(40:34-38) 
• Exodus from Egypt: in haste, silver and 
gold, geographical note (Rameses to 
Succoth), mixed multitude, and dateline 
(430 years) (12:33–41) 
• Passover instructions (12:42–51) 
• God asks for the consecration of firstborn 
(13:1–2) 
• Moses speaks of feast of unleavened bread 
(13:3–10) 
• Moses speaks of consecration of firstborn 
(13:11–16) 
 
• Israel begins to journey (nasa`) into the 
wilderness (13:17–20) 
 
• God leads the people onward in a pillar of 
cloud and fire (13:21–22) 
• Israel continues to journey (nasa`) in the 
wilderness (40:37) 
 
• God leads the people onward in a pillar of 





 One of the interesting features of G is the presentation of additional 
information concerning the Passover and laws concerning the consecration of the 
firstborn (Exod 12:42–13:16). In G’ there is no counterpart to these laws. The idea is 
that while the physical deliverance from Egypt is anticipated and celebrated through 
the Passover feast, the final Exodus from sin is never accomplished in G’. The 
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construction of the sanctuary functions as a temporary means to resolve the problem 
of sin and grant the people the privilege of living under the shadow of YHWH. This 
is why both sections end with the same imagery. 
 G ends with Israel “journeying” (נסע) into the wilderness under the protection 
of the cloud (נָּן ׁש) and the fire (עָּ  Exod 13:17-22). G’ ends with the continuation of) (א 
this journey (נסע) and the continual protection of YHWH through the cloud (נָּן  and (עָּ
the fire (ׁש  Exod 40:37-38). The journey continues; the spiritual Exodus from sin is) (א 
much longer than the physical Exodus from Egypt. Yet the people can trust that the 
God who acts through covenant will continue guiding them on. 
 
God-Human Relation Notes 
 
 The final section dealing with how extrabiblical conceptions of the God-
human relation influence the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus 
will focus on the obvious element in this section: the interpretation of the fire and 
cloud as indicators of divine presence.  
 
Divine presence: cloud and fire 
 
 Because of these extrabiblical conceptions, any literal or univocal reading of 
the narrative implies, to say the least, a great degree of naiveté. Sarna explicitly 
addresses the conception that drives the majority of interpretations regarding the 
cloud and fire as personifications of the divine:  
The God of the Hebrew Bible is a Being who transcends the limits of time and 
space, and thus surpasses human imagining. Hence, God’s indwelling Presence 
in the world is symbolized, however inadequately, by the mysterious, intangible, 
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incorporeal elements of fire and cloud. . . . this should always be understood as 
figurative language.577  
 
With this basic premise in mind, one can see at least two ways in which the pillars of 
cloud and fire are interpreted: through a dismissal of the supernatural via source-
critical and literary arguments; or through arguments related to possible natural 
causes. 
 Fretheim writes concerning these unrealistic imageries that the “combination 
of various sources provides a kaleidoscope of images: divine messengers, pillars of 
fire and cloud,”578 and these elements are present in the narrative due to “liturgical 
interests and powerful storytelling skills.”579 Fretheim summarizes his point by 
insisting that “trying to sort it [these depictions of God] out in literal fashion, or 
suggesting that Israel considered the detail to correspond precisely to reality, is like 
retouching Renoir’s paintings to make them look like photographs.”580 In this light, 
the narratives—along with their depictions of God—must be appreciated as works of 
literature with no correspondence to reality.581 Such an inference does not come from 
                                                 
 
577 Sarna, Exodus, 70. 
578 Fretheim, Exodus, 158. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. 
581 M. F. Unger is correct in assessing the situation in Old Testament 
scholarship in the following way: “The critical theory has been deliberately 
fabricated and foisted in Old Testament scholarship to explain away the 
supernatural, whether in revelation, miracle or fulfilled prophecy. This is its 
fundamental error.” M. F. Unger, Introductory Guide to the Old Testament (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1951), 271.  
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any textual unusualness, but from the categories that prevent any possible literal 
reading of God’s actions through fire or cloud, in a world where pillars of cloud and 
fire do not guide people.  
 Yet, as with other texts depicting the supernatural, in addition to the source-
critical or literary dismissal of the supernatural is the explanation of the phenomena 
of the cloud and fire through natural causes. As C. Houtman puts it, “unwilling to 
consider it a product of pure fantasy, they search for the origin of this imagery.”582 
Among these is Noth, who explains the pillar of cloud and fire by way of natural 
causes in the following manner: “The phenomenon of the pillars of cloud and fire 
presumably goes back to observation of an active volcano, to which allusion is 
without a doubt made in the account of the events on Sinai.”583  
 Once again, whether in source-critical/literary arguments or arguments 
pertaining to natural causes, a timeless conception of reality implies that God is 
beyond the realm of space and time, so these images must be taken into 
consideration only if understood as figurative. In other words, the dichotomy created 
by a timeless conception of reality between what appears and what is causes the 
interpretation of what appears to be merely figurative, since it is distinct from reality 
itself.  
                                                 
 
582 C. Houtman, Exodus, Vol. 2 (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok, 1996), 255. For 
other examples of the imagery as fantasy or as a literary feature, see Laura Feldt, The 
Fantastic in Religious Narrative from Exodus to Elisha (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
105. 




 This section attempted to trace the influence of extrabiblical conceptions upon 
the interpretation of the God-human relation presented by the text itself. The chapter 
began by providing the reader with a fresh assessment of the literary structure of the 
book, showing the possible intention of the author/final redactor in organizing the 
material in a parallel-panel structure. From this seven-part structure, issues 
pertaining to the God-human relation were uncovered and the extrabiblical 
influences upon the interpretation of the text laid out. These delimitations and 
conceptions are not final, but provide the ground for the descriptive analysis of the 
God human relation to take place, with an emphasis on the effect of presuppositions 
upon interpretation.  
 Extrabiblical conceptions of the God-human relation influence interpretation 
in varied ways. From a reliance upon the documentary hypothesis and its dissection 
of the text to the use of analogical language to explain the supernatural elements in 
the text, scholars, through method and their own presuppositional frameworks, are 
bound to a conception of the God-human relation that is, many times, foreign to the 
text.  
 Table 10 provides an overview of how textual depictions of the God-human 
relation are reinterpreted through extrabiblical categories. The first column points 
out the issues observed in each of the seven sections; the second column pinpoints 
the actual assumption that guides the interpretation of the particular issues 
mentioned; the third column shows the means by which the assumption operates in 
interpretation; and the final column depicts the effects of such assumptions upon the 
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interpretation of the text.  
 










a. Impossibility of 
unified conception 





a. The text does not 
present a unified depiction 
of a single author, but the 
worldview of several 
authors. God’s actions 
reflect the worldview of the 






conception of reality 
(nature x 
supernature). 
a. Dichotomy between 
Hebrew faith and 
history. 
a. The text does not 
provide a depiction of real 
historical events, only the 
recounting of faith of an 





a. No connection 
between the 
emphasis on 
covenant and divine 
action in different 









via method or 
individual convictions) 
precede theological 
enquiry and shapes it. 
a. Impossibility of a unified 
perspective of the actions 
of God for the people in 
the book. 
 
b. The location of God is 
shaped by an ontology 
foreign to the textual 









a. Israel’s questioning of 
divine presence unrelated 
to the battle of the 
Amalakites. 
Sinai and Law a. Law has no 
divine origin. 




a. Law is understood as 
cultural product with no 
correspondence to reality. 
Sinai and 
Revelation 
a. Impossibility of 
divine 
communication 
between God and 
humanity (timeless 
conception of God). 
a. Phenomenal and 
Noumenal Torah and 
parallel studies with 
Deuteronomy. 
a. The people heard no 
voice and the actual events 
that resulted in the Law are 
untraceable. Textual 












b. Worldview of the 
ANE. 
 
a. Eliade and the 
appropriation of sacred 
and profane language. 
And the use of 
Alexandrian 
hermeneutics to 
determine the veracity 
of biblical language. 
 
b. Clements and the 
reliance on ANE 
sources to reconstruct 
the intention of the 
biblical author. 
a. Biblical conceptions of 
divine presence and ritual 
understood in terms of 
sacred and profane along 
with the assumptions they 
carry. The translation of 
biblical words into words 
that would carry a 
Hellenized conception of 
the world. 
 
b. The text does not depict 
a complex and profound 
conception of the divine 
but a primitive account of 
reality influenced by the 
sources the Israelites had 
in their world. 
Divine 
Presence: God 





a. Translation and 
inference. 
a. The idea of glory and 
presence is understood in 
distinction to the divine 
essence. A temporal sign of 








b. Impossibility of 
divine action in the 
land. 
a. Interpretation of 
plagues through natural 
causes or myth/fiction. 
 
b. Anthropomorphism. 
a. Plagues understood as 
not having occurred as the 
text depicts and given 
meaning either through 
natural explanations of 
their appearance or 
through setting them under 
the context of fiction 
writing.  
 
b. The depictions of God 
are shaped by the creativity 
of the writer as they have 
no correspondence to 










a. Natural causes or 
literary fiction in the 
depiction of divine 
appearance texts. 
a. The cloud and the fire 
are interpreted either 
















 No exegesis or act of interpretation is presuppositionless. Accordingly, this 
study addressed the question of the influence of philosophical presuppositions upon 
the interpretation of the God-human relation in Exodus. Chapter 1 provided a brief 
introduction to why such analysis is necessary. The chapter explored the neglected 
issue of presuppositions in exegesis and why Exodus was an appropriate platform 
upon which to evaluate them. It also presented the purpose and methodological 
approach of this study, namely, descriptive analysis of the text. Chapter 2 addressed 
the philosophical issues behind the conception of the God-human relation, namely 
the notion of ontology (God), the notion of epistemology (human), and the notion of 
history (relationship). Chapter 3 identified these philosophical conceptions in the 
foundation of two interpretative traditions: the historical-grammatical and historical-
critical methods. Chapter 4 traced the influence of these presuppositions within the 
interpretation of Exodus in general, and in the context of the notion of the God-
human relation in particular.  
 At this stage I will provide a brief overview and summary of Chapters 2-4 and 





The God-Human Relation as Presuppositions 
 
 The second chapter of this study was written to introduce the reader to three 
basic presuppositions that are operative in any act of interpretation. I organized these 
presuppositions in what this study calls the God-human relation. The 
presuppositions that make up this structure are ontology (God), epistemology 




I began this section by outlining the context in which interpretation takes 
place, that is, the question of how one attains knowledge and forms meaning. At the 
center of this discussion was the epistemological notion of the subject-object 
relationship. Although tentative, the subject-object relation provided a way to see 
broad historical developments relating to how humanity attains knowledge. Two 
distinct historical transitions were highlighted in this section. The first transition—
one that emphasized an objectivist epistemological perception—focused on the role 
of the object in interpretation as the subject took on a passive role. As for the 
understanding of Being in this period, it was interpreted as timeless and dependent 
upon a Platonic ontology. The second transition—one that emphasized a subjectivist 
epistemological perception—was characterized by a change of emphasis from the 
object to the subject. By understanding the subject differently from its predecessors, 
postmodernity provided the context for the appearance of a temporal and historical 
dimension of reality at the level of the subject. Yet the full implications of this 
transition have not yet been integrated into the understanding of Being.  
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 Some preliminary implications for biblical interpretation within these 
epistemological concerns are in order. Objectivist epistemology created the Platonic 
distinction between subject and object, leading biblical interpretation into a scientific 
age where empirical evidence determined truth and the seemingly “primitive” 
biblical narratives were turned into folklore. The possibility of humanity to 
apprehend any revelation from God if not denied could only be devised in timeless 
categories. In the modern period, this distance between humanity and any notion of 
the divine was extended even more.  
 Subjectivist epistemology placed the human subject upon a new platform 
where time, history, and language implied a relative outlook upon reality as a whole, 
but has yet not extended this temporal ontological flow into the level of the object, 
that is, to the interpretation of Being. The possibility of humanity apprehending any 
revelation from the divine in history—because this change has not been realized—
becomes even more complex. Biblical stories with divine events become records of 
communities of faith who experienced something that can only be experienced as 




The second section of this chapter addressed how ontological premises 
influence interpretation of what a text is and of the God who acts within the text. 
Emphasis was given to the concept of timelessness and how it carries within itself 
two basic assumptions that influence interpretation: the dichotomy between things as 
they appear and things as they are, and the understanding of Being as timeless. The 
immediate consequence of assuming a timeless conception of Being is the 
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dichotomized perception of appearance and reality. As indicated in this study, both 
liberal and conservative scholars assume such an ontology. The examples of 
Bultmann and Vanhoozer showed how scholars wrestle with this dichotomy in 
interpretation. While on the one hand Bultmann interpreted the mythological divine 
acts in the text through a scientific and existential approach, on the other Vanhoozer, 
explained the divine acts within the parameters of speech-act theory. The ontological 
conception of timeless Being, then, directly affects not only interpretation, but how 
scholars perceive God and his actions. This section also provided a few alternative 




The third and final section of this chapter dealt with the locus in which God 
interacts with humanity: history. It began by noting how, at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, historians departed from a pre-critical approach to the text and 
embraced a scientific approach along with its macro-hermeneutical commitments. By 
the twentieth century, these conceptions were, to some extent, left behind due to the 
turn to the subject. During this transition, there was an emphasis on the fact that the 
historian was not exempt from biases and assumptions. History was then perceived 
as a biased reconstruction of historical events. This period brought forth the 
approach known as historiography, which in turn was also not exempt from macro-
hermeneutical influences.  
 The analysis of the principle of history also shed light on the implications of 
scientific presuppositions concerning the nature of history for biblical interpretation 
in general and the book of Exodus in particular. From this analysis I was able to 
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outline how the distinction between fact and faith is still prevalent in the 
interpretation of Exodus. This reality allows for the gap between the assumptions of 
the interpreter and of the biblical writer/audience to be widened, since the biblical 
record only points to what the writers believed, exempt of any revelation. In order 
for biblical scholarship to remain a scientific discipline, these assumptions cannot be 
left behind.  
 The uncovering of the presupposition of the God-human relation—a notion 
operative in the presuppositional frameworks of interpreters—provided the content 
to be traced throughout the subsequent chapters of this study. Once it was 
uncovered, this study attempted to trace the presupposition within interpretative 
traditions (Chapter 3) and within the interpretation of Exodus (Chapter 4).  
 
Presuppositions in Interpretative Traditions 
 
 The third chapter of this study, as noted earlier, attempted to trace the 
philosophical presuppositions concerning the God-human relation within two 
interpretative methods: the historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods. 
This analysis examined the formative periods of each method, focusing on 
representative examples who influenced the methods’ conception.  
 
The Historical-Grammatical Method 
 
The analysis of the method was divided into two main parts. The first dealt 
with the principle of history (as well as the relation between text and meaning) and 
the second with the principle of ontology. The first section pointed out how in the 
formative periods of the method, and through the work of Ernesti, the grammatical 
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method developed with an emphasis upon philology. No role was given to the reader 
apart from the rigorous application of the philological approach. What this indicates 
is that the mindset of the time followed classical epistemology, where the subject is 
passive in the generation of meaning. Although Ernesti understood the grammatical 
method as one interpretative action—that is, the grammatical is the historical—
interpreters after Ernesti understood the method as two interpretative actions—a 
grammatical as well as a historical. As noted earlier, what this implies is that, in 
time, the influence of historical criticism grew and immersed itself in a grammatical 
approach that was volatile enough to incorporate any presupposition into its 
application. The second section dealt with the principle of ontology. Because the 
words of the text (verba) were signs pointing to a truth or reality within the text (res), 
in the end, the words themselves became disposable. Regardless of the way in which 
the grammatical method is used, this interpretative context created by Platonic 
categories of reality remains.  
 
The Historical-Critical Method 
 
The explicit use of philosophical presuppositions within the formation of 
what is today known as historical criticism began with the work of Spinoza. Spinoza 
did not create the historical-critical method, but created the necessary principles 
upon which it would function. Among these principles are: (1) the primacy of reason 
(as primary source) over the biblical text, ruling out by default any supernatural 
elements such as divine voices, miracles, and theophanies, as well as any connection 
between textual depictions of reality and reality itself; (2) the dichotomy between 
Scripture (ethical piety) and philosophy (truth); (3) the dichotomy between the words 
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of man (subject to imagination) and the word of God (conceived as the ethical 
content that passes the validation of reason); (4) the general idea that the text and its 
history are a wrapping around the ethical essence, or content. In time, these ideas 
were developed and infused into the general practice of biblical interpretation.  
Another representative scholar mentioned in this section was Julius 
Wellhausen. Wellhausen is an example of those who implemented these ideas into 
interpretation. Along with Spinoza, Wellhausen attempted to affirm that the 
presuppositions given to the reader by the text are false and must be corrected by 
reason through different means. Among the presuppositions that guided the work of 
Wellhausen are: (1) as it pertains to epistemology, the Cartesian principle of doubt 
along with its reliance and dependence on human reason (what is presented in the 
text cannot be accepted at face value); (2) as it pertains to ontology, a timeless 
conception of Being that inevitably creates a dichotomy between text and reality, as 
well as the need for a historical-scientific evaluation of the text. In this sense, the 
interpreted historical principle within the structure of historical criticism is inevitably 
tied to specific philosophical commitments.  
 What this brief evaluation attempted to show was that interpretative 
traditions are not exempt from philosophical commitments, whether the interpreter 
realizes this or not. The manners in which these philosophical assumptions are 
implemented into the formation of these methods are as varied as they are effective. 
 
Presuppositions in the Interpretation of Exodus 
 
 The fourth and final chapter of this study attempted to trace the influence of 
presuppositions relating to the God-human relation upon the interpretation of the 
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God-human relation within the text of Exodus. This descriptive analysis took place 
through an evaluation of the literary structure of Exodus. Knowing that scholars 
generally organize the literary contents of Exodus around thematic/theological and 
geographical markers, this study proposed a fresh evaluation of the intentional 
organization of the book: a parallel-panel structure that emphasized the leadership of 
both Moses and God, as well as God’s actions for Israel in their deliverance from 
Egypt and in their deliverance from sin. This new assessment of the literary structure 
provided the direction for the evaluation of the relation between presuppositions and 
the God-human relation in the text. From the literary structure of Exodus, at least 
ten issues relating to the God-human relation were uncovered. A brief summary of 
the extrabiblical philosophical presuppositions that influence the scholarly 
interpretations of these issues are in order. 
 
The Relation between Genesis and Exodus 
 
The first issue attempted to show that while the text points to a possible 
unified continuation—literary and philosophical—between Genesis and Exodus, the 
assignment of different sources to the ending of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus 
points in another direction. The philosophical conceptions that lead to the 
impossibility of a unified conception of God’s action as presented in the text enter 
interpretation via the documentary hypothesis. In the end, under these extrabiblical 
conceptions within the Documentary Hypothesis, the text is not able to present a 
unified depiction of God and his acts from one book to the other. Through the 
Documentary Hypothesis the possibility of a unified conception of God’s relation to 
humanity is exchanged by a fragmented perception of the same notion through the 
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work of several redactors from different sources and contexts. Under these 
assumptions, any possibility of divine revelation implying a unified view of his 
actions in the text, is dismissed. 
 
The Relation between Hebrew Faith and History 
 
The scholarly assumption here is related to the timeless conception of Being 
that leads to the dichotomization of reality. This distinction between what appears 
and what is can also be seen in biblical interpretation concerning the issue of history, 
where there is a radical distance between the written descriptions of the biblical 
authors concerning what happened (based on faith according to biblical scholars) and 
the actual historical processes that took place (dictated by reason). The general 
agreement among scholars is that what happened in history is not what is described 
in the text, since this primitive description was based either on faith or on the 
conflicting agendas of redactors from different time periods. The possibility that the 
biblical author presents a realistic perception of the events—including the 
supernatural elements—is negated. Scientific and sociological insights are favored, 
and the biblical text is filtered through them.  
 
Divine Action: Egypt and Wilderness 
 
At least two assumptions appear regarding this particular issue in the 
interpretation of Exodus: the fragmented perception of divine action from one 
section of the book to another, as well as the influence of onto-theology—the 
precedence of extrabiblical conceptions of Being over the textual description—upon 
interpretation. Because the first issue, concerning the fragmented perception of God’s 
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actions proposed by scholars, is recurrent in this study and has already been pointed 
out above, I will focus here on the precedence of ontology over theology. Because 
philosophical concepts are generally foreign to biblical scholars, the presence of 
philosophical concepts in their work happens via the method of interpretation. 
Because interpretative methods carry concepts of Being in themselves, these concepts 
inevitably shape and condition the results of interpretation. In relation to God’s 
actions in Egypt and in the wilderness, the idea of the location of God and the 
possibility of his actions in history as they are depicted in the text are changed by an 
ontology not portrayed by the text. Thus, while the text depicts an action of God, the 
possibility and theological implications of the action are shifted by inferences that 
change the question of “what it means.” The text might say that God acted in this or 
that way, but what it means is inferred from the assumptions carried into 
interpretation via method.  
 
Israel’s Rebellion: Wilderness 
 
Once again, the issue here is the fragmented perception of the text brought 
about by the use of the documentary hypothesis. To develop a theology or 
philosophy of God’s actions following the insight of biblical scholars in general 
would create a problem. In this case, Israel’s questioning of the guidance and 
presence of God in the wilderness would have no relation to the description of the 
battle of the Amalekites that follows the questioning. Because the relation of human 
choice, the flow of the narrative, and God’s actions are intimately related in Exodus, 
depending on scholarly insights seems problematic to develop a unified conception 
of God’s relation to humanity, a conception seemingly favored by the arrangement 
 
266 
of the text.  
 
Sinai and Law 
 
The denial of the supernatural that takes place both in the presuppositional 
frameworks of biblical scholars and in the formation of their methodologies leads to 
the conclusion that the laws given in the different sections of Exodus and especially 
at Sinai have no divine origin. This extrabiblical assumption places a filter on the text 
and infers understanding from outside of it. While the text depicts God speaking to 
Moses, the elders, and the people in the giving of the law, the scholarly conclusions 
are reached through different means. A reliance upon ANE sources and the general 
principles of historical criticism have led to scholars seeing the law as a product of 
nomadic people, of priests with varied and conflicting agendas, with no 
correspondence to reality or to the modern-day reader. The historical-critical mindset 
determines beforehand what can and cannot be realistic in interpretation and in the 
text, and with this basic structure formed, any difference in viewpoint in the text or 
any apparent contradiction is used to favor their basic assumptions, never to present 
a nuanced understanding of God’s relation to humanity or even to challenge the 
assumptions themselves.  
 
Sinai and Revelation 
 
Following the issue above, a timeless conception of Being makes any 
communication between God and humanity impossible, at least not on the terms the 
text sets forth. This assumption becomes visible in interpretation when notions such 
as the phenomenal and noumenal Torah are introduced in scholarship, leading to a 
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dichotomized conception of revelation and the law itself. The assumption behind the 
interpretation of Sinai—based on a timeless conception of Being—leads to the idea 
that Israel could not have heard any voices, and that the actual events that led into 
the giving of the law are untraceable. The textual depiction of how the law was 
formed is, according to some scholars, incomplete. The gaps in the narrative created 
by denial of the supernatural are filled, in interpretation, through inferences 
influenced by ANE cultural/sociological reconstructions that radically depart from 




The timeless conception of reality is operative in some scholarly work relating 
to the notion of sacred space. As noted earlier, a good number of scholars rely upon 
the work of Eliade in their appropriation of the concepts of sacred and profane. At 
the same time, a good number of scholars see the worldview presented in the text as 
strictly related to the ANE context of the writers, as seen in the work of Clements 
and many others. While this assumption is not completely wrong, the problem arises 
when the supernatural is excluded and the text has no divine counterpoint justifying 
its unified perception of reality and God’s relation to humanity. The result is that 
biblical conception of divine presence and ritual are understood in terms of the 
extrabiblical assumptions within the work of Eliade and others. These ideas place a 
grid upon the text. This problem was also seen in the LXX, where Alexandrian 
hermeneutics shaped the very translation of the Hebrew words related to divine 
presence into words that would be compatible with their worldview. So interpreters 
shift the worldview of the text—along with its divine insights given through 
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revelation—to either the worldview of translators who shifted the language to a 
realistic portrayal of reality as they saw it, or to the worldview of the biblical 
redactors themselves (primitive and based on ANE reconstructions).  
 
Divine Presence: God and Moses on the Mountain 
 
The texts that point directly to the divine and human relation in Exodus are 
crucial to trace the influence of presuppositions in their interpretation. The episode of 
God and Moses on the mountain in Exodus 33–34 is no different. In texts depicting 
a divine manifestation of power, glory, or presence, the influence of a timeless 
conception of Being is clearer than in other instances. In this particular context, some 
scholars’ interpretations of the manifestation of the glory of God set forth the idea 
that the glory and presence in time and before Moses are distinct from the divine 
essence. What appears in the text is not as it is in reality; the manifestation of the 
glory is a temporal sign of a timeless reality. These presuppositions can be seen in the 
biblical interpretations of some scholars. The preeminence of ontology over theology 
is once again noticeable.  
 
Divine Action: Plagues and Passover 
 
As mentioned earlier, whenever the biblical text depicts explicit supernatural 
actions of God, the influence of presuppositions is just as explicit. In the context of 
the textual depiction of the plagues, at least two assumptions are operative: the 
impossibility of divinely intended supernatural actions as well as the impossibility of 
divine action in the land. Both of these assumptions are motivated by a timeless 
conception of Being and a scientific perception of reality. These assumptions lead 
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some interpreters to interpret the plagues differently from the textual pointers, 
favoring natural causes or the creation of myths to explain the meaning that the text 
is attempting to convey. In regard to God’s presence in the land during the Passover, 
because of the same assumptions, scholars point to the use of anthropomorphism to 
provide intelligibility to the textual descriptions. In this sense, the actions of God are 
shaped by the creativity of the writers and have no connection to the historical 
processes themselves or reality as a whole. 
 
Divine Presence: Cloud and Fire 
 
The parallel-panel structure of Exodus ends on both sides with a presentation 
of divine guidance through the cloud and fire. As in the case of the plagues, these 
supernatural appearances are explained through the means of natural causes or 
literary fiction/myth. These explanations are given at the backdrop of an ontology 
foreign to the biblical text. Because a timeless conception of Being creates a 
dichotomy between what appears and what is, the analogical understanding of the 
textual content leads, as pointed out earlier, to unintelligible analogy. The biblical 
interpreter understands what appears through the description of the text, but because 
the interpreter has no access to its timeless correspondent, the interpreter resorts to 
scientific arguments in the flow of history and time to justify its meaning. In the 
majority of cases, interpreters draw the meanings of supernatural actions such as the 
plagues, God’s presence, and the appearance of cloud and fire from conditions set 
forth by science, reason, and the reconstructed worldview of ANE people.  
 Now that a general overview of the ideas set forth by this study has been 
presented, I would like to end this study by addressing the implications of its findings 
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for scholarship and life. 
 
Implications for Scholarship and Life 
 
 In these concluding lines, I will attempt to outline some implications of this 
study for scholarship and life, beginning with scholarship. This study traced the 
philosophical presuppositions relating to the God-human relation (ontology, 
epistemology, and history) that directly influence interpretation, be it from the 
interpreter’s experience or methodology. What can be perceived within each of the 
chapters is that while the text is attempting to convey a picture of the God-human 
relation, the philosophical principles that shape interpretation prevent readers from 
seeing that presentation as real for different reasons. 
 This problem raises the old question of the relation between philosophy and 
the Bible. Because the Bible has been knowingly or unknowingly historically subject 
to philosophy—and more recently science—its philosophical content and weight is 
undermined. Yet this study indicates that a healthy movement between philosophy 
and biblical interpretation should be to: (1) allow philosophy, the human subject, or 
the biblical text to ask the questions; (2) allow the biblical text, with its own wording, 
to shape, validate, or reject the philosophical questions themselves. In this way, the 
control is found in the textual presentation and not in an extrabiblical philosophical 
scheme applied to the text. This approach assumes that the only reliable source of 
information, or window into reality itself, is found in the biblical text.  
 While a proper implementation of this approach would be the object of 
another project, this study does attest that the text presents a philosophical picture of 
the God-human relation that is unattainable in much of scholarly interpretation 
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because of conflicting conceptions of the God-human relation based on extrabiblical 
categories. Methodologically speaking, interpretation is bound to depart from the 
text once its conceptions about a particular topic are interpreted through an 
extrabiblical lens.  
This study ends with a question: what would biblical interpretation, or the 
uncovering of a biblical philosophy, look like if the text had foundational 
preeminence over the human subject? It is in this intersection of philosophy, text, 
and interpreter that this study merges into the realm of existence. Choosing to let go 
or suspend one’s conception of reality is more than a methodological task: it is an 
existential choice. As in the narrative of Exodus, human choice changes the flow of 
the story. Perhaps the history of biblical interpretation still has a few chapters to go 
before it makes this leap of faith into the uncharted territory of the philosophy of the 
Hebrew writers. This philosophy, as mentioned earlier, carries the results of human 
rational and artistic powers as well as the element that makes biblical philosophy the 
authoritative source of information: revelation. The author’s conception of reality is 
informed by revelation and developed through reason. To allow the biblical authors 
to address the philosophical questions of past and contemporary times is the 
challenge. Yet, for that meal to be served, the tables must first be rearranged and 
cleaned.  
 This study concludes, then, with the merging of the academic and existential 
tasks in one question: what would biblical interpretation, or the uncovering of a 
biblical philosophy, look like if the text had a foundational preeminence and priority 
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